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ABSTRACT 
 This Dissertation proposes the application of rarely-used epistemological and 
scientific lenses to the works of four authors spanning two centuries: Honoré de Balzac, 
Émile Zola, Raymond Queneau, and Michel Houellebecq. Each of these novelists 
engaged closely with questions of science and epistemology, yet each approached that 
engagement from a different scientific perspective and epistemological moment. In 
Balzac’s La Peau de chagrin, limits of determinism and experimental method tend to 
demonstrate that there remains an inscrutable yet guided excess in the interactions 
between the protagonist Raphaël and his enchanted skin. This speaks to an embodiment 
of the esprit préscientifique, a framework that minimizes the utility of scientific practice 
in favor of the unresolved mystery of vitalism. With Zola comes a move away from 
undefinable mystery to a construction of the novel consistent with Claude Bernard’s 
deterministic experimental medicine. Yet Zola’s Roman expérimental project is only 
partially executed, in that the Newtonian framework that underlies Bernard’s method 
yields to contrary evidence in Zola’s text of entropy, error, and loss of information 
consistent with the field of thermodynamics. In Queneau’s texts, Zola’s interest in current 
  viii 
science not only remains, but is updated to reflect the massive upheaval in scientific 
thought that took place in the last half of the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth 
centuries. If Queneau’s texts explicitly mention advances like relativity, however, they 
often do so in a humorously dismissive manner that values pre-entropic and even early 
geometric constructs like perpetual motion machines and squared circles. Queneau’s 
apparent return to the pre-scientific ultimately yields to Houellebecq’s textual abyss. For 
Houellebecq, science is not only to be embraced in its entropic and relativistic constructs; 
it is these very constructs - and the style typically used to present them – that serve as a 
reminder of the abjection, decay, and hopelessness of human existence. Gone is the 
mystery of life in its totality. In its place remain humans acting as a series of particles 
mechanically obeying deterministic laws. The parenthesis that opened with Balzac’s 
positive coding of pre-scientific thought closes with Houellebecq’s negative coding of 
modern scientific theory.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 In the fifth and final volume of his Hermès series, Michel Serres undertakes his 
own Northwest Passage – an attempt to navigate the ice floes and other hazards of the 
glacier-bound channel between humanities and science sensu stricto. (Serres, Hermès V 
15-18). Through this and other works, Serres explores the resonances of scientific 
thought in a wide range of materials, some without an obvious scientific nexus. He 
plumbs the beginning of Musil’s The Man Without Qualities in support of a mathematical 
reading of the chaotic cityscape as a network of signals characterized by the stochastic 
(Serres, Hermès V 37-38); he interprets Descartes’ discussion of candle wax as evidence 
of a scientist acting as subject upon an object (Serres, Hermès II 86, 107-108); he 
dedicates an entire volume to the traces of science - thermodynamic, especially - 
throughout Zola’s corpus (Serres, Feux et signaux generally).   
In many ways, Serres’ project in Hermès V is not new – science and other fields 
have long drawn on each other for content and inspiration. In the context of the history of 
cellular biology, Georges Canguilhem’s Connaissance de la vie attempts on numerous 
occasions to demonstrate the influence exercised by political theory on scientific 
discovery and conception, and vice versa. (Canguilhem, Connaissance 76-77). For 
example, the human conception of the cell as part of a larger organism, he contends, is in 
some measure a mirror of how political theory views the behavior of the individual in a 
society of other individuals, either as a part among a set of parts or as a part contributing 
to an integral whole. In the field of philosophy, Henri Bergson engages in lengthy 
discussion on the limits of scientific thought – the méthode cinématographique – that can 
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do nothing more detailed than capture concrete snapshots along a path, in the manner of 
Zeno’s paradox. (Bergson L’évolution 272-73, 304-307). Such thought, characteristic of 
the homo faber described by Bergson, is better suited to building with inanimate 
materials than understanding the animate ever subject to devenir and la durée. Bergson, 
of course, was not the first philosopher to consider scientific questions like these. Among 
many others, the already-mentioned Descartes relied on science when importing an 
apparently scientific method of discovery to a search for truth and God in texts such as 
his Méditations and Discours de la méthode; and also developed his own scientific and 
mathematical theories in the dual form of analytical geometry and a mature, if ultimately 
inaccurate, system of mechanics. If Serres’ project of joining science and other critical 
fields is fraught with some peril, then, it is also not without pedigree or precedent.  
Science has not only served as inspiration for the work of philosophers like 
Descartes and Bergson, it also has often entered into close dialogue with literature. As 
Fiction Rivals Science - the title of Allen Thiher’s text on Balzac, Flaubert, Zola, and 
Proust – suggests, advances in various scientific fields has informed the works of 
generations of novelists.  As a backdrop – Balzac’s La recherche de l’absolu chronicles 
the chemical aspirations of a latter-day alchemist as he attempts to discover the 
philosopher’s stone through more modern chemistry-based techniques, and even seems to 
succeed in synthesizing a diamond. Jeoffrin, the main character in Hennique’s La 
Dévouée (and whose name is a likely allusion to Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire), also randomly 
creates his own diamond before pursuing his inventions so doggedly that he ends up 
wasting a fortune and poisoning his own daughter in order to inherit again. Jules Verne, 
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of course, applied the science of his time to imagine how it might exceed its limits – from 
the breathing apparati and electrical systems of the Nautilus and the generativity of 
Lincoln Island to the application of ballistic technology to describe a trip to, and 
subsequently around, the Moon. Beyond science as backdrop or inspiration for literature, 
however, novelists have also blurred the boundaries between the two disciplines in the 
rivalry that Thiher mentions. Goethe notably contributed to the fields of morphology and 
optics, but others have gone so far as to view their literary creation as scientific creation 
as well. Such, in Thiher’s view, is the case of Balzac and Zola, the two authors that will 
be discussed in the first two chapters of this Dissertation. Beyond La recherche de 
l’absolu, Balzac viewed his entire La Comédie Humaine project as a form of zoology 
applied to the classification of human society. He regularly induced and proposed laws of 
a scientific nature governing his characters. In texts like Louis Lambert, Séraphîta, and 
La Peau de chagrin (the latter of which will be reviewed at length here), he attempted to 
stretch and remold the limits of scientific inquiry in his study of the powers of human will 
and the supernatural. Zola, the acolyte of Claude Bernard’s experimental method, viewed 
his novels as a space of scientific determinism, where the text’s development required 
only a knowledge of the laws governing a group and the initial conditions that the 
group’s members confront. A similar rivalry with science, it may equally be argued, 
characterizes the works of Queneau and Houellebecq, whose texts will inform the final 
two chapters of this Dissertation. Queneau, the amateur mathematician and eventual co-
founder of the Oulipo
1
 movement, structured his novels around pre-determined graphs 
                                                        
1
 Oulipo is an abbreviation for the Ouvroir de littérature potentielle, a group of writers known for 
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and equations, engaged in numerological speculation in both modern and traditional 
senses of the term, and confronted the scientific advances of his time. Houellebecq 
continues with this trend in his dual reliance on modern science and modern scientific 
discourse as a tool for developing characters who are often highly scientific themselves. 
Houellebecq’s texts even exceed the boundaries of modern science in their proposal of 
new unifying theories and the establishment of genetic replication to the end of creating 
new (and possibly improved) versions of the human race.            
The dialogue that will be explored here between literature and science is multi-
layered. There is a superficial historical layer matching text and the science of its time in 
lockstep – a simple overlay where change in text reflects change in scientific study. It 
begins with Balzac’s La Peau de chagrin and its decidedly early nineteenth-century take 
on the possibilities of scientific inquiry. At that time, the appropriate limits of scientific 
inquiry remained hazy, particularly at the point of interface between science, on one 
hand, and theology or mysticism, on the other. Xavier Bichat’s vitalist medicine offers 
one example of this ambiguity, where earnest anatomical inquiry shared the same space 
in scientific discourse as undefined and undefinable notions like “life” or “vitality.” This 
inevitable indefinability allowed space for pure speculation of a metaphysical or 
theological sort within scientific communities, despite the substantial advances in 
mechanics already worked by Newton’s laws in the 17th century, the growth of modern 
chemistry most closely associated with Lavoisier in the 18
th
, and improvements in 
zoology and taxonomies developed by Linnaeus and Cuvier, also in the 18
th
, in 
                                                                                                                                                                     
creating works of fiction often based on mathematically-inspired constraints. One of the best 
examples of this practice is Perec’s La disparition, a novel that does not contain the letter e. 
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preparation for the field of biology. While science had experienced certain meaningful 
advancement, it still clung to the vestiges of what Bachelard would call the esprit 
préscientifique (e.g., Bachelard, La formation 48-49), a form of practice that prized 
variety, speculation, and the unconscious over observed variation, a rigorous and 
controlled experimental method, and conscious thought that eschews prejudices 
overvaluing precious metals and jewels. This moment of equipoise between traditional 
and modern science is equally reflected in the earliest theories of evolution just beginning 
to gain traction at the time. Where Linnaeus had proposed a taxonomy of fixed species 
consistent with a single act of divine creation, Lamarck’s early nineteenth-century 
Philosophie zoologique adopted an early form of transformist evolutionary thought, 
whereby animals could propagate to future generations any changes that they had 
achieved during their lives. This enabled a guided, if gradual, accretion of variation in a 
species from generation to generation, as the consistent stretching of a wing to fly more 
effectively in a parent organism led to offspring with larger and stronger wings. If such a 
theory had moved beyond creationist fixity, it had not moved beyond a natural order 
underpinned by divine intervention – the very sort of intervention that could directly 
guide improvements between generations in an endlessly self-perfecting upward spiral.  
In Balzac’s La Peau de chagrin, the orientation of the spiral may be flipped in the 
main character Raphaël’s downward cycle of self-destruction, but the scientific 
obsessions of the text closely track those of the period. The enchanted skin that Raphaël 
comes to possess appears to have a scientifically measurable effect on the life of its 
owner, in that it seems to serve as a cause of both the satisfaction of his desires and the 
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diminution of his health. Yet the skin is repeatedly referred to as a “talisman,” a focal 
point of traditional superstition that operates in the ill-defined vitalist space of life and 
death. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the enchanted skin proves entirely impermeable – literally, 
to water when it is thrown into a well – but also figuratively, as it cannot be tested with 
any scientific rigor to determine its efficacy. Raphaël’s attempts to decipher the skin 
quickly transform from a scientific inquiry into the unknown to a scientific inquiry that 
accepts the unknown as part and parcel of science. The skin, through its necessary 
unknowability, permits a further reading of the text consistent with Lamarck’s 
transformist theories, whereby the skin is a guided, environmental force, a sort of proto-
genetic code operating in terms of the prevailing theories of Balzac’s time.    
The mid-nineteenth century heralded a number of critical scientific advancements 
that would enable the works of Emile Zola to move away from some of the tendencies of 
his literary model Balzac. One such advancement was the growing acceptance of the 
early field of thermodynamics, whose two laws dictate that: 1) energy is neither created 
nor destroyed, but conserved in a system over time, and 2) a closed system will undergo a 
constant increase in entropy, or the tendency towards chaos. The former, in its prohibition 
against new energy, would seem to deny the possibility of active divine intervention, 
while the second law means that a system will suffer an irretrievable loss of energy and 
information over time. A second key advancement contemporaneous to the works of Zola 
was Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection, which marked a departure from its 
Lamarckian predecessor. Where Lamarck posited that changes occurring during the life 
of an organism could pass on to future generations (a theoretical position that Darwin 
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disfavored but did not entirely dismiss), Darwin focused more on environmental selection 
as a means of operating evolution by favoring the reproduction of organisms better 
adapted to their environment. Rather than follow the directly guided process of 
transmission proposed by Lamarck, Darwin’s evolution follows a much slower process of 
advancement limited by the dynamic dialogue between ever-changing generations of 
organisms and their ever-changing environment. Darwin’s process also relies to a greater 
degree on an immutable, if then ill-understood, form of heredity. A final scientific 
advancement that impacted Zola’s work was the early school of experimental medicine 
espoused by Claude Bernard (walking in the footsteps of Newton), wherein the 
physiology and pathology of the human organism could be reduced to a series of entirely 
knowable mechanical and deterministic phenomena. Gone from Bernard’s vocabulary 
were hazy terms like “life” and “vitality”; replacing them was a propounded experimental 
method based on hypothesis and rigorous testing involving manipulation of the naturally 
occurring.  
Zola’s work reflects each of these three developments, particularly in Le Ventre 
de Paris, the text most carefully reviewed in the second chapter of this Dissertation. The 
Paris to which the once-exiled Florent returns is a space of noise and chaos, a network of 
incomplete communications and malicious gossip. It pits the reigning bourgeois class 
referred to as the gras against an outcast of maigres who generally do not hold property 
or manage a business. The boundary between these groups is not a simple question of 
socioeconomic status, however – it is also a question of the control of the information 
constantly flowing throughout the neighborhood. For the gras, information is knowable, 
  
8 
determined, Newtonian. For the maigres, information is beyond their control and subject 
to constant error and entropy. Yet at this point straddling traditional mechanics with 
modern thermodynamics, even the gras are ever subject to the storage and propagation of 
error. The gras are simply more able to control and harness error in a different form of 
environmental Darwinian selection, one which favors the landed order to the exclusion of 
the maigres. Framing this text – and placing it in a certain mise en abyme - is Zola’s own 
Roman expérimental project, which conceived of the text of a novel as a space subject to 
the very rigid determinacy and experimental knowability that Bernard advocated. But just 
as the characters in Le Ventre de Paris fall victim to the entropic turn of thermodynamics, 
so too does Zola’s project suffer from its own methodological limitations that call into 
question the absolute knowability that Bernard sought.              
In the years following Zola’s work in Les Rougon-Macquart but pre-dating 
Queneau’s own period of activity, science again underwent some notable changes. 
Gregor Mendel developed an early understanding of heredity that would eventually 
blossom into the field of genetics. Maxwell unified electrical and magnetic forces in a 
single theory. Boltzmann developed theories of particulate motion through statistical 
mechanics. In the early twentieth century, the atom came to be adopted as a building 
block of all things, and quantum mechanics followed in the wake of this discovery to 
begin to promote an understanding of the behaviors of atoms and their subparts. Perhaps 
most importantly, Einstein articulated his theory of relativity, which placed all objects in 
their own space-time dependent on their relative motions, as compared to a single 
universal constant, the speed of light. Queneau’s work reflects these changes, a point that 
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will be supported in the third chapter of this Dissertation through a detailed review of Les 
derniers jours. There, the waiter-philosopher Alfred adopts an infallible system to predict 
the outcomes of horse races based on 91 factors. This system, in its reliance on 
mathematics and more particularly, statistics, adopts an attitude consistent with 
Boltzmann’s work, where scientific understanding moved from the single actor like a 
Raphaël or a Florent in favor of measurements that must be undertaken at a system-wide 
level due to the noise and unknown attributes of individual particles. Such is the 
transition from the discrete and individually measurable to the distribution as a 
fundamental means of conceiving of empirical reality. Alfred, meanwhile, is lavish in his 
disdain for Einstein’s theory of relativity, in Queneau’s irreverent and oft-dismissive 
approach to the latest advancements of the science of his time.  
Houellebecq offers a final chronological data point in this study and a final 
reflection of the parallels (and maybe, rivalries) that are possible between literary 
textuality and science. As the very title of Les particules élémentaires suggests, 
Houellebecq’s text concerns itself with questions of quantum mechanics, as both a 
scientific institution (the main character works in a laboratory after having attended 
college near a particle accelerator) and as a metaphor (the main characters might be 
likened to elementary particles in their behavior). The text’s inspiration drawn from 
modern science does not stop there, with references to concepts like Hilbert space and the 
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox (to be discussed further), and a text relying on the 
device that it is a chronicle of the late twentieth century authored by a post-human race 
that results from a perfection in genetic reproduction and engineering. With each step 
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from Balzac through Houellebecq, texts depict an ever-renewing scientific moment in 
history that begins with the unknowably vitalist and ends with the ultimately reduced, 
known, and essential gene.    
There is a deeper level of study undertaken here beyond the simple historical 
overlay of scientific advancement and textuality, however. While the simple overlay 
presents an almost archeological interest in that strata of text and strata of science can be 
plumbed in striking parallel, there should be a limit to the surprise occasioned by 
scientifically-motivated texts reflecting the science of the text’s times. Indeed, a greater 
interest lies in the subtle movements between the texts in a cycling of epistemological 
approaches. While any history of the important points in the development of science over 
the past two hundred years would likely touch on a shared set of discoveries and 
advances (many of which have already been mentioned here), a history of the 
development of epistemology over the same period would seem open to much more 
debate. If a definitive presentation of such a history remains beyond the scope of this 
Dissertation, a closer review of the works of the four authors here reveals a more subtle 
pendulum swing or oscillation in epistemological approach over that time period – a 
waveform hiding beneath the simple surface parallels marrying science and text.  
As epistemology is the study of the methods and scope of practices related to the 
acquisition and transmission of knowledge, one critical variable to trace in the works of 
the four authors presented here is the concept of “knowability.” To recall one of Barthes’ 
discussions of the code herméneutique in S/Z, a text structured around an enigma remains 
suspended between the unfolding of language that drives the work to its conclusion and 
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the contrary force of the enigma which resists resolution through various points of 
blockage. (Barthes, S/Z 75-76). The text must end when the former finally overcomes the 
latter – when all is known in a sort of revelation. Barthes may have been speaking of just 
such a revelation in Balzac’s Sarrasine, but a similar conclusion does not apply to 
Balzac’s La Peau de chagrin. There, the enigma of the skin is introduced almost 
immediately in the text, but it is never satisfactorily resolved. That is, the text never 
produces any conclusive proof that the skin is actually able to grant wishes or to shorten 
the life of its owner. It is possible that the skin performs as advertised, but it is equally 
possible that Raphaël’s aging is a mere coincidence. In a close reflection of the vitalist 
thought of Balzac’s time, the unfolding of the text, like the unfolding of the mysterious 
force of life, remains beyond the scope of knowability, ever escaping like La Peau de 
chagrin’s final image of a diaphanous, turbulent Pauline. Associated with this view is an 
open perspective on causality, where the set of events that lead to a certain outcome – in 
this case, Raphaël’s death – remain unclear – necessarily so, in fact. For as Raphaël 
desires and the skin shrinks, the former may well cause the latter in an early form of the 
Heisenberg uncertainty principle, which dictates that a certain degree of unknowability 
remains in an experiment due to interference by the experimental observer. Here is an 
important epistemological break from the basic archeological dig, where Balzac’s text 
rejects knowability from an epistemological standpoint in anticipation of a theoretical 
construct to be formulated a century after the text was originally authored.  
With Zola, the text transitions away from the open notion of causality and the 
inherent unknowability of Balzac. In both Le Ventre de Paris and the more general 
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Roman expérimental project, everything may be observed, experimented upon, and 
catalogued in a deterministic unfolding as rigorous as the experimental method applied to 
it. The character Lisa is a gras, subject once and always to a Newtonian set of laws that 
enable her to control her environment in the manner of Maxwell’s daemon. Her tenant 
Florent is once and always a maigre, an outcast who only geographically returns from 
exile in Cayenne, as he is ever subject to the exclusionary, entropic laws of Les Halles. In 
theory – and Zola did not successfully implement his theory, as will be shown – 
knowledge of a set of laws and initial conditions renders a text the written reflection of a 
physiological phenomenon captured by Bernard’s all-encompassing medicine. The 
Balzacian text that exceeded both inductive and deductive reasoning due to its 
unknowability becomes a text that theoretically operates in a deductive space due to its 
Cartesian knowability, its formation as a series of necessary links building a logical 
chain. The insertion of noise, uncertainty and chaos, both in Les Halles in Le Ventre de 
Paris and in the Roman expérimental, complicates this conclusion, as we shall see; but 
the pro-science, pro-certainty, and pro-deduction system of Zola remains its stated 
aspiration.  
To this point, Balzac’s and Zola’s texts code science positively, in that each 
reflects an acceptance of the scientific position consistent with the time period of the 
text’s writing; but they approach the limits of knowability very differently. Queneau’s 
arrival matches a move away from the science of the first half of the twentieth century 
with a move back to the unknowability and open causality of Balzac’s work. In his 
sustained comedic touch, Queneau casts a certain degree of ridicule on modern doctrines 
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like relativity, all while creating a textual space that bends the rules of thermodynamics. 
In Les derniers jours and elsewhere, the returns are seemingly eternal and without loss – 
in Alfred’s winnings to compensate perfectly for his father’s losses, in Le chiendent’s 
cycle of the last sentence of the text serving as a return to the first sentence, in the 
alternating game between Cidrolin and the Duc d’Auge in Les fleurs bleues. The text 
generally, and its comedy more specifically, serve a generative function that demolishes 
asymptotic approximation in favor of a Newtonian sort of reversibility and a creation of 
joyous excess and alchemistic wealth from thin air. Causation, meanwhile, is liberated in 
this space of free creation, where understanding why things happen is not a scientific 
winnowing from many hypotheses to one truth, but an overflowing growth from one 
possible truth to many hypotheses, none more or less correct than the next.                 
Houellebecq serves as a closing parenthesis, both for the Dissertation’s study 
opened with Balzac’s unknowability and vitalist excess, and for the atavistic return of 
Balzacian unknowability and open causation in Queneau’s texts. Despite, or perhaps 
because of, the development of statistical methods that de-emphasize the knowledge 
available about one member of a group in favor of a distribution of characteristics 
evidenced by the group as a whole, Houellebecq’s texts suggest an almost absolute 
knowability. Despite statistical methods – because statistics foregoes knowledge of the 
specific in favor of knowledge at a population level, so some knowledge of the stochastic 
individual would seem to be necessarily lost when only general laws and distributions are 
considered. Because of statistical methods – because the amount of Brownian motion of 
the individual particle – or person – in Houellebecq’s texts is so limited and unimportant 
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that the level of sociological law and statistical observation is the only sort of knowledge 
that matters for most characters. Only one exception in Les particules élémentaires, the 
philosopher and scientist Michel, is able to deviate meaningfully from the historical and 
social setting framing his existence, and only he is able to propose an advance in genetics 
that would feed back against the laws of his own era to lead to a newer and better post-
human race. But for those occupants of the Houellebecqian universe doomed to live at 
the end of the twentieth century, such redemption comes far too late to palliate an 
inoperable, strongly decadent mal de siècle. For those occupants, all can be reduced to 
the mechanical and deterministic according to a theoretical framework that adopts an 
extreme version of modern science. The anti-scientific stance of Queneau and the place 
for excessive life are obliterated in Houellebecq’s works; all that remains is a return of 
Bernard in his most frigid and empty iteration imaginable. The epistemological openness 
and possibility of Balzac completely closes the better part of two centuries later with 
Houellebecq. But if the pendulum swing back and forth – from Balzac to Zola, back 
towards Balzac’s position with Queneau, and finishing closer to Zola with Houellebecq – 
is any indication, the next swing back to an unknowable and mystical sort of 
scientifically-inspired literature is ever just around the corner in the infinite oscillations 
that flow from the necessary epistemological instability of the human condition.  
Before launching into the first chapter’s treatment of Balzac, an image drawn 
from Jules Verne’s Paris au XXè siècle serves to provide a final framing for what is 
proposed here. The source is an appropriate example, as Verne wrote the unfinished 
original around 1860 as a vision of Paris in 1960 – in other words, a scientifically-
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oriented text that spans many of the periods discussed in this Dissertation. In the Vernian 
version of 1960 Paris, hard science has taken over all aspects of life at the expense of the 
arts and humanities. Michel Dufrénoy, winner of a much-derided scholarly prize in Latin 
verse (Verne, Paris 34) and inheritor of his father’s artistic tendencies, decides to buck 
society’s constraints by heading to a bookstore to look for copies of canonical literature 
and poetry on his only day off before beginning work at a bank (Verne, Paris 51). The 
Librairie des Cinq parties du Monde, where he begins his search, seems promising in 
view of the overwhelming number of volumes lining the shelves. His hope quickly turns 
to disappointment, however, as his initial request for a book by Hugo is met with total 
ignorance and confusion by the bookstore employee. The store’s inventory, it turns out, is 
entirely comprised of scientific treatises bearing humorless titles like Traité pratique du 
graissage des roues motrices and a twenty-volume Théorie des frottements (Verne, Paris 
52). When another employee hears of Michel’s plight, he offers to satisfy Michel’s 
interest in nineteenth-century poetry with its twentieth-century replacement – “entre 
autres, les Harmonies Electriques de Martillac, ouvrage couronné par l’Académie des 
Sciences, les Méditations sur l’oxygène de M. de Pulfasse, le Parallélograme poétique, 
les Odes décarbonatées...” (Verne, Paris 53). This is quite the dark dystopic joke offered 
by Verne, where even the names of the authors of twentieth-century scientific poetry 
sound like tools – Martillac like marteau, Pulfasse like some combination of poulie, 
potasse, and sulfate. If Lucretius’ De rerum managed to combine poetry and a philosophy 
of pleasure with a theory of atoms (Greenblatt 8-11), it is fairly safe to say – at the risk of 
judging on insufficient information – that a “Decarbonated Ode” would promise its 
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reader far less. That is the humor of the bit – that a “decarbonated ode” has not just lost 
its carbonate, it has drained the poetry from the poem, the aesthetic pleasure from the art.   
When undertaking a project to review science and epistemology in the works of 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century authors, we should be all too aware of the lesson of this 
scene. The task here is not to treat the works of Balzac, Zola, Queneau, and Houellebecq 
as so many Odes Décarbonatées; nor – what would be worse – to convert them to such 
rigidly bound simulacra in pale reflection of the lively originals. This criticism can be 
approached from two distinct vectors. One relies on an observation that the use of 
scientific structures and discourse in a novel is not a monovalent practice. The reader of a 
novel is not simply consuming a peer-reviewed article in an academic journal that intends 
to do no more than shed light on a new finding.
2
 Rather, the use of scientific discourse in 
the space of a novel can serve a number of highly distinct ends. In the Rougon-Macquart 
or La Comédie humaine, science serves the end of instituting a form of legality in the 
text, a structure to lend the credibility of the real – be it in the form of a human zoology 
or the realization of a Bernardian project - to the non-legally bound space of the 
imaginary and fanciful. For Balzac, science as a sort of legitimizing device does not 
exclude a second role for science – to provide a means of considering questions more 
mystical, or extra-scientific, in nature. For Zola, science’s legitimization of the text seems 
to be as much a rhetorical device to contest the claims of critics of the naturalist project. 
                                                        
2
 This point recalls Barthes’ description of scientific language: “Pour la science, le langage n’est 
qu’un instrument, que l’on a intérêt à rendre aussi transparent, aussi neutre que possible, 
assujetti à la matière scientifique (opérations, hypothèses, résultats) qui, dit-on, existe en dehors 
de lui et le précède : il y d’un côté et d’abord les contenus du message scientifique, qui sont tout, 
d’un autre côté et ensuite la forme verbale chargée d’exprimer ces contenus, qui n’est rien.” 
(Barthes, Bruissement 12).  
  
17 
By the time that we reach Queneau’s work, science accomplishes a very different goal, as 
a structure that ironically frees the playfulness of the text, all while injecting a comedic or 
parodic element wielded against both scientific institutions and knowledge. In 
Houellebecq’s work, science is as much a discursive practice as it is a means of 
communicating apparently “objective” information. By presenting almost everything in 
the late twentieth-century human condition as subject to a variety of scientific (or quasi-
scientific) laws, Les particules élémentaires drains that existence of any emotional value 
in favor of a nihilistic sort of determinism. In each of these cases, a recognition of the 
multi-valence of scientific discourse when presented in a work of fiction is one necessary 
means of avoiding an overly dry or rote application of epistemology and the history of 
science to texts which demand more – particularly those as comedic as Queneau’s or as 
dark as Houellebecq’s.  
The other vector of approach to avoid simply “decarbonating” the texts studied 
here is an understanding of both the limits and the usefulness of the techniques proposed. 
By choosing science and epistemology as a lens, we are necessarily forsaking any 
number of other lenses – such as structuralism, gender theory, psychoanalysis, among 
many others – which could potentially be applied just as fruitfully to the texts studied 
here. The concepts of science and epistemology represent just one code that consciously 
or unconsciously passes through each of the texts studied here. Perhaps the analysis here 
will not be too closed or stilted if we are ever mindful of the critical space that 
necessarily lies elsewhere, often in dialogue with elements of epistemology or science. 
An epistemological and scientific approach to criticism can be spun more positively, 
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however. By shedding new light on an oft-darkened corner of literary criticism, this 
Dissertation proposes to reveal points of interest, connection, and philosophical dialogue 
rarely captured by other critical approaches. In this space, epistemology and science – far 
from draining the texts of their poetry or art, joy or despair – promise to supplement these 
qualities with further layers of structure and interest. We are following a well-tread path 
to oft-visited places, but might see some new sites for the different map we have in hand.          
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CHAPTER ONE: BALZAC 
In L’avant-propos de la Comédie Humaine, Honoré de Balzac outlines a project 
no less ambitious than a complete inventory of the society of his time. Yet “inventory” is 
not quite the right word to describe this aim, as Balzac’s goals were more scientific in 
nature. The title of Alan Thiher’s Fiction Rivals Science is again suggestive in this 
respect, as Thiher posits that Balzac viewed his works as a worthy supplement to the 
scientific thought of the time period. And with good reason: Balzac dedicated Le Père 
Goriot to the naturalist Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, engaged in scientific speculation in La 
recherche de l’absolu, and more tellingly, envisioned his inventory in La Comédie 
Humaine as a form of human taxonomy; his array of characters, a form of social zoology. 
In L’avant-propos, Balzac explicitly invokes Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire’s unity of 
composition as a model not only to apply, but to expand in the context of human society. 
For if the distinctions between different species of plants and animals blur in view of the 
analogous parts present across species – which speak to a fundamental natural order and 
structure - such simplicity does not necessarily follow in the different “species” 
characterizing human social organization. Far more detail is required, Balzac notes, to 
detail fully the differences between men and women in society than is necessary to 
distinguish a male and female animal, for example. And such a distinction between 
humans is just one fault line in a species further balkanized by an astronomically large 
number of permutations on the political, social, and familial.  
 If the scientific aspirations of Balzac’s project are clear, a question remains as to 
the nature of the science that Balzac was attempting to develop. One possible answer is 
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suggested by Thomas Klinkert, who views Balzac’s work in the novels Louis Lambert 
and La Peau de chagrin as organizing a triangular relation between science, poetry, and 
mysticism, with the former two combining synthetically to produce the third. (Klinkert 
certainly could have added Seraphîta and La recherche de l’absolu to this list, as well.) 
This interpretation represents a useful starting point for an analysis of Balzac, because it 
points to the position that Balzacian science occupies in proximity to topics traditionally 
considered non-scientific. In fact, Klinkert probably does not go far enough in his 
characterization, as Balzacian science is not merely a generative counterpoint to poetry 
feeding towards mysticism. Balzacian science often seems to surpass the limits of 
traditional scientific or experimental method to espouse a mystical or animist view of the 
epistemological quest. At the very least, the boundaries between science and mysticism 
for Balzac are blurred. Traces of harmony associated with an animist evolution to 
perfection are in evidence throughout L’avant-propos alone, and serve as a quasi-
scientific purpose in Balzac’s model. Two citations bear brief attention: “Enfin, après 
avoir cherché, je ne dis pas trouvé, cette raison, ce moteur social, ne fallait-il pas méditer 
sur les principes naturels et voir en quoi les Sociétés s'écartent ou se rapprochent de la 
règle éternelle, du vrai, du beau ?” and “la Société devait porter avec elle la raison de son 
mouvement.” Two levels of abstraction seem to characterize the development of society 
– one is inherent to the social organism itself, in which it finds the “reason” for its 
movement, another is a set of traditional aesthetic or moral ideals on beauty and truth that 
serve as a measuring stick by which to compare society. Balzac may allow for the 
possibility of movement here, and with it, a form of evolutionary thought; but the use of 
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the word “éternelle” recalls Cuvier’s position in the 1830 debate with Geoffroy Saint-
Hilaire (See generally Piveteau). As history has judged Cuvier, his focus on differences 
between organisms and the totality of each organism in and of itself suggests a sort of 
divine, unchanging order; meanwhile Saint-Hilaire’s focus on the analogies and 
similarities between species lends itself to a view that species may have evolved from one 
another.   
If the former is the correct view of Balzac’s règle éternelle (and we shall soon see 
Balzac’s text heap praise on Cuvier), it is reasonable to view his two idealizations as 
reflections of two key scientific concepts to be discussed in greater detail later – l’ordre 
naturel posited by Lamarck and la classification naturelle offered by Duhem. The 
sometimes imprecise approximation necessary to model society generally tends to exhibit 
a unified underlying motor and reason; just as the sometimes imprecise approximation 
that necessarily accompanies zoological classification or theories of astronomical 
movement tends to exhibit a hidden natural classification and order at a very high level. 
Balzac’s project with respect to society is isomorphic to the physicist’s or the zoologist’s 
with respect to their fields of study – to discover the eternal, natural abstractions that 
subtend the superficially chaotic.   
Convergence between the social and idealized models, however, is not a 
necessary outcome for Balzac, but he views it as hypothetically attainable. “Ceux qui 
veulent apercevoir chez moi l'intention de considérer l'homme comme une créature finie 
se trompent donc étrangement,” Balzac continues in L’avant-propos. Humans as infinite, 
capable of extending the influence of their will beyond traditionally accepted limits, 
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speaks to Balzac’s fascination with Swedenborgian mysticism. His theory seems to find a 
more detailed projection in fictional form within Louis Lambert, where, at the end stages 
of the eponymous Lambert’s delirium is presented a sort of quasi-philosophical, quasi-
scientific treatise explaining the interface between human will and corporeal substance. 
Notable among the laws posited by Lambert is “Si l’espace existe, certaines facultés 
donnent le pouvoir de le franchir avec une telle vitesse que leurs effets équivalent à son 
abolition. De ton lit aux frontières du monde, il n’y a que deux pas : LA VOLONTÉ– LA 
FOI !” (Balzac, Louis Lambert 166). That such a rule is scientific seems a dubious 
proposition, but it should be recalled in this respect that the science of the 18th and early 
19th century was characterized by what Gaston Bachelard called l’esprit préscientifique. 
In the vein of Lambert’s quasi-science, Bachelard recounts the purportedly scientific 
theories of one Carra, who proposed to describe the lifespan of Martians and the flora of 
Venus (Bachelard 262). As Swedenborg himself reported that he had been visited by 
spirits from other planets, the overlap between primitive science and mysticism becomes 
clear. Science, as it was practiced in the centuries preceding Balzac, was a necessary part 
of the convergence between the collective and the individual, the socially observed and 
the hypothetically possible, and matter and spirit – a series of convergences that in 
totalizing, exceed the taxonomy of a Saint-Hilaire. Curiously, as shall be demonstrated in 
greater detail here, science not only leads to an animist answer to Balzac’s animist project 
as Klinkert proposes; science is the answer on its own.    
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 This much is made clear in La Peau de chagrin, the companion to Louis Lambert
3
 
and the text that forms the basis for this Chapter. The written work of Geoffroy Saint-
Hilaire’s scientific rival Cuvier is described as follows:  
Soudain les marbres s’animalisent, la mort se vivifie, le monde se déroule ! Après 
d’innombrables dynasties de créatures gigantesques, après des races de poissons 
et des clans de mollusques, arrive enfin le genre humain, produit dégénéré d’un 
type grandiose, brisé peut-être par le Créateur. Échauffés par son regard 
rétrospectif, ces hommes chétifs, nés d’hier, peuvent franchir le chaos, entonner 
un hymne sans fin et se configurer le passé de l’univers dans une sorte 
d’Apocalypse rétrograde. (Balzac, La Peau 31) 
 
What is said of Cuvier here could be applied to scientific inquiry more broadly, at least in 
its perfected form. Science, for Balzac, is not just observational or empirical; it, like 
geometry and mathematics, is independently generative – an infinite source of deductions 
based on a limited series of basic axioms. Scientific description, as much as zoological 
reality itself, animates marble, undoes death, and gives birth to legion species populating 
the planet. Yet words like innombrables, gigantesques, and grandiose speak at once to 
both the massiveness and the immeasurability of the scientific enterprise. If Bernard, as 
we shall discuss, saw all phenomena as reducible to measurable certainty some thirty 
years after the first publication of La Peau de chagrin, Balzac subscribes to a very 
different view of the scientific task – one that generates without being able to 
comprehend or measure what has been generated, a sort of truth ever escaping the 
laboratory. A curious duality underlies such indeterminacy when considered in the light 
of modern science. On one hand, such indeterminacy could be interpreted as entirely 
scientific in nature, at once a marker of the limits of human knowledge in the vein of 
                                                        
3
 Louis Lambert directly references La Peau de chagrin, and the main characters in each 
undertake works on the topic of human will.   
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Heisenberg and a reminder that evolutionary theory involves a largely undetectable 
movement (it is for this reason that Darwin had to rely on examples of artificial selection 
to demonstrate natural selection – the former is the only one of the two that can be 
reasonably observed on a human scale). The interpretation proposed here, on the other 
hand, is that Balzac’s indeterminacy is extra-scientific in light of modern advances, a 
surrender in the face of guided movement that can be observed but not defined, that 
follows a consistent vectored path in the Lamarckian sense of the term.    
Despite, or perhaps because of, this indeterminacy, scientific inquiry is able to 
promote the evolution of humankind towards the convergence that Balzac posited as 
aspirationally possible, if not always achieved, in L’avant-propos. Science is not the cold 
and unpredictable observation of a cold and chaotic universe, it is échauffée, energetic, 
unfolding in a continuously harmonizing upward spiral leading to an infinite hymn and a 
regeneration of Biblical proportions. Balzacian science, as borrowed from his description 
of Cuvier, is a subjective, immeasurable, and guided “system.” It accordingly occupies a 
space that is as much metaphysical and mystical as it is Newtonian.     
 At first glance, La Peau de chagrin may seem an unusual choice to serve as the 
basis for a discussion of science in Balzac. For example, Balzac relies on scientific 
rhetoric and content throughout his work, and often in ways that seem more directly on 
point. Illusions perdues is stocked with discussions of applied science, from its opening 
description of printing technology to its later inclusion of an almost patent-worthy set of 
improvements to the production of paper. Le Médecin de campagne follows the daily 
practice of medicine in a developing rural community. These are but two examples of 
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Balzac’s ubiquitous fascination with science in La Comédie Humaine, but each might 
seem a better candidate for epistemological discussion than the cryptic, and potentially 
supernatural, behavior of the titular skin in La Peau de chagrin. Yet it is precisely the 
skin’s potentially supernatural behavior that makes it a better topic of scientific inquiry 
than the more functional questions of printer technology or routine medical advice. The 
potentially supernatural requires a deeper and more complicated engagement with 
experimental method and observation than the already known and implemented. Further, 
in view of the very sort of science described in the homage to Cuvier, the behavior of the 
skin in La Peau de chagrin is less a scientific anomaly and more an exact illustration of 
the cloudy limits of science as it was practiced in Balzac’s time. The ever-degenerating 
skin becomes, in this light, an inverted double of the generative science applied to it. For 
an era where experimental and theoretical practices were very different than they would 
become in the twentieth century, a text that approaches epistemological questions in just 
such an unusual, potentially supernatural way is precisely the sort of text most favorable 
to an appropriately generative study of science. 
    
La Peau de Chagrin as Supernatural Selection 
When considering questions of epistemology or the theory of science in Balzac’s 
La Peau de chagrin, it is tempting to focus on the text’s many descriptions of science as 
an institutional artifact of Balzac’s time period. A few examples will serve to briefly 
highlight this aspect of the text. As Raphaël’s despair increases in inverse proportion to 
the fateful skin’s size, he resorts to a cross-section of practicing scientists in his quest to 
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reverse the skin’s progressive disappearance. His first step is a visit to a zoologist 
(Balzac, La Peau 230-235) whose “rhetorical overkill” complete with “empty 
explanations” (Thiher 50) seems to track a number of the naturalist Buffon’s ideas and 
verbose style. This initial meeting culminates in a referral to a professor of mechanics 
who, in conjunction with a colleague, vainly submits the skin to a compression device 
(Balzac, La Peau 245). In a final effort to alter the skin, Raphaël seeks out the help of a 
chemist, whose attempts to alter the skin either by razor or acid bath (Balzac, La Peau 
247-248) prove just as fruitless as his predecessors’ in the task. In a final parodic turn, the 
chemist is left only to ask Raphaël, “Gardons-nous bien de raconter cette aventure à 
l’Académie, nos collègues s’y moqueraient de nous” (Balzac, La Peau 248). The 
traditional sciences, then, seem both incapable of making the transition from the 
theoretical to the applied, and of escaping the rigors of an established institution that 
incentivizes the non-disclosure of anomalous results. This is science as historically-based, 
culturally-bound, and curiously, anti-scientific.    
Raphaël’s later consultations with four of the finest medical minds in Paris only 
serve to expand Balzac’s parody of science. Three of the four physicians, the text 
clarifies, adhere to a medical système. Maugredie - whose name is a clear reference to the 
early experimental physician and mentor of Claude Bernard, Magendie – tracks his real-
life model inasmuch as he “ne croyait qu’au scalpel” (Balzac, La Peau 256). Brisset and 
Caméristus each subscribe to different vitalist systems – the former, Bichat’s, and the 
latter, Van Helmont’s archea. Joining the three système physicians is Bianchon, a young 
colleague whose future career promises to build “le monument que pour lequel les siècles 
  
27 
précédents ont apporté tant de matériaux divers (Balzac, La Peau 255). Yet despite the 
diversity of opinions and quantity of expertise, the doctors are no more effective than the 
theoretical scientists. After taking only an “une apparence d’intérêt” (Balzac, La Peau 
254) in their patient, they reach the fairly routine consensus that Raphaël requires 
treatment by leaches, a change in diet, and a stay at the baths in Auvergne or Savoie 
(Balzac, La Peau 261-62). Here, again, the practice of an ostensibly scientific field is 
shown to be quarrelsome as an institutional matter and feckless in its palliative charge. 
Even at this high level, Balzac’s parody of the science of his times is clear.4      
Yet to focus solely on the parodic presentation of scientific practitioners in La 
Peau de chagrin is to ignore a deeper and more fruitful epistemological instability in the 
text. This textual instability depends on a question that is never answered in the text – 
specifically, does the skin actually have an effect on its ill-fated owner? The most 
obvious response to this question is an affirmative one. Raphaël acquires a skin that 
clearly states the conditions of its ownership – the skin will realize any desire of its 
owners, but in so doing, will shrink in lockstep with the remaining days of the owner’s 
life. This serves as a statement-function, to use Popper’s language (Popper 52), which 
need only have a specific term – or here, person – inserted into its terms to become a 
statement that is at least theoretically falsifiable. One may argue over whether this 
categorization is the best fit under Popper’s theory, but the latter characteristic – 
falsifiability – is the more relevant criterion in an investigation of the efficacy of the 
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 This raises the question – “what to make of this parody?” One possible response is that Balzac 
is admitting to his own shortcomings as a scientific author. While this seems reasonable, I believe 
that the better argument is that adopted by Thiher – that is, that Balzac viewed his attempts at 
scientific advancement through textuality better than anything that science could do in the early 
nineteenth century.   
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titular peau de chagrin. And indeed, the remainder of La Peau de chagrin does not 
ostensibly seem to bring about such a falsification of the skin’s statement-function. 
Whenever and whatever Raphaël wishes seems to be granted to him – he initially desires 
a bacchanalian feast which happens almost exactly as he imagines it. He seeks monetary 
fortune and finds himself declared the sole legal heir to a deceased maternal uncle’s 
estate (Balzac, La Peau 194). He desires to win a duel when challenged at the baths 
where he is recovering, and wins the duel despite possessing supposedly poor aim and 
firing randomly (Balzac, La Peau 277). And with each of these desires granted, the skin 
seems to shrink. The terms of the contract at least appear fulfilled, or at the least, not 
falsified.  
Not falsified is not the logical equivalent of verified, however, leaving another 
potential response to the question of the skin’s efficacy. It is equally possible – as Allen 
Thiher points out – that the skin has no effect whatsoever on Raphaël’s existence (Thiher 
48). Under this line of reasoning, each of the purportedly granted wishes above was 
merely the result of circumstances unrelated to the enchanted skin.
5
 Raphaël was 
alternately lucky to attend a wild party and inherit millions, and unlucky to die at a young 
age of an apparent case of tuberculosis. The skin may have shrunk during this time 
period, but it did so independently of anything that was happening to Raphael. This 
proposal would run counter to much of the science of Balzac’s time, which, according to 
Bachelard, relied heavily on variety, conjecture, and coincidence rather than experimental 
method. Lending credibility, or at least, feasibility, to this reading skeptical of early 
                                                        
5
 In this respect, the skin’s efficacy sits in a space of limbo, like the famous thought experiment of 
Schrödinger’s cat. 
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nineteenth-century science are certain minor details. Even before Raphaël acquires the 
skin, his trip to the gambling house finds him in a sorry state of health that doctors 
“auraient sans doute attribué à des lésions au cœur ou à la poitrine le cercle jaune qui 
encadrait les paupières, et la rongeur qui marquait les joues.” (Balzac, La Peau 14). 
Perhaps medical opinions are not worthy of full faith and credit in the text, as discussed 
above; but there is already evidence in this passage – before Raphaël’s first wish - of the 
very symptomology that the four physicians would later observe, if not cure. 
Hypothetically, the disease might have developed in exactly the same way in the absence 
of the skin. Still other timing curiosities call the efficacy of the skin into question. 
Immediately after Raphaël’s acquisition of the skin, he happens upon his friends who will 
take him to his desired party. Their almost immediate comment to Raphaël? – “nous te 
cherchions” (Balzac, La Peau 47). That search for Raphaël could well have begun prior 
to Raphaël’s possession of the skin, meaning that the party that he was to attend would 
have occurred independently of his wish to celebrate excessively. A similarly non-
synchronized detail marks the announcement of Raphaël’s inheritance, where the 
functionary delivering the news declares that he has sought Raphaël for fifteen days – 
undoubtedly far longer than the party that Raphaël has just attended immediately after 
acquiring the skin. So unless one is willing to grant the skin powers over Raphaël even 
before he knew that it existed, there is at least a feasible reading that the events of the 
story would have occurred in exactly the same way had Raphaël not acquired it. Raphaël 
simply would have pursued the final months of his life while the skin separately shrunk 
amid the bric-à-brac of a Parisian boutique.   
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Much like its primary character, then, the question of whether the skin has an 
effect seems to subsist in a liminal state of purgatory. But where Raphaël’s existential 
limbo pits his apparent power over his surroundings against his will not to use such 
power, the skin’s effect is relegated to a zone of falsifiability without actually being 
falsified. Either of the two interpretations of the skin, as causal factor or merely 
coincident phenomenon, remains a valid possibility. What is interesting about the skin’s 
equivocal nature is why the question of causation or mere coincidence is never resolved. 
After all, Raphaël shows interest in observing the process of the skin’s gradual 
disappearance. Perhaps his observations could have (or should have) led to a more 
scientific understanding of the skin’s behavior. This is the first question to be addressed 
here, and it will turn on Raphaël’s insufficient approach to his role as a scientific 
experimenter or observer. In particular, Raphaël’s experimental technique may be 
compared to Claude Bernard’s model of experimental medicine outlined in Introduction 
à l’étude de la médecine expérimentale. By this measuring stick – and others – like 
Bachelard’s theory of obstacles épistémologiques, Raphaël’s shortcomings as 
experimenter become clearer. Yet some of the inscrutability of the skin follows not from 
experimenter error – an area already begun to be studied in Balzac’s time by Laplace - 
but from the very nature of the scientific question being posed – one of life and its 
progress to death. This will allow a transition from an initial analysis of Raphaël as active 
experimenter to an analysis of Raphaël as passive experimental subject, along with the 
enchanted skin. It is through this Heisenbergian turning point – the dual role of Raphaël 
as experimenter and experimental subject – that a vitalist reading of Raphaël’s role takes 
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shape. Such a reading, consistent with Bergsonian theory, necessitates that when dealing 
with a gradual process pitting a vital force against la durée, scientific reasoning is 
incapable of conducting successful observations or reaching satisfactory results. It is not 
just that Raphaël fails as an experimenter; it is the very phenomenon that he chooses to 
study that remains beyond the scope of experiment. The necessary instability in the skin’s 
function informed in part by vitalist thought leads to a final transition – to a third 
potential conception of the skin’s effect on Raphaël. Where the two options discussed 
above offer either supernatural causation by taking the skin’s behavior on the contract’s 
face or mere coincidence driven by independent events, there remains an intermediate 
point not yet explored. This is the point of supernatural selection – where the skin serves 
as a sort of proto-genetic code for Raphaël, an immutable text translated from genotype 
in the skin to phenotype in its perishing owner in a curious inversion of Heisenberg’s 
uncertainty principle. Or, put in a manner more historically appropriate to Balzac, the 
skin is neither supernaturally causal nor merely coincidental, it is naturally transforming 
of its holder through a process akin to the precisely guided evolution of Lamarckian 
transformism. It is in this way that the scientific instability that underlies the entirety of 
La Peau de chagrin serves not only as a reminder of the limits of scientific method, but 
as a generative force opening to an ever-expanding vitalist reading of the text, from 
Bernard and Bachelard to Bergson and Lamarck.                 
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Raphaël as Experimenter 
Even upon his first attempt at experimentation in La Peau de chagrin – the initial 
encounter with the allegedly enchanted skin, Raphaël’s surroundings already evoke 
Bachelardian epistemological obstacles consistent with the esprit préscienfitique. Amid 
the bric-à-brac of the Parisian boutique, he is first shown the skin, but only after a 
lengthy tour of the store’s curiosities, which draw their origins from seemingly all points 
of the globe and all time periods in human history. The items on display span pipes and 
weaponry; sculptures and paintings; random machines, slippers, and idols (Balzac, La 
Peau 23). The view of these spectacles cannot help but affect their spectator: 
La vue de tant d’existences nationales ou individuelles, attestées par ces gages 
humains qui leur survivaient, acheva d’engourdir les sens du jeune homme, le désir 
qui l’avait poussé dans le magasin fut exaucé : il sortit de la vie réelle, monta par 
degrés vers un monde idéal, arriva dans les palais enchantés de l’extase où l’univers 
lui apparut par bribes et en traits de feu, comme l’avenir passa jadis flamboyant aux 
yeux de saint Jean dans Pathmos. (Balzac, La Peau 24-25).  
 
Here is a moment that simultaneously encapsulates numerous hindrances to the 
development of scientifically based knowledge.
6
 The first is the distinction between 
variety and variation (Bachelard, La formation 36). Where the latter is the proper object 
of scientific inquiry within the bounds of a single set of related phenomena, the tant 
d’existences evidenced by the artifacts surrounding Raphaël suggest the former only – an 
overflowing, turbulent pre-scientific variety that prizes excess over precision. Such 
variety is not the target of objective study, but the site of concentrated interest. That the 
existences nationales ou individuelles are attested by so many gages humains only 
                                                        
6
 And perhaps, to the development of La Comédie humaine project in its scientific aims. Yet as 
already noted, it may equally be contended that Balzac viewed his own work as exempt from 
such hindrances.  
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supplements the play of variety here. Access to the historical moment and place of the 
creators of these artifacts is strictly forbidden; a speculative leap of the imagination alone 
can bridge the gap between object and prior existence. The initial variety in the artifacts 
themselves thus feeds an additional cycle of generative variety, at a level even farther 
removed from the concrete and observable. The text terms the décor of the boutique a 
chaos d’antiquités (Balzac, La Peau 24), but such chaos is far from consonant with the 
post-thermodynamic chaos that we will return to in connection with Zola and Brillouin. 
Where chaos in the latter sense means a noisy channel propagating error and an 
associated passage to a state of disordered equilibrium, chaos here means something very 
different. Here is the continual generation of information without payment in energy – 
Carnot’s burning of an imperfectly efficient energy source recast (or pre-cast) as an entire 
universe seen in strokes of fire. The probability-based, tripartite structure of 
cloud/dike/downpour that characterizes a cataract’s fall (Mehlman, Cataract 22) is 
supplanted by a progressive flaming climb par degrés to a higher state of energy and 
consciousness.  
There is, however, a temptation to view this progressive internal climb as a sort of 
metaphor for the advancement of knowledge. In this respect, one might evoke François 
Jacob’s image of science as “partiel” and “provisoire” (Jacob, Le jeu 11) or Bernard’s 
view that even if phenomena are subject to rigorous determinism, the theories describing 
them are not so assured (Bernard 371). These images directly index the limits of human 
knowledge in developing theoretical constructs, but they implicitly speak to the continual 
possibility of advancement and improvement in a particular construct. As Bernard states, 
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theories are “toujours mobiles” and “toujours perfectibles” (Bernard 371). Bernard 
emphasizes this point when proposing an ostensibly Comtean or positivist set of three 
ages that characterize the evolution of medicine. Where Comte proposes the theological, 
metaphysical, and positivist ages (Comte 59), Bernard offers the Hippocratic, the passive 
empirical, and the active experimental (Bernard 355, for example). In each system, it is 
the third age that represents the most perfected stage in an evolutionary process. It is a 
passage from the speculation of metaphysics or the système of the empiricist to the monde 
idéal of order and progress for Comte and perfected experimental method for Bernard. At 
its asymptotic limit, the latter development moves from mere medical practice to the 
absolute and certain description of a real phenomenon. This final stage surpasses a certain 
Kantian boundary, where theoretical science is no more than a rationalist construct that 
reflects its human creators more than its natural objects (Bachelard, Le nouvel esprit 5-7). 
With Bernard, experimental medicine’s accurate knowledge of determined phenomena 
reflects something like Duhem’s “classification naturelle” (Duhem, La théorie physique 
53-54) or Lamarck’s “ordre naturel” (Lamarck 241, for example). When revelations of 
this order are reached - in a curious combination of logic, observation, and faith - a 
metaphorical curtain is pulled back, and the universe begins to appear, just as in 
Raphaël’s case, where “l’univers lui apparut par bribes.” Supplementing this similarity is 
a passage from the present to the future for both Raphaël and the experimental scientist. 
For one and the other, the future shifts from the indeterminate to the knowable and 
predictable, be it in Raphaël’s flames or Bernard’s absolute certainty in a cure. Through 
these parallels between Raphaël’s internal reaction to the boutique and certain models of 
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scientific progress, what might be cast as pure reverie in the former case would seem to 
offer a potential reflection of the latter.      
A more compelling argument rejects such similarities, however. It may be noted 
in this respect that Lamarck’s ordre naturel and Duhem’s classification naturelle each 
function in a marginal space informed as much by theology as scientific inquiry. For 
Lamarck’s construct, there is never a question that it owes its origin to a “Sublime 
Auteur” (Lamarck 650); Newton generally retained a deity in his scientific edifice lest he 
be seen as seeking final causes rather than scientific relations. Duhem, for his part, is 
compelled to go to great lengths to prove that his theory of physics is entirely unrelated to 
his personal Catholic faith (Duhem La théorie physique, 373-423). Still Duhem 
acknowledges that the existence of a classification naturelle is a matter of faith for the 
practicing physicist. Raphaël’s vision and ecstasy in the boutique falls in this same 
liminal space, where an evocation of Saint John of Patmos, the author of the Biblical 
book of Revelation, informs, and perhaps overwhelms, the development of empirical 
knowledge. This is, indeed, a revelation, and not a mere observation. Yet the relationship 
between legitimate scientific inquiry and Raphaël’s ecstasy in the boutique is more than a 
simple matter of theologically-tinged worldview. Again, traces of Bachelard’s 
epistemological obstacles may be observed here in a direct similarity between Raphaël’s 
ecstasy and the traditional practice of alchemy. For the alchemist – and Balzac separately 
describes the life of one in La recherche de l’absolu, the synthesis of precious metals was 
only one part of experimental practice. Bachelard observes that alchemy is as much an 
initiation to an order with its own ritualistic structure (Bachelard 56-59). This structure is 
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based on a profound equivalence between the internal meditations of the alchemist and 
the set of symbols that can be applied to the external world. A realization of the 
alchemist’s goal is not only possible; it is ever realized by virtue of the alchemist’s 
participation in the symbolism and process of alchemy. It is in this way that the alchemist 
is at all times both unsuccessful due to an expectation that may never be achieved, and 
successful precisely because that hopeful expectation is a necessary aspect of alchemy. 
Assisting the alchemist in navigating these poles is a scale of symbols advancing in 
perfection that serve as a double for a series of intimate meditations. In view of this 
background, Raphaël’s moment of ecstasy in the boutique is less a tribute to the 
perfectibility of scientific knowledge and more the result of a collapsed process of 
alchemy. The set of external symbols surrounding Raphaël in the boutique numb 
(engourdir) his empirical senses and trigger a turn inward, where the increasing 
complexity and variety of the artifacts parallels the increasing perfection of the degrés 
vers un monde idéal. Here is the internal scale that each alchemist must climb, the 
necessary state that is at once process and realization, or for Raphaël, ascent and 
pinnacle. Truth, for the alchemist as for Raphaël in this passage, is a reconciliation of his 
own nature and the nature of the universe (Bachelard 60). The evocation of that universe 
seen in fire only heightens the parallel in view of the importance of the fiery “element” to 
the alchemist’s process.  
Raphaël’s mental state, as he first approaches the skin, is entirely consonant with 
the esprit préscientifique, then; and that state only persists as he conducts his first 
experimental activities on the skin. When first confronting the skin, Raphaël is 
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immediately struck by its seemingly supernatural luminosity in the midst of a boutique 
then darkened in dying twilight. This provokes an initial examination of the skin:      
Cependant, animé d’une curiosité bien légitime, il se pencha pour la regarder 
alternativement sous toutes les faces, et découvrit bientôt une cause naturelle à cette 
singulière lucidité : les grains noirs du chagrin étaient si soigneusement polis et si 
bien brunis, les rayures capricieuses en étaient si propres et si nettes que, pareilles à 
des facettes de grenat, les aspérités de ce cuir oriental formaient autant de petits 
foyers qui réfléchissaient vivement la lumière. Il démontra mathématiquement la 
raison de ce phénomène au vieillard, qui, pour toute réponse, sourit avec malice. Ce 
sourire de supériorité fit croire au jeune savant qu’il était dupe en ce moment de 
quelque charlatanisme. (Balzac, La Peau, 39) 
 
This indeed seems légitime, both as a matter of the curiosity provoked by the skin and the 
method by which Raphaël analyzes it. If Bernard’s challenge, as a successor of Newton’s, 
was to reduce all phenomena to the predictable due to their inherent determinism, 
Raphaël would seem his forerunner in this scene. The skin’s unusual luminosity is an 
unknown at first; but upon closer inspection of the tissue, Raphaël is able to reduce if to a 
sort of if x, then y functional or deductive relationship. If, among other things, a skin has 
a particular texture and has been polished in a particular way, then the skin’s ability to 
capture and reflect light is a certainty that can be demonstrated mathématiquement. This 
much can be shown without violating one of the central tenets of scientific inquiry – the 
prohibition on seeking the final causes of a given phenomenon (see generally Duhem, 
Sauver les phénomènes). Raphaël thereby avoids treating the curiosity of the skin either 
as an aspect of the tissue somehow exceeding experimentation or as motivation to discern 
some divine or diabolical intervention.   
 Yet the last two sentences of this passage fundamentally invert this initial appeal 
to experimental normality. This observation first turns on the text’s use of the word 
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mathématiquement. Raphaël’s demonstration does not result in a chemical, physical, 
biological, or mechanical certainty; it is a mathematical certainty. The reduction of a 
phenomenon to mathematical proof underscores the connection between Raphaël’s 
methodology and the philosophy of Descartes. It may be recalled in this respect that 
Descartes’ foundation in proposing the cogito is a profound doubt as to the nature of his 
existence and surroundings. It is precisely to this doubt that the text alludes when 
Raphaël first encounters the elderly shopkeeper who will show him the skin, “pendant le 
rapide intervalle qui sépara sa vie somnambulique de sa vie réelle, il demeura dans le 
doute philosophique recommandé par Descartes” (Balzac, La Peau 33). Even without 
going too deeply into Descartes’ interpretation of sleep versus waking states (let alone an 
interval between the two states), it may be argued that Cartesian doubt is as much a 
touchstone for Balzac in La Peau de chagrin as it was for Descartes himself. Precisely 
because Descartes possessed this doubt, he could readily prove to himself that he at the 
very least existed (Descartes La recherche, 90-91). Having established his existence 
through doubt, Descartes was able to move beyond this point, thanks to divine 
intervention, to prove to his own satisfaction that the material world surrounding him was 
not presented in error. That Raphaël demeura in a state of doubt begins to highlight the 
impossibility of such a transition to certainty. Even here, the chain of Cartesian logic is 
broken. Returning to the use of the word mathématiquement to describe Raphaël’s initial 
proof of the skin’s luminosity, the initial break in the chain later proves a more 
fundamental inversion of the Cartesian progression. As the Fifth Meditation highlights, 
Descartes’s doubt had its limits, most notably as regards what Descartes deemed 
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immutable truths. Figuring prominently among such truths are mathematical formulae 
and geometric relations. (Descartes, Méditations 159-161). So when Raphaël is able to 
make a mathematical showing as to the character of the skin, he is proposing an 
immutable, abstract truth not limited by the instabilities of the chemical or the 
mechanical. He is initially able to pass from doubt to certainty in the same manner as 
Descartes. Yet the next sentence flips the polarity of this relation, as Raphaël worries 
“qu’il était dupe en ce moment de quelque charlatanisme.” This sentence sounds a retreat 
to original doubt. Perhaps a simultaneous shift from an abstract truth to a concrete 
illusion, and from the mathematical to the chemical or mechanical, explains this retreat. 
In this case, the shift is not an impeachment of Cartesian logic, but a mere redeployment 
of its focus. Yet mathematical proofs in Descartes’ view should not be susceptible to such 
shifts, least of all due to some charlatanism. The better reading of this passage, instead, is 
a chiasmatic inversion of Cartesian thought. Where Descartes moves from profound 
doubt to abstract mathematical certainty, Raphaël moves from abstract mathematical 
certainty to profound doubt. Coincident with the initial appearance of the skin, the text 
undermines the very foundations of experimental and scientific logic and method; and, as 
we shall see in the discussion of vitalism, the text only reemphasizes this Cartesian 
inversion once Raphaël is laboring under the “effects” of the skin.    
 If the initial encounter with the skin effects a fundamental inversion in Cartesian 
methodological practice, Raphaël’s experimental attempts, once he has the skin in his 
possession, tend to illustrate further limitations in his method. This much may be shown 
as early as his first attempt to observe empirically the purported effect that his desires 
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have on the skin’s surface area. At that moment, Raphaël has enjoyed a long night of 
celebration – possibly the very party that he had wished for – and expansively recounted 
his earlier life to his friend Émile. As he and Émile express an interest in observing the 
possible shrinking of the skin as a reply to Raphaël’s desire for monetary fortune, 
Raphaël:  
“animé d’une adresse de singe, grâce à cette singulière lucidité dont les phénomènes 
contrastent parfois chez les ivrognes avec les obtuses visions de l’ivresse, sut trouver 
une écritoire et une serviette, en répétant toujours : — Prenons la mesure ! Prenons 
la mesure ! 
— Eh ! bien, oui, reprit Émile, prenons la mesure ! 
Les deux amis étendirent la serviette et y superposèrent la Peau de chagrin. Émile, 
dont la main semblait être plus assurée que celle de Raphaël, décrivit à la plume, par 
une ligne d’encre, les contours du talisman, pendant que son ami lui disait : — J’ai 
souhaité deux cent mille livres de rente, n’est-il pas vrai ? Eh bien, quand je les 
aurai, tu verras la diminution de tout mon chagrin.” (Balzac, La Peau 189-90) 
 
As with Raphaël’s initial inquiry into the unusual luminosity of the skin, Raphaël’s 
technique when attempting to discern the behavior of the skin here seems to withstand at 
least cursory scrutiny. To draw these two experimental scenes together does not seem 
misplaced, due to a critical equivalence between the scenes – each repeats the unusual 
phrase “singulière lucidité.” While we shall return to this unusual equivalence below, we 
may begin by observing again how Raphaël’s method superficially compares favorably to 
Bernardian experimental technique. For Bernard, experiments structure around a passage 
from sentiment to reason to experiment (Bernard 74). The first of these three steps 
precedes any testing itself, and reflects the mere development of a more emotional or 
intuitive idée préconçue (Bernard 57, for example). It is this idea or hypothesis that 
serves not as a rigid frame into which experimental results are to be forced, but as a 
baseline to be measured in view of observed experimental results. So far, so good for 
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Raphaël at the outset of this passage, as he comes in with just such an idée préconçue – 
the idea that the skin will shrink while granting his wishes. The next step for Bernard is 
the application of reason in the development of the hypothesis and its related experiment. 
Depending on the scope of the latter, very little “reason” may be needed. Bernard 
favorably notes an experiment conducted by Pascal involving no more than two 
barometric measurements taken at the top and bottom of the Tour Saint-Jacques (Bernard 
57). Such limited observation may suffice to begin to demonstrate the set of relations 
between the objects and phenomena that form the basis of the experiment. Once again, 
Raphaël’s technique here is in line with this experimental design as a matter of reason. If 
it is believed that the realization of a desire will somehow cause a skin to shrink, it is 
reasonable to follow Pascal’s lead and take two measures – for Raphaël, one before 
realization of the wish and another following.     
Yet with the shift to the third stage of Bernardian experimental technique, the 
experiment itself, the fissures in Raphaël’s approach begin to show. For it is not Raphaël, 
but his friend Émile who traces the initial plot of the skin. He might be a less partial 
observer with a steadier hand; but the image of this latter hand, disembodied as it were in 
its own clause above, suggests yet another of Bachelard’s obstacles, the unconscious. An 
undue focus on symbols associated with the unconscious – precious metals or 
disembodied hands – may speak to an inability to conduct an empirical observation. Only 
amplifying the force of Émile’s hand tracing the skin is its likeness to the Biblical image 
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of the hand applying the fatal inscription to Belshazzar’s wall.7 The idée préconçue for 
Raphaël is not a baseline to be accepted or rejected according to empirical results or 
application of the experimental method; it is the fatal commitment of a hypothesis to ink-
bound, immutable truth. The third experimental stage is not an experiment at all, but a 
resignation to predetermined future events. Raphaël’s comment at the end of the passage 
reinforces this – a summary of the wish and a sentence using two future tense verbs – 
aurai and verras – to cast the mechanism of the skin as a necessarily closing loop.   
To whatever extent a judgment might even be possible when assessing the 
outcome of Raphaël’s experiment, such a judgment necessarily will suffer from another 
critical limitation – the lack of experimentum crucis. The latter is an experiment that will 
serve as an additional and final proof of a hypothesis. Such experiments will often take 
the form of a reductio ad absurdum, in which an eliminatory process sieves the universe 
of hypotheses until only one remains (Duhem, La théorie physique 263-266). Bernard 
proposes such an elimination by resort to a contre-épreuve, a scenario where the change 
in a critical experimental condition brings a corresponding change in experimental 
outcome (Bernard 114-15). The findings of the original experiment are, in Bernard’s 
estimation, thereby proven as the changed phenomenon is responsible for the changed 
outcome. This is a particularly potent technique in cases where the number of hypotheses 
is limited. If we imagine that a given experiment admits only two hypotheses, for 
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 This image, it should be noted, is referenced elsewhere in La Peau de chagrin, when Raphaël 
finally decides to seek the counsel of the scientific community : “ Quoi ! s’écria Raphaël quand il 
fut seul, dans un siècle de lumières où nous avons appris que les diamants sont les cristaux du 
carbone, à une époque où tout s’explique, où la police traduirait un nouveau Messie devant les 
tribunaux et soumettrait ses miracles à l’Académie des Sciences, dans un temps où nous ne 
croyons plus qu’aux paraphes des notaires, je croirais, moi ! à une espèce de Mané, Thekel, 
Pharès ?” (Balzac, La Peau 230-31).  
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example, two experiments would suffice to establish a contre-épreuve and resolve all 
unknowns. Interestingly, perhaps, this theory reduces actual experiment in a science like 
physics or chemistry to the mere mathematical question of solving a system of equations 
– as long as there are more experiments (or in the algebraic case, equations) than 
unknowns, all unknowns can be discovered (or the system can be shown to have either no 
or infinite solutions). If Duhem and Bernard notably disagree on the very possibility that 
an experimentum crucis might occur, Duhem seems to have logic in his favor in holding 
that such an experiment is impossible outside of pure mathematics. Where a certain 
number of mathematical equations will always suffice to solve (or demonstrate that there 
is either no or an infinite solution) for the same number of variables, physical, chemical 
and biological conditions are not so easily reduced to a limited number of rigid 
interactions due to the fundamentally stochastic nature of what is measured. In Duhem’s 
view, hypotheses related to real-world phenomena can be multiplied ad infinitem, so the 
elimination of one or many will never lead to a single remaining truth to the exclusion of 
all others (Duhem, La théorie physique 265-66). Under either Duhem’s or Bernard’s view 
of the experimentum crucis, Raphaël’s technique promises no absolute results. Taking 
Bernard’s view, it would be necessary for Raphaël to change an experimental condition 
that would change the experimental outcome. This would require the impossible – the 
complete removal of the skin from his life. To be probative, this would require a parallel, 
non-existent Raphaël to refuse the skin initially and continue to live his life (that is, not 
commit suicide after leaving the boutique) in the skin’s absence. It would then be 
possible, under this Bernardian experimentum crucis, to determine if Raphaël’s premature 
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aging and demise are the result of the skin. Even in this view though, Raphaël’s 
experimentation will not lead to certain results. Yet we might also reject the possibility of 
an experimentum crucis more generally in light of Duhem’s view. The necessary 
complexity of the two systems involved – Raphaël’s physiology and the bizarrely 
luminescent, ever-shrinking skin – make for highly indeterminate and changing 
conditions that would seem to surpass any distillation to two simple hypotheses. And as 
in the introduction above, if those hypotheses posit either a causal or a coincidental 
relation between the skin’s behavior and Raphaël’s existence, there remain a near infinite 
number of possible combinations and permutations of relations to supplement these two 
over-general possibilities. Indeed, a third such possibility will be proposed later in this 
very chapter. By accepting the possibility of an ever-growing series of hypotheses, no 
experimentum crucis would ever be possible for Raphaël, even in the Bernardian sense of 
the term.         
 Still other complications prevent Raphaël from conducting effective 
experimentation on the skin and his relation to it. One is Raphaël’s continual passage 
from the exercise of a particular type of human reason to behavior consistent with other 
categories in zoological taxonomy. In the scene above, he behaves with an adresse de 
singe, thereby shifting from the group bimane to the group quadrumane, according to 
Lamarck’s taxonomy (Lamarck 297-98). Even for the latter zoologist, who as a precursor 
to Darwin was favorable to the possibility that humans could have descended from other 
primates (Lamarck 298-300), there appears to remain a substantial gulf between these 
two categories. So in transitioning from man to monkey, Raphaël has plainly surrendered 
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his ability to reason experimentally. An application of Buffon’s concept of the homo 
duplex only reinforces this point of surrender within the single taxonomical group of 
humans. The homo duplex, Buffon posits, is a construct by which all humans contain two 
interior principles (Buffon 133). One principle, associated with the soul, is the source of 
all science, reason, and wisdom (“la science, la raison, la sagesse” Buffon 134). A 
contrasting principle, associated with the animal, is tempestuous, and brings about only 
passion and error (Buffon 134). This oppositional dichotomy is an entirely appropriate 
tool to apply to the works of Balzac generally. The entire arc of Lucien de Rubempré in 
Illusions Perdues is a long meditation on the young arriviste’s tendency to obey his 
material and error-prone animal instincts in abdication of the pure spirituality offered by 
a life of work and symbolized by the Cénacle. Much the same structure overlays neatly 
on Benassis’ confession and redemption in Le Médecin de campagne or Rastignac more 
generally in Le Père Goriot (and elsewhere). In these latter two texts, however, the 
prevailing side of the homo duplex differs, with Benassis obeying the spiritual role of 
physician and community developer while Rastignac squanders his inheritance and 
amasses debts by spending on fleeting whims. Balzacian texts were frequent in their 
reliance on the homo duplex, then; and Raphaël is no exception to this. In the passage 
above, the word souhaité serves as a reminder that Raphaël’s life, upon acquisition of the 
skin, reduces to a series of wishes and desires – first, the grandiose desires souhaités, and 
then the desire not to desire that dominates his existence once he believes that the skin is 
effective. This is doubly problematic for an experimenter. First, to behave in a manner 
consistent with the animal half of Buffonian dichotomy translates to an existence of not 
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only passion, but error. The Raphaël who abandons his treatise on human will and the 
“soul” associated with that activity cannot possibly analyze his own existence without 
error. Further, the complex struggle pitting desire and the desire not to desire for Raphaël 
only re-stages the issue of fatality already discussed. If Raphaël desires not to desire, it is 
because he has already concluded that the skin performs as advertised on its face. He is 
not capable of testing an idée préconçue as an objective observer would.  
 The doubling in the homo duplex expands in Serres’ tripartite set of libidones – 
the libido sentiendi, the libido sciendi, and the libido dominandi (Serres, Le contrat 
naturel 96-97). In Serres’ view, the Genesis scene in the Garden of Eden captures these 
three libidos, where Eve’s sentient desire could serve as an intermediate generative step 
enabling male science to engage in direct combat with divine dominance. For Raphaël, 
such transition between libidones is eliminated with the acquisition of the skin. His life 
reduces to the first, most primitive libido - the dream of love and feasts transformed 
ultimately into the dream of not having such dreams. He can no longer pass from a 
background desire to a foreground role as combatant. He cannot act on a libido sciendi, 
and accordingly, cannot know in a scientific sense.        
Raphaël’s limits as an experimenter – summarized well by an abortive desire to 
know ceding in the face of fatalistic resignation – has one final critical dimension. This 
dimension flows from the repetition of the phrase singulière lucidité in both the scene 
when Raphaël first encounters the skin and in the scene where he first attempts to observe 
the skin’s shrinking. Not only does the re-use of this phrase underscore a point of 
resonance between the scenes, it underscores an equivalence between elements in the 
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scenes. In the first scene, the singulière lucidité is characteristic of the skin itself. In the 
second scene, it is associated with Raphaël. Once Raphaël possesses the skin, then, he 
and the skin become, to a certain extent, one and the same. In view of this equivalence, 
any attempt by Raphaël to experiment on the skin runs into the limits of the Heisenberg 
uncertainty principle. The latter principle dictates the impossibility of simultaneously 
knowing an electron’s precise position and exact velocity. This limit follows from the 
idea that in attempting to detect these characteristics of an electron (or electron beam), 
the experimenter necessarily exercises an influence on the very electron or electrons 
being tested, thereby disturbing the examined system (Popper 233). Popper argues 
against the rigidity of Heisenberg’s principle as a general matter (Popper 234), as he 
viewed its limit as a reflection on the limits of then-current human technique, and not 
experimental technique as an absolute matter. The specific case of Raphaël and the skin 
has no such escape from the rigors of Heisenberg. In part, this is because Raphaël himself 
serves as both experimenter and experimentee, object and subject. When acting in one 
capacity, he fundamentally alters the observations or realities of the other. This view only 
complicates when expanded to include the skin. For if one of the two sites of singulière 
lucidité is affected at a given time, it would follow that the other site would undergo a 
corresponding effect. When Raphaël desires to know about the skin, his desire should 
work a change in the skin itself if the skin in fact functions as advertised. Here is the 
would-be scientist facing a phenomenon ever recoiling from the span of his calipers. This 
is experimental method as a downward spiral, a cycle of recursion where the base case is 
not knowledge, but death.    
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Raphaël as Vitalist 
That Raphaël’s experimental process inevitably ends in death serves as an important 
reminder. Not only is he limited due to a Heisenbergian confusion between experimenter 
and experimental object, but he is attempting to test a phenomenon that seems to elude 
experimentation by its character. Questions of life and death were a matter of purportedly 
scientific inquiry in the time of Balzac – Xavier Bichat notably undertook just such a 
study in Recherches physiologiques sur la vie et la mort. Yet such attempts to understand 
the process of birth, aging, and passing often reduced to a sort of pseudo-science that the 
likes of Duhem, Bachelard, and Bernard would later decry as ineffectual, overbroad, and 
under-detailed. The former’s thesis in Sauver les apparences bears mention in this 
respect. In that study, Duhem highlights the long pedigree of the central quarrel between 
astronomes and physiciens (e.g., Duhem, Sauver les apparences 14-16, 20). For the 
astronomer, the task of scientific modeling is to generate a set of equations or theories 
that predict future phenomena – here, the movement of the stars – within a certain degree 
of accuracy based solely on external appearances. For phenomena of any complexity, 
many such models may be applied, be they Ptolemaic epicycles or post-Galilean ellipses; 
and each is admissible provided that they are sufficiently predictive . The physicist has a 
different charge – to choose among a set of models the one that most accurately conforms 
to a metaphysical system – a system which reaches the essence of the object or 
phenomenon studied. Numerically, the epicycle or the ellipse can be manipulated with a 
similar degree of accuracy to predict a star’s path as a matter of strictly external 
appearance; metaphysically, they have no equivalence, as one system presumes 
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geocentrism and the other radically rejects it. It is this latter metaphysical query that leads 
the experimenter astray. Duhem provides myriad examples of choices made in favor of a 
metaphysical system that diminished numerical accuracy. Yet it is not just this trade-off 
that incenses Duhem and others (like Poincaré, who espoused a similar theory), it is the 
physicist’s further tendency to push science beyond its legitimate boundaries to explore 
final or original causes.   
Questions raised by vitalist thinkers regularly seem to fall squarely in this space at 
the boundaries of scientific and theological inquiry. The vitalist equation, offered by 
Lamarck or Bergson, turns on a struggle between two fundamental forces – la durée and 
la vie. The natural development of inanimate objects is in some ways, even before 
Carnot’s thermodynamics, entropic. The mineral that encapsulates energy and matter in a 
state of disequilibrium inevitably follows a process of loss – loss of consistency and loss 
of form (Lamarck 322) in a move towards what thermodynamics would come to 
designate as chaotic equilibrium. Animate objects are better positioned to counteract this 
destructive force through their own vital force. The latter force, at work within the 
animate body, constantly serves to remedy, repair, and renew the physiological system 
that would otherwise only decay if acted on exclusively by la durée (Lamarck 322). In 
living beings, these two contradictory forces tend towards a different, non-
thermodynamic, equilibrium state.     
It is, however, difficult to pin down a precise definition for the ever-renewing, ever-
repairing vital force. Lamarck refers to it as a force particulière without further detail 
(Lamarck 322). For Bergson or Teilhard, life is a non-specific movement (Bergson, 
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L’évolution 250) charged with a sort of consciousness that tends to regulate evolution in 
an ever-climbing spiral (Teilhard 144-45). None of these definitions seems entirely 
satisfactory, in part because the vital force seems to be known solely by its effects, not its 
causes or mechanisms. To exceed the limits of this definition, the vitalist is forced, in 
some measure, to violate Duhem’s articulated principal, and inquire as to final causes.    
Raphaël finds himself in just such a vitalist trap when faced with the diminution of 
his skin. This much is cast in sharp relief when Raphaël returns to the traced skin upon 
receiving news of his unexpected (but wished-for) inheritance: 
Rendu à toute sa raison par la brusque obéissance du sort, Raphaël étendit 
promptement sur la table la serviette avec laquelle il avait mesuré naguère la Peau de 
chagrin. Sans rien écouter, il y superposa le talisman, et frissonna violemment en 
voyant une assez grande distance entre le contour tracé sur le linge et celui de la 
Peau…. 
Une horrible pâleur dessina tous les muscles de la figure flétrie de cet héritier : ses 
traits se contractèrent, les saillies de son visage blanchirent, les creux devinrent 
sombres, le masque fut livide, et les yeux se fixèrent. Il voyait la MORT. (Balzac, La 
Peau 194-95) 
 
The equation described here is superficially simple, but reveals a fair bit of complexity 
upon closer examination. As Raphaël observes, he sees death in the space marking the 
difference between the skin in its original size and the skin in its observed size. In other 
words, the remaining skin plus the lost skin would lead to the original skin just as 
Raphaël’s remaining life plus the amount that his life has diminished (by death) equates 
to his prior life. At first blush, this seems to fit, in one form or another, within the vitalist 
taxonomy already outlined. Under this theory, the progressive diminution of the skin is 
merely obeying the degenerative force to which all matter is subject. As the skin is 
nothing more than a piece of inanimate matter, such degeneration should comport with 
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vitalist expectation, in the absence of a life force to repair any loss in the tissue. Indeed, 
this will be the very hypothesis proposed by the first scientist that Raphaël visits.  
Still another vitalist reading seems possible – one which embraces both sides of 
the equation. When Bichat seeks to define life, it is in relation to death – “la vie est 
l’ensemble des fonctions qui résistent à la mort” (Bichat 1). Life and death remain in a 
sort of mathematical equilibrium, the former balancing out the latter by the additive 
intermediary of certain bodily functions. This equation of sorts finds a broader reflection 
in the context of a passage that relies on death as dramatic mathematical difference. 
Evidently, it is his own death that Raphaël sees, but it is the disappearance of the 
allegedly inanimate skin on which that death is superimposed. The skin itself belies 
analysis because it too appears to have a death and life of its own. That Raphaël 
superposa the skin on its prior contour map seems no coincidence, then, as the text enters 
a space of complex imbrication and superposition, the skin not just overlaying its prior 
trace as a foreshadowing of death, but independently animate in its own way. And further 
overlaying this representation is Raphaël himself. He, too, is at once animate and 
inanimate as he reviews the skin – le masque fut livide – his face no longer a part of a 
living organism but a three-dimensional surface in inanimate contoured trace. The very 
écart that signals death for the skin does likewise for Raphaël.  
And here again opens the recursive feedback loop tending toward death already 
sketched above, a loop only complicated by questions of hybridity and identity figured by 
the skin and its owner in this scene. On the topic of hybridity, one may begin by 
considering Bichat’s view of contractility in tissue. Bichat frames his discussion by resort 
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to a hierarchical substructure of different types of tissue that might sense, extend, or 
contract according to their type and where they fall in his organic/animal dichotomy. Yet 
no matter where tissue falls in his hierarchy, whether it is animal or organic, tissue is 
always capable of exercising a single least common denominator action – la contractilité 
(Bichat 79-80) and in particular, la contractilité par défaut d’extension (Bichat 76-77). 
This latter tendency of tissue to contract when not extended is precisely what seems to be 
happening with the skin in this scene and elsewhere in the text, and this phenomenon is, 
in Bichat’s view, independent of whether the tissue in question is animate or inanimate. 
Raphaël’s talisman fits precisely within Bichat’s system, but that very fit translates to 
further indeterminacy. If questions of life and death exceed science generally, here the 
narrower question of whether the skin is living or dead (or both, perhaps) is equally 
unavailing. The skin, as hybrid artifact, raises the further question of mapping. As 
Houellebecq will ask in a title analyzed later in this Dissertation – what is the map and 
what is the territory here? The skin seems to be both. It is territory for its singulière 
lucidité highlighted elsewhere, for its foyers that capture and reflect light, and for its 
ability to figure life and death in its simplest of movements or deformations. But it is a 
map of sorts, too - a sign figuring a complex topological relation between the skin and its 
owner. As Raphaël performs his overlay, the skin has no meaningful dimensionality, it 
occupies only two dimensions in superposition on the originally traced cloth, and it 
reduces even further to a fluid assez grande distance bounded by parallel two-
dimensional lines. This sort of mise en abyme effect is part and parcel of the very act of 
mapping. As Bertrand Russell notes (in citing to Royce), an accurate map implies a 
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“perfect one-to-one correspondence” with the territory that it represents. But if the map is 
correct, Russell continues, it also must contain a map of the map, a map of the map of the 
map, and so on, in an infinite and infinitely diminishing loop (Russell 48). Even before 
Raphaël’s effect in feedback with the skin is considered, the skin itself independently 
assumes its own dual cycle of decay, as map and as contracting tissue in Bichat’s vitalist 
system.  
Amid the downward spiral of the skin’s mise en abyme mapping, one might also 
persuasively observe the presence of a certain mereological construction in the skin’s 
territory. Raphaël’s attempt in placing the skin within its previous tracing is to perform a 
division and measurement of space, between that which was outside the skin when he 
first acquired it, that which belongs to the skin at the time of the measurement, and the 
intermediate space of the skin’s decay in the meantime. As a matter of topological 
construction, Raphaël’s intent is entirely traditional – to establish three entirely disjoint, 
formally defined sets with no overlap, a taxonomy in the same sense as those established 
by Lamarck and Cuvier. This mathematical and logical formality yields here to a more 
modern conception of sets, a mereological conception where the real supplants the formal 
in the form of “fragments” that extend as classes into “territories.” (Parrochia 196). An 
indefinite multi-fragmentation is permitted in a given class, and any re-assembly of 
fragments may form a class if they satisfy the class’ property. The practical import of this 
is: “Le découpage de l’univers est profondément perturbé par des phénomènes 
d’interfaces, d’interpénétrations et d’empiétements.” (Parrochia 198). The skin cannot 
remain separate from its owner, the space that it no longer occupies can be defined as no 
  
54 
more than une assez grand distance, because of the complex mobility and overlap 
between the skin and its owner, the space it occupies at the moment of purported 
measurement and the space that it once occupied.    
Much the same can be said separately of Raphaël. His face-cum-mask is equally 
susceptible of characterization as fragmented territory in the mereological sense, 
inasmuch as it is both inanimate surface and living tissue - a space constantly defined and 
redefined. Ses traits se contractèrent - again Bichat’s system of contractility finds a point 
of ambiguous applicability. A reflexive verb characterizes the contraction, a movement 
that accordingly happens on its own, without intentional input from Raphaël. Such a 
movement could occur, like that of the skin, in any category of tissue, in any state of 
animation. The contracting mask confuses the taxonomy based on animation, but it also 
works a simple spatial fragmentation, a movement that undermines the notion of a fixed 
extension in favor of an undefined territoriality. Les yeux se fixèrent – again, a reflexive 
verb removing Raphaël from the role of active agent into a more ambiguous space, one 
where the whole is slowly being reduced to fragments. Doubly so here, and with 
important epistemological consequences, as the mobility of Raphaël’s eyes link closely to 
his ability to conduct empirical observation. Here, immobility in observation is 
tantamount to immobility in conclusion – Raphaël now fatally believes that the skin 
performs its advertised function before receiving conclusive proof of this.  
Thus far, we have two curiously mirrored cycles of contraction – that of the skin 
and its owner. What is less clear is whether these cycles are interacting in feedback or 
independently. It is entirely possible that the mirroring effect that would appear to link 
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Raphaël and the talisman in a causal feedback loop is nothing more than two parallel 
phenomena happening in the same location, regardless of Raphaël’s own limited, biased 
view of the matter. The very instability mentioned at the outset of this chapter is only 
underscored here. Even any potential mirroring between the skin and Raphaël in the cited 
passage seems to exceed simple reflection and reach a photonegative state of sorts. 
Returning to the vitalist “equation” offered by Bichat, where life is balanced against 
death by the addition of a series of generative or regenerative bodily functions, an 
opposite equation seems to characterize Raphaël’s view of the skin.8 When he interprets 
the distance separating the then-current skin from its prior size, he does not see life in the 
interstices, but death in all capital letters. Death, and not life, represents a perversely 
additive force in any effort to reset the disequilibrium between the skin’s varying size at 
two separate moments. The striking chiaroscuro that comes over Raphaël’s face in this 
scene – the hollow portions of his face darkening while the more prominent portions are 
cast in white light – heightens the potentially photonegative effect linking the skin and its 
holder, as well as the territorial instability and fragmentation of Raphaël’s face as 
topological space. An indeterminacy born of inversion subsists even if one were to 
presume that the skin were effective in its ostensible supernatural charge.  
The seeming imbalance in the equation linking death and the skin at varying sizes 
leads to an additional source of indeterminacy with its own entropic implications – the 
irreversibility of the skin’s shrinking process. The skin has shrunk according to the 
                                                        
8
 If there exists an inversion of Bichat’s vitalist equation here, it would not be inconsistent with 
Anne Vila’s reading of Louis Lambert, which posited that the character of Louis Lambert reflected 
a pathological inversion of Bichat’s organic/animal hierarchy to be destroyed at the conclusion of 
the text in a return to the normative. (See generally, Vila). 
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simplest of experimental observations; it has suffered a certain degeneration. The cause 
of this degeneration remains unknown, however. The skin may simply have submitted to 
the forces of deterioration that beset inanimate objects; it may express a proto-entropic 
move towards chaotic equilibrium. Regardless of the choice, the process cannot be 
undone or reversed; it cannot be repeated. This is shown empirically later in the text 
when Raphaël seeks the guidance of scientists who unavailingly attempt to alter the skin 
by stretching, cutting, or acid treatment. Irreversibility’s demonstration begins in this 
scene, however. The specter of death filling the space between the prior trace of the skin 
and its presently shrunken contours speaks to the ultimate impossibility of undoing the 
diminution. One can imagine adding matter to a shrunken skin or simply stretching it to 
restore it to its original size after a contraction. But such idealized constructions are a 
function of Newtonian physics where molecules can be oriented in a certain way, 
changed, and then restored to their original state. It is a form of conservation, whether 
stated as a conservation of mass, energy, or even in an Einsteinian form, the relation 
between mass and energy. It is also, perhaps, a function of Buffonian naturalism, where 
the number of living molecules on a global level remains stable at all times, only to be 
redistributed between different organisms as they are born and perish (Balzac specifically 
mentions this concept in L’avant-propos de la Comédie Humaine). Not so here, however 
– Raphaël cannot simply add or subtract “death” to undo the skin’s degeneration; there is, 
to the extent that the skin actually grants wishes, no way to exchange the fortune that he 
has inherited for a growth in the skin – there is no commutativity in this geometry. 
Raphaël will make precisely this offer to the scientists later in the text, and their inability 
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to turn Raphaël’s fortune into a larger skin is further proof of the irreversibility of this 
exchange economy.        
Once again, however, there is no sufficient proof that the skin is actually 
effective. Because the irreversibility could equally follow from a simple aging or 
deterioration process, all that can be said about such irreversibility is that it generally 
situates the skin in a Bergsonian or Teilhardian sort of durée. The skin’s behavior as a 
phenomenon is oriented in space-time, following a vector path that cannot then be 
retraced in the opposite direction. What Teilhard says of the formation of the noogénèse 
could equally apply here (Teilhard 271-72) – the skin’s behavior is a function of an 
evolving – or devolving – process that happens successively and in dependence on the 
specific conditions that have come before it. This set of initial conditions leading in 
succession to a certain experimental result could never be realized again or reproduced in 
exactly the same way, a source of hazard undermining the predictability of the 
phenomenon (we will have occasion to revisit this concept on a number of occasions, but 
most saliently in Queneau’s indirect reflection of Balzac’s attitude towards science). The 
simple external measurement – undertaken approximatively in the form of une assez 
grande distance – belies this reality by reducing the phenomenon to the empirically 
observable and the strictly external. All that Raphaël reviews is the skin’s very edge, its 
external border, while clearly something has occurred inside the skin’s narrow confines, 
the inverted movement of a sort of moule intérieur (Buffon 176-77). Seen from this 
perspective, the insertion of death in the equation is a flight of paranoid imagination, but 
one which reaches the same result as a more scientifically-oriented approach. It tends 
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towards a showing of fundamental indeterminacy in the changes in the skin and its 
owner, changes that cannot be said conclusively to be parallel or intertwined and 
randomness that cannot be eliminated. Such, again, is the very nature of the 
mereologically fragmented space of imbrication and overlap.    
What remains to be examined is the more realistic view of the skin’s 
irreversibility – whether it is the result of an entropic move towards an equilibrium state 
or whether it reflects a more vitalist view relying on change in senescence. The latter 
seems plainly the better view, and thereby frames not just the indeterminacy of this scene 
(and the skin more generally), but the type of indeterminacy that the skin and its owner 
reflect. On the one hand, the entropic view seems a poor fit here for a number of reasons. 
One is a matter of history – Carnot’s thermodynamics, while proposed effectively 
contemporaneously with Balzac’s writing of La Peau de chagrin – would not gain real 
traction until several decades later. Another more important reason flows from a central 
conflict between the fundamental nature of entropic movement when measured against 
the guided indeterminacy of an animist or vitalist viewpoint. Jacques Monod underscores 
this when proposing genetic evolution as a simple series of purely random events not 
guided by any overarching principle or force. This concept more or less finds a reflection 
in the propagation of entropy, another probabilistic process driven by random interactions 
between particles tending towards a chaotic (rather than ordered) equilibrium. Monod’s 
view on his own theory of genetics might apply equally to entropy – the former, like the 
latter, is une idée austère et froide (Monod 213) which has, as backdrop, un univers glacé 
(213). The energy and heat of thermodynamics is, indeed, destined to loss of energy and 
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cold; but so too must evolve the particles’ affective double, the researcher, left to face an 
icy universe devoid of a necessary order, divine guiding force, or tendency towards 
overarching perfection. At first glance, this seems a reasonable model for Raphaël’s 
interaction with the shrunken skin. The text evokes a multiple passage to an icy, deathly 
white in the words pâleur, blanchirent, and livide. The non-equilibrium and the ordered 
pass to an ever diminishing energy state. The affective energy of Raphaël’s former life of 
study and written production – a life that Balzac himself viewed as expressive of the 
author’s soul - shifts to the chilled and soulless. The latter transition is only reinforced by 
Raphaël’s frisson upon first seeing the skin. Raphaël is akin to particulate matter, 
gyrating in place in disequilibrium, only to expend that energy irreversibly in a move to 
an obsessed psychological equilibrium, overall energetic diminution, and ultimately, a 
state of vegetation and death.  
This reading of the passage is credible, but it is less persuasive than a view of the 
skin’s initial shrinking as reflective of a vitalist (or animist) phenomenon that exceeds 
Monod’s chilling universe. Any excess beyond Monod’s purely probabilistic universe 
maps precisely to the point of excess in this passage – the death that fills the space 
beyond the shrunken skin’s boundaries. To this point, the discussion has tended to treat 
Raphaël’s view of death as a means of balancing an equation between two states of the 
skin at two separate moments. Such an understanding is useful to index the basic 
relations between the objects in the passage, but it also represents a certain 
mischaracterization. Life and death are not, in a vitalist view, quantifiable within an 
equation or set of equations; they necessarily exceed such relations. To reduce death to a 
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line item on a ledger (Canguilhem, La connaissance 111) is to subject it to a method that 
voids the term of its very meaning. If death is merely a mechanism that shrinks a skin, a 
vitalist would contend, then it is not death at all. It is more than the sum of a sequence of 
parts or a part in a sequence of sums, just as la MORT for Raphaël is far more than a 
measured space between a red trace and a skin’s diminished boundaries. Death is in all 
capitals; it is a dramatic actor entering the text at a moment of scientific experiment, 
necessarily surpassing the methods of the latter, and completely re-orienting the already 
confused fragmentation of the scene. It is, as Canguilhem notes, an inherent exception to 
a world otherwise governed by scientific theory and law (Canguilhem, La connaissance 
121). Une assez grande distance remains between the lines before Raphaël – not only 
does he not bother to measure the distance of the spread, he has concluded that it would 
not be useful to do so. The mere fact that the space appears between the lines is all that 
matters. Whether the skin had retreated one centimeter or five, death would fill Raphaël’s 
gaze in stark, big-print totality, beyond quantity or quantification.    
Raphaël’s behavior is accordingly more consistent with that of a vitalist than that 
of a scientist in a coldly entropic universe. Here we have a second, complementary 
scientific limit to Raphaël’s limits as experimenter. For if a definition of this attitude in 
terms like totality and exception is an affirming way of situating the vitalist tendency, a 
more negative view is certainly possible. Bernard would notably later decry the 
intermingling of scientific experimentation, on one hand, and words like life, death, and 
vitality, on the other (Bernard 319). When a fellow medical researcher took the reported 
results of an experiment to task because different experimental subjects had different 
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“vitalities,” Bernard rejected that contention and the word vitalité that informed it as 
completely meaningless. Where a scientific conclusion relies on life or death, the scientist 
is doing little more than reciting a sort of shibboleth that is not the object of science, but 
inherently beyond its limits. The magic word, for Bernard, becomes a container that 
simultaneously signifies almost anything and absolutely nothing. A word as talisman for 
Bernard is no different than a skin as talisman for Raphaël the vitalist. One could 
superpose – in yet another level of superposition, then - a perfect relation of equivalence 
between the skin and “life,” the skin’s degeneration and “death”; and each is equal in its 
indeterminacy. The nature of such indeterminacy is not entropic, but pre-entropic. What 
is not scientifically known or knowable is not treated as the result of a tendency towards 
chaos measured by a probability distribution of gas molecules, or as a locus of limited 
information due to the energy cost of information or negentropy. Rather, indeterminacy is 
a space of Bachelardian obstacle where science can only apply magic words and magic 
skins to that which fundamentally exceeds its grasp (see also Canguilhem, Idéologie et 
rationalité 72). And if Bernard believed that experimental medicine would relegate words 
like “life” and “death” to the dustbin once those phenomena were fully understood 
(Bernard 319), La Peau de chagrin offers no apparent tendency to eliminate this 
uncertainty. Far from it - rather than close the gap between the original boundary of the 
skin and its shrunken dimensions, the specter of death figured between the lines (and 
beyond) is only destined to grow to an infinite of unknowability as the skin’s dimensions 
approach zero.      
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Because an interpretation of Raphaël as vitalist is preferable to an interpretation of 
Raphaël as shuffled, entropic particle, vitalism may serve as an entry point for a further 
interpretive framework to analyze the skin - Teilhard’s animism. In the skin and its 
holder, La Peau de chagrin presents a worthy predecessor to Teilhard’s great project to 
systematize the evolution of the universe from its beginnings to the formation of life, the 
development of higher forms of life through thought, and the promise of achievement of 
an Omega point mega-synthesis (see generally, Teilhard). This evolution is carefully 
controlled and impelled by a perpetually active guiding force that belies the strict chance 
underlying Monod’s view of the world. Such a force relies on a speculative turn proposed 
by Teilhard – the existence of conscience within all matter, his dedans des choses 
(Teilhard 44-45). Ever evolving, the conscience in all matter develops in an anti-entropic 
inversion of entropic physical reality. The crux of this division is the distinction between 
two types of energy – a tangential energy and a radial energy (Teilhard 52-54). The first 
variety is energy in its scientifically accepted sense, subject to the law of conservation of 
energy and principles of thermodynamics. The second variety of energy is not so stable 
or limited – it promises seemingly infinite growth through the development of higher 
forms of consciousness and the perfection of human society. We will have occasion to 
return to these ideas in the later chapter on Houellebecq; but for now, it suffices to note 
that Raphaël’s enchanted skin – according to his vitalist opinion – behaves as if animated 
by an odd configuration of Teilhard’s construction.  
Teilhard’s choice in characterizing his dual energetic system as part tangential, 
part radial, is telling. The implied movement in such terms is circular. One can imagine a 
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particle on the edge of a circle rotating around the circle’s central point. The movement 
of that point is characterized by two forces – an angular force in the direction of the 
circle’s tangent at the point which makes the point move, and a centripetal force oriented 
radially that keeps the point on the circle from shooting linearly into space. The former 
tangential force fits within the commonly accepted understanding of thermodynamics 
because, in the absence of the centripetal radial force, it would lead to non-directed, 
chaotic movement with a net zero gain in energy according to the conservation of energy. 
The radial force, by contrast, need obey no such energy limits, and in fact exerts greater 
and greater force – in direct proportion to the maturation and progression of 
consciousness - as it pulls all matter and life towards a perfected center in an upward 
spiral.         
A play between a radial collapse and a tangential, boundary linearity is evident in 
Raphaël’s observation and reaction of the shrunken skin. There is the frisson of Raphaël, 
a tangential sort of vibration, back in forth in place without a necessary center. Then there 
is the bounded ring of empty space surrounding the skin - a site of energy exchange in 
degeneration and a tangential movement following in the direction of, or away from, two 
determined edges. Such tangential space and energy tells only part of the story, however. 
Raphaël’s physical changes in the passage speak to a series of guided, radial changes. 
Une horrible pâleur dessina tous les muscles de la figure flétrie de cet héritier : ses traits 
se contractèrent, les saillies de son visage blanchirent, les creux devinrent sombres. The 
color in Raphaël’s face seems to drain from the edges to an internal center, an image 
reinforced by the implied evaporation of fluid antecedent to withering (flétrir, it might be 
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noted, also evoked “branding with a hot iron” in 18th century criminal punishment – an 
interesting different sort of dry heat energy in evidence here, then). His facial features 
proceed to contract, undergoing a radial movement from their normal expansion to a 
diminished, skeletal state. Reflecting Raphaël’s alteration, of course, is the radial change 
that tangential ring around the skin implies – the gradual movement of the skin towards 
its center. Here is a scene animated (or deadened, perhaps) by a radial energy that 
overwhelms and exceeds the simply entropic sort of motion associated with the 
tangential. An entropic interpretation of this scene may be necessary, but it is insufficient 
in the face of a certain animist, Teilhardian excess of energy tending to move in parallel 
in different objects, as if guided by an overarching force. Yet where Teilhard’s 
construction of radial energy is fundamentally generative and infinitely growing, the 
radial for Raphaël is decidedly degenerative. Supplanting the progression to an Omega 
point is a devolution to death and immobility - le masque fut livide, et les yeux se fixèrent. 
There is an approach to a single point in both cases, but the directionality has flipped for 
Raphaël’s downward spiral.  
Before moving to a final section on the genetic implications of the double decline 
of Raphaël and his talisman, worth note is yet another inversion of Cartesian thought 
implied by Raphaël’s possession of the skin.  Previously, this Chapter recorded the 
tendency in Raphaël to follow a methodological chain diametrically opposed to 
Descartes’ proposed chain. Where Descartes moved from doubt to certainty, and in 
particular, mathematical certainty, Raphaël seems to follow a chain from mathematical 
certainty to doubt, from Newtonian to Heisenbergian. Even where he reaches a state of 
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certainty, as he does when first observing the skin’s shrinking, he does so non-
scientifically, non-mathematically, in his refusal to measure the haunting space separating 
the skin from its prior dimensions. This is certainty that is not worthy of the designation 
in a Cartesian sense, as it is based on the spectral and – as has been shown here on a 
number of occasions – the unproven. Certainty, for Raphaël, as possessor of the skin, is 
not the end-point of a chain of reason, but a fortuitous contraction, collapse, and 
superposition of objects placed in proximity.  
This contortion of Cartesian thought continues for Raphaël as he readapts to life 
laboring under the belief that the skin is effective. In this state of readapted life, Raphaël 
receives a visit from a childhood teacher who is seeking employment. Coincident with 
the teacher’s arrival is the observation that:  
Au sein du luxe, [Raphaël] mena la vie d’une machine à vapeur. …[Du point de 
vue du professeur], tout lui semblait artificiel dans ce corps fluet et débile. En 
apercevant le marquis à l’œil dévorant, au front chargé de pensées, il ne put 
reconnaître l’élève au teint frais et rose, aux membres juvéniles, dont il avait 
gardé le souvenir.” (Balzac, La Peau 206) 
 
The critical image here is one of the most typically Cartesian, though espoused by many 
others – the man as steam engine. Descartes’ earlier analogue to this was the clock-man 
(Descartes, Méditations 201-03), but Canguilhem notes that this original image had 
assumed greater complexity by the time of Balzac in view of the increasing complexity of 
machinery (Canguilhem, Idéologie et rationalité 114). So the clock-man and the steam 
engine-man might reasonably be viewed as equivalent. Of critical interest here is the 
rejection of the image in its original sense. For Descartes, the clock-man was a symbol 
for the human organism whether healthy or ill; but the properly functioning clock-man 
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was one who could tell time, that is, who was healthy. The unhealthy human could still 
be compared to a clock, but reflected an error of nature, a clock that no longer told time 
accurately. He was the hydropique who sought water despite the fact that he already had 
an excess of fluid. The representation of Raphaël as he receives the visit modifies this set 
of relations. Raphaël is plainly unhealthy here, as evidenced by his corps fluet et débile, 
yet he appears to be a perfectly functioning steam engine. He specifically aims to model 
his life in possession of the skin after an ailing patient who “n’avait pas dit un mot 
pendant dix ans, et s’était soumis à ne respirer que six fois par minute dans l’air épais 
d’une vacherie” (Balzac, La Peau 206). Setting aside the palliative oddity of this model, 
Raphaël’s life unfolds with pneumatic (or chronometric) precision under its dictates - 
with every breath in measure and rhythm, and with every human desire suppressed in 
favor of mechanical activities like reading the newspaper. Raphaël is a perfected steam 
engine when receiving his former instructor, yet he is also a highly flawed physiological 
specimen. In Balzac’s text, Descartes’ view is inaccurate – humans are reduced to the 
status of machinery only when they are in a state of disease or psychological disorder. 
The comparison fails when a human is functioning properly, precisely where Descartes 
felt it was the most probative. This serves as a final reminder of the vitalist inclinations of 
La Peau de chagrin. One common criticism lofted by vitalism in the direction of 
Descartes’ mechanical view of physiology is its inability to view the human organism (or 
any organism) in its totality. By comparing a leg to a piston or the heart to an engine, the 
mechanical comparison reduces the human to a series of individual mechanical parts, not 
a fully functioning organism, whose functioning can only be captured with an eye to the 
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complex and dynamic interactions of the whole. Then there is the additional criticism that 
a mechanical view of the human body is guilty of the historical inaccuracy of applying a 
strictly human creation – artificial machinery – to an organism that necessarily predated 
such a creation. As Canguilhem notes, there was no machine to construct the first 
machine, only the eternally original human.
9
 The vital, then, is the original and authentic; 
the mechanical is the partial latecomer. Such a construction corresponds to the arrival and 
memory of Raphaël’s professor, where the machine is the decrepit simulacrum-Raphaël 
that follows in the wake of the rosy-cheeked and limber youth that Raphaël once had 
been. As the text seems to intimate, in any attempt to construct Raphaël’s life 
experimentally once he possesses the skin, there is ever a beyond and a before that 
escapes analysis in an élan vital surviving only in the space encircling the skin and the 
sepia-hued memories of childhood instructors.        
 
Raphaël as Lamarckian Transformist 
The first two sections of this Chapter have demonstrated why Raphaël’s allegedly 
enchanted skin may not actually be enchanted at all. For one, Raphaël proves repeatedly, 
and perhaps inherently, incapable of serving as an experimenter when studying the 
potential effects of the skin on himself. Further, even if Raphaël were able to adhere to 
more rigorous experimental method when testing the skin’s hypothetical enchantment, 
the very nature of that enchantment exceeds the limits of experimental or empirical 
science. Raphaël cannot resolve the skin’s fundamental set of life and death questions 
                                                        
9
 For an illustration of the paradoxical nature of this image, one might consult M.C. Escher’s 
image of the hand drawing itself. 
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because such questions exceed the purview of scientific inquiry. This leaves the skin 
where the Chapter started, in a limbo between two primary possibilities – a causal 
interaction between the skin and its holder where the skin lives up to its bargain and an 
unrelated interaction where the skin and its holder decay in parallel without feedback 
between the two. For lack of experimental determinacy in this case, one is left to climb 
back up the slope of Duhem’s proof denying the possibility of an experimentum crucis. 
Where Duhem showed that the experimentum crucis would hypothetically involve the 
serial elimination of hypotheses until only one remained, he rejected such a winnowing 
process due to the sheer – perhaps even infinite - number of hypotheses that would need 
to be eliminated in a given case. Rather than move from many, or even two, hypotheses 
to a single proven relation, Raphaël assumes the truth of one possibility, thereby leaving 
his actual relation to the skin indeterminate. This means a necessary countermove from 
the artificial one selected by Raphaël to a potential of many hypotheses that could 
describe the relation between Raphaël and the skin. Just as two hypotheses would not 
normally satisfy Duhem to describe a phenomenon of any complexity, so should two 
possibilities not suffice here. There is, at the very least, a third, offered under the 
proposed name “supernatural selection,” to describe Raphaël’s degeneration in the 
context of the skin’s own degeneration. Rather than limiting the phenomenon 
encompassing Raphaël and the skin to simple, tightly intertwined, supernatural causation 
or complete segregation in parallel, there is the possibility that the skin acts in an 
intermediate relation to Raphaël, whereby the skin serves as a proto-genetic text by which 
Raphaël is subsequently selected in his environment. A double curiosity of timing 
  
69 
follows from this initial proposal. The first is historical, as Mendelian genetics and 
Darwinian natural selection were only first proposed close to fifty and thirty years, 
respectively, after La Peau de chagrin. The second flows from the nature of genetics, a 
code effective from birth, not first applied in the later stages of a prematurely aging 
man’s life. The skin’s powers of “supernatural selection,” then, may be best understood 
as a proto-genetic code, an influence verging on Lamarckian transformism, due in part to 
the skin’s late appearance in Raphaël’s life, in part to the precisely guided nature of 
transformism in reflection of Teilhard’s theories, and in part to the historical timeliness of 
Lamarck’s theories. By subscribing unthinkingly to the supernatural powers of the skin – 
a showing already made here – Raphaël allows himself to be selected supernaturally in a 
sense. In another, he is allowing for a transformation of his organism consistent with 
Lamarckian theory. It remains to be seen how the text demonstrates this additional 
hybridity. 
 The beginnings of a genetics-based reading of La Peau de chagrin can be found 
as early as the text’s dedication, and only amplify in Raphaël’s immediate appearance. It 
is in the dedication that Balzac supplements his mention of M. Savary of L’Académie des 
Sciences with an image from Sterne’s Tristram Shandy, the irregularly sinusoidal trace of 
a snake. Such sinuosity might serve as a symbol for the vicissitudes of Raphaël’s 
existence, but the narrow, twisting snake seems to suggest a purely coincidental 
phenomenon – a strange prefiguration of DNA. Here, the balled-up, twisting, helical 
amino acids unwind and rewrap themselves in an eerily predictive inflections of the 
snake’s body. An effect of pure coincidence, indeed, but the text’s seeming prescience 
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continues with Raphaël’s immediate, desperate visit to the gambling house. With the last 
coin of his diminished fortune in hand, Raphaël resolves to multiply his wealth or destroy 
it in a single wager. His evident desperation is greeted by the gambling den’s regular 
denizens, a group of professeurs émérites forming their own academy of vice in parody 
of the real-life academies of science of Balzac’s time:  
Aussi tous ces professeurs émérites de vice et d’infamie, semblables à une vieille 
femme édentée, prise de pitié à l’aspect d’une belle fille qui s’offre à la 
corruption, furent-ils prêts à crier au novice : — Sortez ! Celui-ci marcha droit à 
la table, s’y tint debout, jeta sans calcul sur le tapis une pièce d’or qu’il avait à la 
main, et qui roula sur Noir. (Balzac, La Peau 15)  
 
A throw of a coin without design or aim speaks to the probabilistic randomness of 
Raphaël’s act, and of the subsequent act of playing a game of chance. His toss fits the 
dual criteria of von Mises’ definition of probability (Popper 139). A given event – 
Raphaël’s thoughtless toss of the coin on black or the dealer’s later turn of a red card – 
behaves randomly on its own according to the “axiom of randomness.” If repeated 
indefinitely, however, both the cards and Raphaël’s toss would ultimately behave 
according to an “axiom (or theorem) of convergence,” with the relative frequency of 
different outcomes asymptotically approaching certain limits according to the law of 
averages. In simplified form, red or black are the only possible outcomes for both 
Raphaël’s toss and the cards dealt (in modern roulette, there are green spaces that 
effectively guarantee that the house will win against red/black bettors, but the presence of 
cards of this type is not evident in the text), so each should converge to a probability of 
.5, each independent of the other. Four permutations could have resulted from this 
perspective – Black-Black, Red-Red, Red-Black, and Black-Red – each converging to a 
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probability of .25 in the long run as a matter of a priori probability. But only the fourth 
case happens in the text, accordingly with a retrospective or a posteriori probability of 1. 
Raphaël’s financial ruin, due to the rupture between extreme short-run noise and long-run 
stability, is assured.  
 Despite the apparent randomness governing the scene, the certain loss following 
the tossed coin and the flipped card has an air of fatality to it. If the paragraph above 
describes a classical probability analysis, the fatality of Raphaël’s wager flows from a 
Bayesian reconstruction of the scene built on greater and greater knowledge as to the 
initial conditions underlying the wager. Under a classical analysis, a probabilistic 
construction is superficially necessary to attempt to quantify the uncertainty inherent in 
the scene, the tossed coin and the flipped card behave according to what Monod refers to 
as “operational probability” (Monod 148-49). This concept, which Monod contrasts with 
“essential probability,” speaks to the theoretical possibility of eliminating the very 
uncertainty that requires probabilistic analysis. For each thoughtless throw of a coin or 
flip of a card, there are a series of initial conditions that inform the uncertain move. For 
the coin toss, such conditions could include the weight of the coin, the angle and velocity 
at which it is tossed, the pressure of the air in the room, the coefficient of friction 
operating between the carpet of the table and the coin, and many others. For the flipped 
card, this would be the series of shuffling moves executed by the dealer, coupled with the 
initial arrangement of the cards before the shuffle. As Monod notes, if all such initial 
conditions were known for these two events, no resort to probabilistic analysis would be 
necessary – the coin would be known to fall on black every time that Raphaël threw that 
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specific coin in the manner that he did; the card would always turn up red. Monod’s 
operational probability is not a new construction – what he suggests is indistinguishable 
from Laplace’s early 19th century daemon (Laplace 4), the hypothetical creature that 
could correctly foresee the unfolding of the universe by virtue of knowing all conditions 
governing every particle. Such a daemon would know that Raphaël’s financial ruin was 
inevitable – a fatalistically pre-ordained outcome. This air of fatality is only reinforced by 
the fact that this scene is the last in a long series of wagers by Raphaël, beginning with a 
surreptitious wager of his father’s money and continuing throughout his life in Paris. The 
single coin toss and card flip might behave according to a short-term probability, but the 
long-term practice of gambling on games of strict chance all but assures the gambler’s 
ruin. If not in this scene for Raphaël, ruin awaited him in another seedy gambling house. 
If theoretically governed by a pure probability analysis, then, Raphaël’s ultimate 
gambling loss implied aspects of both short- and long-term inevitability. The wager is for 
Raphaël at once conditionally and unconditionally fatal – a clever inversion of Pascal’s 
famous wager, with its own elements of the classical and the Bayesian. (Parrochia 86-87). 
And the suicidal Raphaël, like the gambler in Pascal’s wager, is throwing down more 
than his last coin - he is gambling an indivisible human life. 
“Que de choses dans un coup de dés !” (Balzac, La Peau 16), the text notes in a 
Mallarméan élan (Mallarmé, Un Coup de Dés jamais n’abolira le Hasard), and 
accurately so, for the rolls of the dice in this scene are not just a reminder of the odd 
combination of probability and fatality in Raphaël’s financial fortunes, they are equally a 
pre-figuration of a sort of genetic fatality plaguing Raphaël. Monod again supports such 
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an interpretation here, but this time in a move from pure probability to genetics. 
Characterizing the latter field is a mix of pure randomness and near certainty. On one 
hand, protein replication and interaction is a highly mechanical, predictable process with 
very little variance. Proteins almost inevitably create perfect copies of themselves. 
Further, the notion of stereospecificity, or the ability of proteins to recognize and bind to 
only very specific matched proteins during reactions, is an entirely certain, fixed process. 
It is a type of sorting so careful in its handling of complex chemical elements that Monod 
finds occasion to compare it to that other famous daemon – Maxwell’s daemon (Monod 
82-83). Where Maxwell’s daemon’s gas molecule sorting was shown to be a matter of 
myth from the perspective of energy expenditure, a similar type of sorting happens in 
reality in the case of stereospecificity, where information is exchanged between 
molecules effectively without loss or error. Against this backdrop of predictability and 
invariance, however, randomness characterizes other aspects of genetics. The original 
sequences of DNA proteins, for example, remain random, such that knowledge of 199 of 
200 parts of a protein provides no knowledge, theoretical or empirical, as to the identity 
of the 200
th
 (Monod 126-27). And then there is the unexpected variation that serves as an 
engine for evolution, the random mutations in genetic proteins that spark new 
stereospecific interactions which, in turn, drive change on the level of the organism. If the 
latter is successful in passing on this mutation by inheritance, and the environment selects 
for that trait, a species may come to reflect a single chance modification.  
For Raphaël, his initial chance throw of the coin, followed by the chance flip of a 
card, seems to straddle the random and the fatalistic in a similar manner. Animating the 
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initial move in both genetics and the coin toss is a seeming randomness. Any eligible 
protein could complete the string of 200; either red or black could end up Raphaël’s bet. 
Yet once the die is cast in both cases, the genes follow their established sequence in near-
perfect replication while Raphaël is sent necessarily down the path of acquiring the skin 
and suffering its potential effects. A pure coincidence again, but worth noting – Monod 
describes the teleonomic system of genetic evolution as a spin of the roulette wheel 
(Monod 159), a selection of one possibility among many that the universe comes to 
integrate, maintain, and amplify. Such is the arguably genetic turn taken by Raphaël’s 
initial experience at the gambling house, where the random coin toss becomes something 
much more determinate.   
 That something, of course, depends in large part on Raphaël’s interaction with 
what might reasonably be compared to his own later-life genetic code – the onager skin 
itself. Raphaël’s first interactions with the contract inscribed on the skin, under the 
watchful eye of the aged shopkeeper, speak to this possibility.  
Le vieillard présenta son stylet à l’inconnu [i.e., Raphaël], qui le prit et tenta 
d’entamer la peau à l’endroit où les paroles se trouvaient écrites ; mais, quand il 
eut enlevé une légère couche de cuir, les lettres y reparurent si nettes et tellement 
conformes à celles qui étaient imprimées sur la surface, que, pendant un moment, 
il crut n’en avoir rien ôté. (Balzac, La Peau 40) 
 
The characters written on the skin penetrate more deeply than superficial ink; they are 
fully ingrained – the text elsewhere uses the word incrusté - in the skin’s surface. This 
text is immutable, then, impervious to change in the surface that contains it. Such is the 
relation between an organism and its underlying genetic code, where the latter would 
remain unchanged despite superficial modification to the organism itself. And such, as 
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noted via Monod, is the invariant nature of the genetic code itself as it develops and 
replicates. The reappearance of the letters highlights the generativity of the skin’s text – 
an apparent subtraction of material leads to no loss in the skin’s informational content, 
and even seems to generate new clarity and lucidity. For Monod’s version of Maxwell’s 
daemon, the interaction of matched proteins in stereospecific processes promotes just 
such an energy-efficient immunity to loss of informational content. The skin here is a 
seemingly realized genotype, a genetic code awaiting for its phenotypic realization.  
The skin need not wait long to find it. The contract’s content itself seems to 
clarify that its owner will become just such a phenotype. Among the contract’s terms 
appears the all caps “TA VIE M’APARTIENDRA.” (Balzac, La Peau 41). By accepting 
possession of the contract, if its terms are to be believed, Raphaël has, in return, shifted 
possession of his own life to the contract. It should be noted that this reality has nothing 
to do with whether the contract actually performs as advertised – it suffices that the 
holder believe that the contract is effective. Thus between the two oft-mentioned 
possibilities of an effective skin and the parallel, but unrelated, decay of the skin and its 
holder, there lies a median point where the skin exercises a certain psychological and 
physiological control by virtue of the holder’s simple belief. The skin’s text becomes 
embodied reality – genomenon, to borrow Serres’ word (Serres, Hermès III 47), finding 
its phenomenon. The transfer between genetic text and body fulfills biological 
expectations through a relation of precedence and explanation. Despite Raphaël’s age, the 
skin is much older – it precedes its holder. For the remainder of the text, it explains its 
holder’s behavior and decline. 
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The ominous TA VIE M’APARTIENDRA is not written on the contract in 
French, and this detail serves as a critical additional pivot point between the genetic 
coding of the skin and the body to be coded. The contract is actually written in Arabic, a 
language that the shopkeeper mistakenly refers to as Sanskrit. The contract, in other 
words, has no direct meaning to him. Raphaël, by contrast, is able to translate the skin for 
the shopkeeper without any guidance. (Balzac, La Peau 42). Translation is the 
fundamental basis for genetics, as Serres points out. (Serres, Hermès III 47). Raphaël is 
precisely the translating medium for the text of the skin – he is the intermediary by 
which, and the outlet through which, the contract text is given voice. Translation and 
transfer – passage again and again from genetic model to phenotypic physiology. As 
Raphaël holds up the skin to decipher its markings, it is telling that he is still referred to 
as the inconnu, but he will remain anonymous only until his friends recognize him as he 
leaves the boutique. Acquiring the skin means acquiring an identity for Raphaël, a 
translation relegating his prior existence to inauthentic simulacrum and elevating the 
skin’s text to indirect identifier of its owner.  
 But the question must be asked whether something is lost in the translation from 
the skin to Raphaël. If the question of genetic translation between the skin and its owner 
is a biological one, there remains, as Serres notes, another dimension to explore – the 
question of physics. Does the skin behave entropically? The discussion thus far has 
tended to show that the skin exhibits the characteristics of a pre-entropic vitalism rather 
than those of a proto-entropic thermodynamics. Unfortunately, there remains no 
experimentum crucis in this regard – Raphaël never seems to make the direct wish that 
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the skin enlarge (such would be the equivalent of the meta-wish example offered by 
Hofstadter). If the skin were functional, the interest of such a wish would be to observe 
the overall change in the size of the skin. Perhaps the skin would grow, with the desired 
outcome exceeding the diminishment of the skin required to grant the wish. Perhaps the 
skin would remain exactly the same size as the diminishment of the skin balances 
perfectly against the magnitude of growth sought. In an entropic view, however, there 
would be necessary loss in the size of the skin, with no possibility of ordered growth 
outstripping the energy required to realize that growth. With Monod’s so-called 
Maxwell’s daemons serving as genetic intermediaries, however, the question becomes 
even more fine-grained, as energy loss reaches a minimum while information transfer 
reaches a maximum. Even if Raphaël translates the skin perfectly, that alone does not 
lead to any necessary conclusion. Perhaps it is a precursor of genetic transmission; 
perhaps – and more probably - it suggests an outgrowth of the vitalist state of affairs 
already observed.    
 If the thermodynamics of the skin’s behavior remain hazy – both textually and 
historically, additional clues to complete the skin’s genetic puzzle lie elsewhere. The crux 
of genetics is the passage of characteristics between generations, the carrying forward of 
the very invariance observed by Monod offset by the limited possibility of mutation or 
variation. Doctor Pascal’s arbre généalogique of the Rougon-Macquart points up a 
chapter in advance here, in the form of Raphaël’s familial inheritance, in all senses of the 
word.  
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First, there is the maternal as a source of a medical condition - “Puis il croyait à la 
Peau de chagrin, il s’écoutait respirer, il se sentait déjà malade, il se demandait : Ne suis-
je pas pulmonique ? Ma mère n’est-elle pas morte de la poitrine ?” (Balzac, La Peau 194-
95). The confluence of events implied in this brief citation speaks curiously to the powers 
attributed by Raphaël – correctly or incorrectly – to the skin. What results is an 
alternative, more historically appropriate interpretation of the skin as working a 
Lamarckian transformation. Before shifting to Lamarck, however, it is worth noting that 
these few sentences belie the skin’s capacity to function as a genotype in the modern 
sense of the term. If Raphaël’s mother suffered from an ailment of the chest during her 
lifetime and her son would eventually suffer from the same medical issues, genetic 
transmission would dictate that the chest disease be encoded at the time of Raphaël’s 
birth. Yet the passage clarifies that Raphaël is concerned about a chest condition only 
upon acquiring the skin much later in life. The timing of the skin’s influence does not 
align with the timing of modern genetic inheritance. This could, of course, lead to an 
alternate means of finding the skin ineffective. If the genetic predisposition to chest 
ailments were present prior to Raphaël’s acquisition of the skin, then the skin cannot 
possibly be effective in a natural sense. Then again, if the skin actually does perform its 
advertised function, it is behaving outside the bounds of not only modern science, but all 
science, and no rules need apply. The skin hypothetically could change a living organism 
then, either through direct intervention in the organism or by re-writing the organism’s 
very genetic code. Such would be the response in a feedback loop, the translation by 
Raphaël of the skin’s text retransmitted to him, almost outside the linearity of time. There 
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is equally a separate possibility lurking in the passage above – a sort of reverse placebo 
effect. If Raphaël se sentait déjà malade, he has reached a conclusion without sufficient 
evidence. His belief in the skin expressed in the first sentence immediately means a belief 
in its effects. Much as a patient ingesting a placebo feels better due to the mere ingestion 
of a pill, Raphaël feels worse due to the mere presence and shrinking of the skin. 
Regardless of whether the skin behaves supernaturally or merely exercises a placebo 
effect, it is reasonable to qualify its effect as a form of “supernatural selection.” The 
environment around Raphaël – his time at a bacchanalian feast followed by his 
unexpected inheritance – selects against Raphaël the organism tethered to his pseudo-
genetic code, the skin. Unlike his mother, he will not be able to reproduce and retransmit 
his condition.     
 Sterility is curiously over-determined when the combination of the skin and 
paternal influence are taken into account. The skin draws its origin from a wild donkey 
of some variety. Taken within a larger family including mules, the skin is already 
associated with a set of animals that served as zoological curiosities in the 18
th
 century 
for their inability to reproduce successfully. The text goes farther, however, in labeling 
the skin a “peau d’un onagre” (Balzac, La Peau 40). The onager as a zoological 
phenomenon was historically taxed with its own mythology of sorts. As early as the 2
nd
 
century, the poet Oppian observed the exaggerated jealousy of the male onager against 
other males. Such jealousy manifest itself not only between adult males, but between an 
adult male and his newborn offspring - offspring whom the father onager was alleged to 
castrate orally immediately after birth (Oppian 131). The onager skin in La Peau de 
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chagrin is a clear reference to a castration of Raphaël by his father, then – a sort of 
revenge by Laius on Oedipus.  Its diminution serves as a perfect parallel for Raphaël’s 
relationship to his father and his paternal inheritance. By the time that Raphaël acquires 
the skin, the properties that his family once possessed – comprised of a maternal 
inheritance in France and certain foreign parcels granted by Napoleon to Raphaël’s father 
- have been completely alienated. As Raphaël explains, when the Restoration ruins his 
father’s fortune, the latter exhausts the fortune inherited from his wife paying costs to 
secure rights in his foreign land titles. The effort proves fruitless, and it is thus when 
Minister Villèle “exhuma…un décret impérial sur les déchéances, et nous eut ruinés, 
signai-je la vente de mes propriétés, n’en gardant qu’une île sans valeur, située au milieu 
de la Loire, et où se trouvait le tombeau de ma mère.” (Balzac, La Peau 95). Raphaël’s 
decline in lockstep with the disappearance of the skin is already figured in the decline of 
Raphaël’s father – who, the text notes, dies of sorrow for having ruined his son (Balzac, 
La Peau 95) – and the disappearance of the family land’s. In Raphaël’s futile 
expenditures of energy and fortune to expand the disappearing skin, one can clearly see 
his father’s futile expenditures of energy and fortune to protect disappearing family lands. 
The skin is a topological representation, once again, this time representing family lands 
consuming themselves in a seemingly entropically inefficient energy loss. Yet the end 
result is non-entropic, a move from the chaos of disjointed lands spread to the four 
corners of Europe to a radially guided, complete annihilation of wealth. Teilhard’s 
generation is directed to the degenerate again here, as the word déchéance means not 
only “forfeiture” in the sense of lost property, but also degeneration. The skin is a 
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reminder of the re-embodiment in Raphaël of his father’s impotence and waste, a code to 
be passed from generation to generation, degenerate to degenerate in a downward, 
disappearing spiral. One would be tempted to see an early imagining of the double helix 
here – twisting in parallel around diminishing maps, only to wrap ever closer in 
convergent destruction.  
Raphaël is destined to serve as the end point of this dizzying intergenerational 
spiral. He ultimately sells the final piece of family land – the island containing his 
mother’s tomb(!) – upon an offer from a speculator. Multiple interpretations are possible 
for this final île sans valeur. The lack of value in the land could refer only to economic 
value, with the tomb retaining value both sentimentally and as a symbol for a sort of cold, 
masochistic, Oedipal love never to be meaningfully satisfied for, and ultimately to be 
relinquished by, Raphaël (See generally Deleuze, Présentation de Sacher-Masoch). Or 
the island could be bereft of value for a slightly different reason – that it represents an 
Oedipal love for Raphaël rendered impossible for lack of an animate partner. Whatever 
the case, the ultimate sale of the island marks the final, dual closure of the maternal and 
paternal coding of Raphaël, a coding resulting in his own infertility. The mother has 
finally been sold as reproductive body; the father’s erosion of the family lands has finally 
been brought to completion. Raphaël has been castrated (indeed, he surrenders his hat 
when entering the gambling house in the first scene), and will never be a father himself.   
 So much for a proto-Darwinian, proto-Mendelian reading of the skin as a sort of 
DNA for Raphaël. Through its reminder of the heritage passed to Raphaël from prior 
generations, the skin is code behaving as supernatural double in a process of natural 
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selection. Yet if Paris selects away from Raphaël in this survival of the fittest, the skin 
again serves a dual role. It is again topological sign and territory – it is code and selector; 
underlying text embodied in Raphaël and force driving Raphaël to despairing impotence 
and death. It is this second role that suggests a final reading of the skin – as an artifact 
driving a process of Lamarckian transformation.  
  Two laws structure transformism in the Lamarckian sense. First, when a 
developing organism uses an organ or body part more frequently or consistently, that 
organ or body will grow and strengthen in proportion to such increased use. The obverse 
is equally proposed – where organisms use an organ or body part less, the lack of use will 
tend to weaken the organ or body part proportionally (Lamarck 216). The second law of 
transformism dictates that such changes – either in the form of strengthening or 
weakening of organs – may be transmitted to subsequent generations if both parents share 
the characteristics (Lamarck 217). According to these laws, Lamarck posited, giraffes 
developed long necks as each generation of the species stretched their necks towards 
higher and higher branches, and such development gained during the giraffes’ life would 
be transmitted forward to their progeny. Already in evidence from these two laws is the 
notion of a gradual but guided intergenerational change – an evolving progression or 
regression depending on particular behaviors consistently practiced over time. Such is a 
precise description of the changes that characterize intergenerational transmission in 
Raphaël’s family. There is a concerted tendency towards diminishment of wealth and 
fertility between Raphaël’s parents and Raphaël himself. All the earmarks of a regressive 
transformism are present, just set against a backdrop that is as much social, economic, 
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and psychological as it is purely physiological. As with the comparison to genetics and 
natural selection, the skin equally serves as a double for this Lamarckian mechanism, a 
form of degeneration to mirror its possessor’s, regardless of its actual efficacy.  
 Yet also akin to the Darwinian in this Lamarckian construct is the skin’s active 
participation in Raphaël’s degeneration. Underpinning the two primary Lamarckian laws 
are three corollaries developing in the form of a chain. They begin with - 1) the 
possibility of a change in the circumstances surrounding a set of organisms, which in turn 
leads to a change in the organism’s needs. A change in needs creates - 2) a change in 
actions and habits for the affected organisms. And the change in actions and habits works 
- 3) a change in the organisms themselves over time. The skin impels Raphaël along this 
chain of serial modifications until his death eliminates the propagation of such 
modifications. The process begins – in a doubling-down of the previous wager - when he 
ostensibly agrees to the contract’s bargain by taking possession of it and assenting to its 
terms:  “— Eh ! bien, oui, je veux vivre avec excès, dit l’inconnu en saisissant la Peau de 
chagrin.” (Balzac, La Peau 45). Vouloir vivre is the key construction in this exclamation, 
as Raphaël expresses a desire to change his life by seeking excess. This change in desire 
offers a distorted, exaggerated take on the Lamarckian change in needs. The distortion 
from need to desire feeds forward in the Lamarckian chain, as Raphaël’s planned 
transition to habits and actions consistent with l’excès, become the muted habits and 
actions of the diminished and vegetal. He passes to the state of a machine à vapeur in an 
inversion of the Cartesian and, to a lesser extent, the Lamarckian.  
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The passage discussed at length above – when Raphaël first comes to believe in 
the skin’s efficacy - speaks to the beginnings of this transformation. The skin shrinks in 
the proximity of Raphaël, accordingly working a change in his immediate environment 
only amplified by Raphaël’s belief. Change in the environment, change in the organism – 
Raphaël immediately undergoes noticeable physiological change. His facial features 
contract; his skin loses its color and begins to resemble a mask. His entire existence 
ultimately bears the traces of this initial change in his premature senescence and altered 
behavior. All of this because Raphaël believes in the skin, rendering the talisman – 
actually or artificially – a participant in a feedback loop that passes through each phase of 
Lamarckian transformism until the characteristics of the transformed organism cannot be 
passed on to future generations.      
  
Conclusion 
The dual nature of the skin – as proto-genetic and Lamarckian, among other 
hybridities – compels a return to questions of determinacy and indeterminacy in Balzac’s 
text. A brief description of the title character in Le Curé de Tours will help focus this 
return. The feckless curé Birotteau, the text comments, is un peu tard à la vérité (Balzac, 
Le Curé de Tours 43). Birotteau may be a special case in his limited ability to appreciate 
the world around him. Indeed, such limits lead directly both to his failure to achieve 
promotion and to his ultimate relegation from Tours to a second-rate parish across the 
river. But his “lateness” to truth speaks to an issue that reaches beyond his own text, as 
far as Raphaël’s own predicament (and perhaps, still even more broadly throughout La 
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Comédie Humaine
10
). To be late to the truth places a character in a state of present 
suspension, incapable of gathering knowledge or acting on a sufficient set of facts. There 
is no Maxwell’s daemon to predictably move molecules between bottles in the present, 
no Laplace’s daemon to inventory and track the movements of the entire universe in a 
single, simultaneous act of conscience. There is instead the ever-fleeing, ever-différant 
truth delayed into a necessarily unknown space, leaving in its wake an indeterminate and 
underdetermined present – one that does not fulfill Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire’s unity of 
composition. Such, in effect, is Raphaël’s predicament in his confrontation with the skin. 
A state that he assumes at a given moment is limited to that moment – no meaningful 
measurement or classification of the skin is possible, as the very act of measuring the skin 
may change the skin’s dimensions in a Heisenbergian interplay. And even if a 
measurement does not bring about such a change, through its very act of degeneration, 
the skin is following a continual process marked by la durée, a constant escape to the 
intervals between the measured contour traces that attempted to capture the skin at a 
given instant. Before the ink dries on a given contour, the truth has fled radially inward, 
away from the grasp of Raphaël’s line. The present truth must remain indeterminate for 
Raphaël. Like Birotteau, he is ever late, until it is too late. The flight of truth is precisely 
what keeps Raphaël from ever proving the efficacy of the skin in accomplishing its 
contractual terms. The instability underlined at the outset of this Chapter remains 
throughout the text. This instability also acts in a feedback loop with the hybridity of the 
skin, where the unknowability of the skin at a given moment allows the skin to assume 
                                                        
10
 Or even broader still. As Balzac notes in L’avant-propos à la Comédie Humaine: “Les 
infortunes des Birotteau, le prêtre et le parfumeur, sont pour moi celles de l'humanité.” 
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more real and hypothetical hybrid states, which in turn feed-back on and amplify the 
skin’s unknowability. The skin might be supernaturally effective; it might be ineffective 
in coincidentally parallel degeneration; it might be Lamarckian or proto-genetic in its 
selection; and it still might answer to any number of other hypotheses. Raphaël is a sort 
of Tantalus, and when truth’s branch has fled his grasp into the future, all he can do is 
construct or update a theory to model how the branch once appeared. In his case, this is a 
belief in the skin’s powers. Yet as Duhem would note, such belief is speculation as to 
final causes, not scientific truth.       
Yet for all the present indeterminacy in lateness to truth, there remains for those 
who are un peu tard à la vérité the word vérité itself, and the implicit possibility of truth. 
In Balzac’s text, somewhere behind the image of the screen that blocks the view of the 
future from those in the present (Bergson, Durée et simultanéité 61) subsists the tangibly 
verifiable, the truth. To define such truth may not be possible in any concrete way, but it 
can be demonstrated (and has been demonstrated here) what that truth is not. It is not pre-
Bernardian, in the sense that an ultimate understanding of a phenomenon is posited. Not 
only is the skin’s behavior beyond Raphaël’s understanding, it necessarily surpasses 
anyone’s understanding – scientist or not, regardless of the historical time period. 
Scientific truth in the Bernardian (or Newtonian) sense is a form of determinacy or 
certainty. If the set of relevant facts contributing to a phenomenon are known, then the 
phenomenon’s development reduces to pure predictability in every case. The very 
possibility of a supernatural cause beyond human understanding necessarily displaces the 
skin from a Bernardian framework. The skin is not proto-entropic either – its progressive 
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disappearance is too guided to translate directly to an asymptotic path to chaotic 
equilibrium. Further, the text never demonstrates that a necessary loss of energy and 
information over time accompanies the skin’s disappearance. It remains possible that the 
skin, as an independent engine for exchange, operates efficiently – if Raphaël wishes for 
millions, he gets just that, with a fixed loss in skin mass as a price for the transfer. That 
loss of the skin could be a simple part of the exchange equation, or it could be energy lost 
to entropy; but neither hypothesis is necessarily correct. Lest the text’s opening toss of 
the coin and flip of the card mislead, the skin does not seem a space for probabilistic 
modeling of the sort that models the distribution of gas particles in a given 
thermodynamically governed environment. By contrast, the skin’s behavior implies the 
fatalistic and certain in guided degeneration. The skin, then, is too certain for entropic 
modeling, yet not certain enough for a Bernardian comprehension of its behavior. 
The skin is not located at an artificial midpoint between these two scientific 
views, however. Rather, the skin seems to subsist in an extra-scientific space fraught with 
Bachelardian obstacles and vitalist unknowability – a reminder of the limits of the 
science of Balzac’s time and a subtle critique of the systèmes that claimed to explain 
everything scientifically. A different sort of indeterminacy characterizes the skin, one 
grounded in the superstition of the talisman and the vague and arbitrary meaning of 
words like “life” and “death.” The skin may be measured, perhaps, but the concepts 
taxing the skin’s significance and symbolism are immeasurable. If Bernard would see life 
and death as ultimately yielding to the objective and experimental, Raphaël remains in a 
subjective and undefinable space. If Serres interpreted Monod as reducing life to pure 
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calculation in genetics (Serres, Hermès III 51), Raphaël’s skin exceeds the calculable. 
Such is Balzac’s specific brand of scientific indeterminacy. 
There is a remedy – or perhaps a panacea – for this indeterminacy in Balzac’s 
idealized model of science. The task of penetrating the seemingly unknowable 
degeneration of the skin falls squarely on the type of science that La Peau de chagrin 
associates with Cuvier, but which could have been associated with a more general brand 
of late 18
th
 and early 19
th
 century science. This science was generative; it exceeded the 
coldly descriptive and superficially empirical in an élan, such that “les marbres 
s’animalisent, la mort se vivifie, le monde se déroule !” (Balzac, La Peau 31). The 
science was also directed: rather than await the slow ricochets of genetics selected by 
environment under the later Darwinian view, Lamarck’s theory implies a continual 
adoption in offspring of the changes that an organism undergoes during its lifetime. The 
excessive and guided generation in Balzac’s text reflects the great scientific project of his 
time, which at the borders of modern science and the supernatural, could finally begin to 
model Raphaël’s decay, place itself in the durée unfolding around him, and reach the 
very final causes that surpass Duhem’s warnings. Through this process, the undefinable 
and immeasurable that characterize Balzac’s specific brand of scientific indeterminacy 
would be more than defined and measured – the force particulière animating vitalist 
thought would animate a different sort of marble, the mask that Raphaël’s face becomes 
when he first subscribes to the skin’s powers. And the cycle of decay and death plaguing 
Raphaël would be reversed and retransmitted, as the scientifically-animated world could 
  
89 
unfold in an ever-guided, infinitely generative climb beyond the margins of the 
seemingly possible and measurable.   
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CHAPTER TWO: ZOLA 
Introduction: The Problem(s) with Le Roman expérimental 
Jean Macquart is sowing wheat, every few steps grabbing a handful of seeds and 
scattering them. He passes from south to north, his boots sinking in the farm soil, until he 
reaches the end of a row. There, he pauses to admire the countryside, the checkerboard of 
fields spreading almost as far as his eye can see, a view only interrupted by distant 
forests, homes, and cut by a road and telegraph lines. He still wears his army-issued 
jacket, having come to La Beauce following his tour in the 1859 campaign against Italy. 
He is far away from his native Provence, and is treated like an outsider by the 
Beaucerons, who unfailingly address him only by the military nickname Caporal and 
dismiss him because he does not possess any land of his own. If Jean does not own land, 
however, he still is awe-struck by the countryside, and nourishes a romanticized ideal of 
agrarian life. It is precisely this ideal that has driven Jean to take up work as a farmhand, 
and convinced him to give up carpentry in favor of any odd job that his boss Hourdequin 
can find for him on his farm. Normally, Hourdequin’s obsession with all forms of 
agricultural technology would have meant the use of the mechanical semoir for the rows 
that Jean is planting, but Hourdequin has elected to have the work done by hand. As Jean 
turns back to the south and the next row awaiting sowing, he unleashes “un vol continu 
de semence;” he is “enveloppé dans la poussière vivante du grain.” It is at this time that 
the young Françoise arrives, leading her cow, only for the cow to get spooked and take 
off with its guardian dragged in tow. Seeing Françoise’s plight, Jean is able to cut the 
cow off in its flight and bring it under control, to the gratitude of the unharmed Françoise. 
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(The previous is a rough summary of the very beginning of Zola, La Terre 27-33). 
Meanwhile, the père Fouan, due to his advancing years, has finally reached the decision 
to pass his hard-earned, jealously-coveted land to his three children – the brutish rustre 
Buteau, the industrious and judgmental Fanny (along with her husband Delhomme), and 
the drunken and extremely flatulent man-child Jésus-Christ. This will mean an arpentage 
where a surveyor divides Fouan’s land in three ostensibly equal parts, and a subsequent 
drawing of lots among the three children to decide the priority for selecting among the 
three plots. (This continues the previous summary with a few details from Chapter 2 of 
Zola, La Terre, 40-55).      
Such, at a general level, are the initial conditions of Zola’s La Terre. Based on 
these initial conditions, Buteau will draw the worst lot of the three. Françoise will 
ultimately marry the much older Jean, but only after a long period of hesitation and only 
as a sort of unpleasant last resort, and not before her brother-in-law Buteau has expended 
tremendous but futile energy trying to violate her. Buteau’s extreme violence is not just 
sexual in nature, however; as he also murders his mother, and is an accomplice to the 
murder of his father and subsequent incineration of his body to cover the crime. During a 
final scene of brutality against Françoise, his wife Lise joins him and ultimately drives 
Françoise, then pregnant with Jean’s child, to fatally wound herself on a scythe. Jean’s 
boss Hourdequin will end up at the bottom of a flight of stairs, the victim of a trap door 
left intentionally open by one of his mistress’ lovers. And Jean, ever the outcast, will be 
rejected by his dying wife, who prefers not to break ties with her family by testifying to 
her sister and brother-in-law’s crime. Dismayed by the possibility of a legal fight with 
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Buteau over what may pass to him from Françoise, Jean simply leaves, to return later in 
the pages of La Débâcle. Based on the conditions sketched above, this is how the story 
had to unfold.  
At least, this is what Zola would like the reader to believe, and he communicates 
as much in Le Roman expérimental. If the discussion of La Peau de chagrin highlighted a 
certain unknowability that exceeded experimental method in the direction of vitalism and 
animism, that interpretation necessarily excluded a Bernardian reading of Balzac, where 
the text could be viewed as rigorously determined or deterministic. Just decades after 
Balzac, Zola at least claims to follow this diametrically opposed tack – one which 
conceives of literature as a necessary offshoot of Bernard’s deterministic thought, and 
one which devotes to Bernard himself praise that Zola metes out nowhere else. A few 
quotations suffice to highlight the scope and intent of Zola’s project of applying 
Bernardian thought to the novel. With the advent of Bernard’s proposed experimental 
method, “[n]ous assistons là aux balbutiements d’une science se dégageant peu à peu de 
l’empirisme pour se fixer dans la vérité, grâce à la méthode expérimentale. Claude 
Bernard démontre que cette méthode appliquée dans l’étude des corps bruts, dans la 
chimie et dans la physique, doit l’être également dans l’étude des corps vivants, en 
physiologie et en médecine. Je vais tâcher de prouver à mon tour que, si la méthode 
expérimentale conduit à la connaissance de la vie physique, elle doit conduire aussi à la 
connaissance de la vie passionnelle et intellectuelle.” (Zola, Le Roman expérimental 48). 
Again, the reading of Balzac sets off in sharp contrast against Zola’s project. Where 
vitalism implies an immeasurable force that irremediably separates study of the animate 
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from the inanimate, Bernardian thought would reduce these two supposedly opposing 
forces to a unified and legitimate topic of scientific study, where the “truth” attainable in 
one is as attainable in the other. Zola would take Bernard’s project a step farther, 
proposing an experimental study of the mind leading to a similar degree of truth and 
knowledge.  
The Bernardian project, as seen in the chapter on Balzac, is one part method, one 
part outcome. As a matter of method, the Bernardian disciple, especially when acting in 
the capacity of an experimenter, follows a process that begins with a hypothesis or initial 
idea informed by intuition. That hypothesis serves as a non-binding framework for 
experimental design, where the hypothesis is tested against the natural phenomenon to be 
studied through certain provoked changes in circumstance. By following this method, 
Bernard claims to be able to deduce results, and ultimately, to induce rigorous laws that 
always govern a given phenomenon. To the latter point, Zola opines, “Tout ce qu’on peut 
dire, c’est qu’il y a un déterminisme absolu pour tous les phénomènes humains.” (Zola, 
Le Roman expérimental 60). What does this mean, if not that given a certain set of initial 
conditions input to a system, all behaviors of the system, whether human or inanimate in 
nature, lead to a certain result? What does it mean, if not that the relation between cause 
and effect is entirely rigorous and defined? According to this Newtonian view, it is 
reasonable to conclude that based on the initial conditions in La Terre, for example, all of 
the violent and scatological sequellae must follow as a matter of strict determinism.  
La Terre is an interesting case in point because of the nature of the phenomena 
that are apparently reduced to such strict determinism. Such phenomena map along 
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various points of a spectrum ranging from that which ought to be susceptible to 
determinism to that which should escape such a rigorous conclusion in some measure. At 
the end of the spectrum favoring determinism falls the almost classically geometric – the 
arpentage. As Serres often mentions, one of the catalysts in the invention of geometry 
was the division of property by stretched rope in the Nile Delta. Effectively the same 
procedure will divide père Fouan’s land in three, and if the expectation of a perfect 
reflection of the abstract concept 1/3 will not be met as a matter of reality, some 
reasonably determined approximation of that concept will inevitably occur. But then 
there are phenomena that manifest less determinacy in favor of more suitable statistical 
modeling. The fistfuls of grain that Jean casts to the field are an example of one such 
phenomenon, as each individual seed will flourish or perish based on complex and highly 
variable factors. The study of the field’s output as a whole is better served through a 
statistical distribution of outcomes, as opposed to a minute tabulation of factors like 
temperature, soil condition, and sunlight as they apply to every single seed. A statistical 
study like that might enable some macroscopic observations that form a shaded sort of 
determinism – perhaps that a certain percentage of seeds can be expected to flourish in a 
relatively normal year. And then there are elements that seem almost strictly 
indeterminate – first, there is la poussière vivante du grain. It does not suffice to treat the 
grain as inanimate; it has its own life that may spark comparisons to the prior reading of 
Balzac in a necessary, and necessarily unknowable, vitalist excess. Then there is Buteau’s 
drawing of the worst lot in the property transfer. As with Raphaël’s roulette play of red 
versus black, there is a long-term expectation that is strictly probabilistic in nature. If 
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Zola were to write La Terre ninety-nine times, the average expectation would be that 
each of père Fouan’s children draw the worst lot 33 times. The only way that the 
phenomenon of a roulette choice or a randomly drawn lot reconnects with rigid 
determinism is, as noted in the chapter on Balzac, through the intervention of a Laplace’s 
daemon that knows everything about the roulette toss or lot draw. If Balzac did not 
subscribe to such extreme determinism, Zola clearly does : “[L]es romanciers sont 
certainement les travailleurs qui s’appuient à la fois sur le plus grand nombre des 
sciences, car ils traitent de tout et il leur faut tout savoir, puisque le roman est devenue 
une enquête générale sur la nature et sur l’homme.” (Zola, Le Roman expérimental, 
76)[emphasis added]. As a novelist, Zola plainly fashions himself a Laplace’s daemon. 
Zola as Laplace’s daemon represents a reasonable springboard to offer certain 
critiques of the Roman expérimental project. As Zola acknowledges himself, even the 
most knowledgeable novelist will encounter limits in omniscience : “[L]a nature est là 
qui s’impose, tout au moins la partie de la nature dont la science nous a livré le secret, et 
sur laquelle nous n’avons plus le droit de mentir. Le romancier expérimentateur est donc 
celui qui accepte les faits prouvés, qui montre dans l’homme et dans la société le 
mécanisme des phénomènes dont la science est maîtresse…” (Zola, Le Roman 
expérimental 88). As we shall see in the next chapter, Zola’s belief that the novelist no 
longer has the right to lie to the reader will be contradicted in Queneau’s textual practice, 
where, at least within the text, the state of scientific knowledge does not serve as an 
absolute limit. Perpetual motion machines and squared circles do not exist according to 
accepted scientific truth, yet Queneau entertains such possibilities textually even if Zola 
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would not. Between the space of active fabrication and determined phenomenon, 
however, a margin of unknown is the ever present remnant escaping rigorous 
determinacy. Precisely that sort of unknown subtly inserts itself in the landscape of La 
Terre at its outset. There are the telegraph lines cutting through the fields with their 
charge of information, information that may be subject to loss, error, or modified 
transmission (see Dumas, Le Comte de Monte-Cristo 746-56, for an excellent example of 
an intentionally modified telegraph message). The lines might even be cut entirely, and 
with them, the immediate possibility of any transmission (see Verne, L’île mystérieuse 
630, for an example of this). Like his contemporary novelists, Zola would have 
acknowledged these possibilities, of course, but the field of information theory – to be 
discussed further in this chapter - did not yet exist during his career as a novelist. The 
telegraph lines cutting through La Beauce, then, are just one example of a field 
indeterminate for lack of scientific mastery, and further, indeterminate by their very 
nature. Then there is the semoir mécanique that Hourdequin has decided to keep in his 
barn. The motorized and mechanical remain marginal, but they are present, the site of the 
newly developing field of thermodynamics. The machine is idle because it is not the most 
efficient way to sow the field that Jean treads – an inefficiency that closely reflects the 
limited pay-off that all motors imply due to thermodynamic limits. Still another field 
escapes determinism due both to its lack of development in Zola’s time and its inherent 
inefficiency. 
Further critiques of Le Roman expérimental are possible. Perhaps the most 
obvious is how a fictional creation of the mind could possibly constitute a form of 
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experimentation on the real world, no matter how closely the text attempts to mirror real 
events, people, and places, no matter how well the novelist has documented a visit to the 
mines or the new department store prior to writing the novel.  The application of 
experimental method to a novel raises further issues of imprecision. It is not entirely clear 
whether Zola considers his task one of deduction or induction. If the former, then a series 
of laws are understood as given, in addition to a set of initial conditions by which the 
unfolding of a plot may be predicted with a certain degree of rigor. Zola certainly 
acknowledges the action of such laws as a basis for the determinacy of the text. Yet Zola 
also speaks of the novelist’s hypothesis, just as Bernard does, in which case the novelist’s 
process becomes fundamentally inductive – a testing of the hypothesis against a series of 
observed events to determine as-yet-undetermined laws. If this is the case, the entire 
Roman expérimental project consumes itself, as the very determinacy that Zola vaunts is 
subject to laws that are indeterminate for lack of a priori development. As between 
deduction and induction, then, Zola is caught between two less than satisfactory stances. 
Either he is simply deducing determined events, in which case the novel can scarcely be 
called experimental in the Bernardian sense of the word; or he is inducing, and taking 
away with one hand the very determinacy that he relies on with the other. If Zola is 
understood to be inducing laws, there is a further inconsistency that he clearly struggles 
to navigate. As Meyerson notes, all laws require genres, for no legal relation can result if 
there is no defined class to which it applies.
11
 For lack of a genre, a given phenomena can 
                                                        
11
 This recalls the resolution of Russell’s paradox, which considers the set of all sets that are not 
members of themselves. In this case, a proposed element of that set is necessarily subject to the 
contradiction that that element is not a member of the set. Russell proposed to resolve this 
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never be linked or compared to another in view of the infinite diversity of reality. With 
the creation of a class or genre to which a law applies, there is a necessary act of 
idealization to bring identity to a class that necessarily does not possess it. The ideal that 
Zola decries as anathema to his intended depiction of reality is part and parcel of the laws 
that he is inducing, an unavoidable compromise undermining the purity of his method 
and purported truth.  
Meyerson provides the basis for a final pair of critiques of Le Roman 
expérimental. In the introduction to Identité et Réalité, the early twentieth-century 
epistemologist cites the inability of reason to reconstruct its own steps or methods. When 
the mind attempts such a reconstruction, it is likely to rely on post hoc justifications that 
make potentially intuitive steps seem more logical, more grounded in a theory of 
extension (as opposed to comprehension). When Zola describes his method for writing 
novels, he might reasonably be accused of falling prey to this tendency. This is all the 
more true when considering the rhetoric that Zola chooses, grounded in words like 
“vérité,” “méthode,” “déterminisme,” and “logique,” that seem to render his writing 
technique a perfected edifice, when his writing undoubtedly involved turns that could be 
described as fanciful or intuitive. What is Le Roman expérimental, then, but a form of 
rhetoric lofted at critics? As will be discussed later, it should not be forgotten that 
scientific discourse does not solely serve the advancement of knowledge; it also serves a 
sociological purpose as a form of argumentation and rhetoric. It is not enough to discover 
                                                                                                                                                                     
through the theory of types, by which a given set contains a specified type. This obviates the 
need to consider whether a set should or should not contain itself, but this solution is susceptible 
to criticism in that it creates an artificial, and artificially bounded, hierarchy. (Hofstadter 21).  
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(or really, create) a scientific truth, the scientist must also use words that convince others 
that the truth deserves credibility in the community – that is, communicate his or her 
results persuasively. Zola as scientist is participating in precisely this sort of game with 
respect to romanticism and the critics that called his works obscene, thus there remains 
some question whether the underlying truth that he has created merits the belief of his 
consumers.     
With these critiques of Le Roman expérimental in view, this Chapter proposes a 
close reading of the third installment of Les Rougon-Macquart, Le Ventre de Paris, from 
the perspective of information theory
12
 and thermodynamics. As will become clear, the 
very same issues that challenge Zola’s project outside the text present challenges within 
the text. If Zola ever attempted to apply scientific method through experiment in his texts 
to the end of discovering truth, the character of Auguste will resort to just such 
experimental method to the end of discovering determinate truths about blood sausage. If 
Zola seeks to act as Laplace’s daemon, one of his characters will restore a messy drawer 
of papers as if she were Maxwell’s daemon. And for the faith that Zola professes in the 
determinacy of all phenomena, there is ever a margin that remains unknowable and 
uncaptured by current science. In Le Ventre de Paris, thermodynamics and information 
theory play that role through the necessary transmission of misinformation, error, chaos, 
and noise throughout the society of Les Halles. In a mise en abyme effect reminiscent of 
Raphaël’s relation to the enchanted skin, the characters of Le Ventre de Paris seem to be 
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 It should be noted that while information theory did not first arise until the first half of the 
twentieth century, the retroactive application of the theory here is not without more historically 
appropriate basis. As Shannon’s information theory is an outgrowth of Carnot’s thermodynamics 
and Boltzmann’s mechanics, the former fits within a current of scientific thought already 
mobilizing during the last half of the nineteenth century.   
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navigating the complexities of their own miniature Roman expérimental within the larger 
Roman expérimental project. 
Information Theory and Le Ventre de Paris 
In Le Ventre de Paris’ struggle pitting the maigres outcasts against the gras 
bourgeois, it is only a matter of time before Lisa, the paradigm of the gras’ excess, comes 
into direct conflict with her maigre house-guest and brother-in-law, Florent. Her 
animosity seems to begin as a general uneasiness towards Florent and the inconsistencies 
between his past and the bourgeois society surrounding him (Zola, Le Ventre 144-154), 
but swells as the neighborhood’s commérages and cancans feed her own growing 
suspicions about Florent’s intentions. Eventually, a desire to know overcomes her – she 
has to visit Florent’s bedroom to learn for herself what he is doing:  
“décidée d’ailleurs à mentir, à dire qu’elle venait s’assurer de la propreté du linge, 
si Florent remontait. Elle l’avait vu, en bas, très-occupé, au milieu de la marée. 
S’asseyant devant la petite table, elle enleva le tiroir, le mit sur ses genoux, le vida 
avec de grandes précautions, en ayant grand soin de replacer les paquets de 
papiers dans le même ordre. Elle trouva d’abord les premiers chapitres de 
l’ouvrage sur Cayenne, puis les projets, les plans de toutes sortes, la 
transformation des octrois en taxes sur les transactions, la réforme du système 
administratif des Halles, et les autres. Ces pages de fine écriture qu’elle 
s’appliquait à lire l’ennuyèrent beaucoup ; elle allait remettre le tiroir, convaincue 
que Florent cachait ailleurs la preuve de ses mauvais desseins, rêvant déjà de 
fouiller la laine des matelas, lorsqu’elle découvrit, dans une enveloppe à lettre, le 
portrait de la Normande.” (Zola, Le Ventre 311). 
 
To begin at this point in the story is to trace a profound fissure in Zola’s society of Les 
Halles. Implicit in Lisa’s rummaging through Florent’s drawers is a direct contrast of two 
visions of an ideal world. On one hand, Lisa’s vision of utopia involves a comfortable 
existence built on daily work, removed from the wild buffetings of fortune and the 
constant quest for money that plague an Aristide Saccard, for example (Zola, Le Ventre 
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99-100, and La Curée and L’Argent generally). It is, in effect, the life that she actually 
leads. For Florent, by contrast, a vision of utopia appears confusedly on the sheets lining 
his drawer, through his machinations and plots to overthrow the then-current government 
and establish a new order, post-Empire and, by extension, post-Lisa (Zola, Le Ventre 
311). Unlike Lisa’s ideal existence, Florent’s is not based in reality. Far from it, his ideal 
fits within a larger theme of Zola’s of the utopian vision as an escape to the imaginary 
and unrealizable (the “no place,” the Utopia, of Thomas More), be it the musings of 
Maurice Levasseur (Zola, La Débâcle 215), the political discourse of Etienne (Zola, 
Germinal 283), the communism-inspired plans of Canon (Zola, La Terre 499, for 
example) or the sketches of Florent (Cosset 140, 147) (among others). The vision of the 
world to replace the flawed present proves no more than so many châteaux en Espagne. 
Indeed, inasmuch as utopia means an organization at the level of society in general, the 
very conflict between the two utopic visions ensures that they cannot co-exist. In this 
scene, through an act of violation, an acolyte for one utopic vision trespasses in the space 
of the other, searching where she is not permitted, false pretense at the ready, to scatter 
the other vision in disgust before covering the traces of her presence. As the bourgeois 
gras come into conflict with the non-bourgeois maigres, the two utopic visions collide, 
reflected by two social groups that cannot co-exist.     
 To begin at this point in the story is also to highlight the inner workings of the Les 
Halles’ society as a system that functions in large measure according to the tenets of the 
scientific field of information theory. According to the latter theory, a direct descendant 
of thermodynamics (Brillouin 11), Les Halles embodies a network of objects capable of 
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serving multiple roles in the creation and propagation of information (Shannon generally 
and Serres, Hermès II 77-79). The markets carry information in the redolence of their 
content - a symphony of putrid cheese odors (Zola uses the word “symphonie” in Le 
Ventre 337) or the ocean salt and air that have impregnated the fish displays. People carry 
information through imprinting – Muche’s hands turn blue from exposure to cold water 
(Zola, Le Ventre 193) and Marjolin’s dulled head bears the effect of Lisa’s stony blow 
(Zola, Le Ventre 288, 366). These points of information – scientifically known as 
“negentropy” - may be perceived by others in the system and transmitted further, often 
through the many forms observed by Yvonne Bargues Rollins, “racontars, rumeurs, 
médisances, calomnies, bavardages, commérages, jacasseries, colportages, contes à 
dormir debout, histoires sans fin, histoires pour les petits enfants, contes de fée, bruits 
qui courent” (Rollins 92).  Receipt of this information may be transmitted again and 
again, circulated to new interlocutors and gossip-mongers. But as information is emitted, 
expands, and travels, it changes and assumes errored forms. A truth about a person or 
object gives way to the alternate information conveyed and exaggerated in the racontars, 
rumeurs, etc. It is in this way that the public of Les Halles transforms Florent, from 
suspected man into croque-mitaine (Zola, Le Ventre 343); thus it also misinterprets the 
cause of Marjolin’s injury as a simple accident (Zola, Le Ventre 291). This system of 
discrete points of information obeys the laws of entropy, or the tendency to chaos, 
inherent to all information systems (Brillouin 9-13). Through the workings of entropy, 
the specific and precise are progressively reduced to the noisy and errored.  
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    Lisa’s unauthorized visit to Florent’s room sits precisely at this fulcrum between 
the desire to receive and transmit information and the necessary propagation of error. She 
enters the scene awash in entropy and error – she is animated by suspicions about Florent 
born largely from the noise and chaos of the neighborhood. She is determined to add to 
such chaos through a lie of her own – if caught, she will say she is only checking the 
cleanliness of the linens (Zola, Le Ventre 311). By potentially spreading such error, Lisa 
herself serves as point of entropy, tending to diminish the amount of correct information 
knowable in the closed system of Les Halles. Of course, her lie is not entirely one – in a 
symbolic sense, Lisa is very much looking to dig into Florent’s dirty laundry by 
rummaging through his personal effects. Truth, then, is a relative term, and points of 
misinformation can also carry elements of reliable information. Rather than change the 
overall entropic character of Les Halles, however, such reliable information actually 
promotes entropy by eroding any frame of reference as to what is true or not. If all 
information were known to be true, a receiver could view it as consistently reliable. If all 
information were known to be false, that receiver could treat it as consistently unreliable. 
But at points mixing measures of reliable and unreliable information, the possibility for 
erroneous communication and reception reaches a maximum, and entropy quickly 
overwhelms information. Lisa appears to serve as an information object in this scene, but 
she is not a very reliable one. 
 She is not the only such object – the content of the drawer represents yet another 
source of information. There, the wooden dimensions provide rectilinear structure for 
contents far less ordered – a firsthand work on Cayenne, a proposal to reform Les Halles, 
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more confused plans de toutes sortes (Zola, Le Ventre 311). Each matches elements of 
the imaginary and the real, the reliable and unreliable. Each matches elements of chaos 
and error with discrete points of information. Chaos - in the form of ill-conceived and ill-
understood utopian ideas, the bundle of random projects dealing with an incoherent range 
of topics, and especially the most exaggerated move to disorder – the plan to foment a 
rebellion to overthrow the current order. But discrete points of information, as well – for 
Lisa, the pile of troublesome writing that confirms her suspicions that Florent is surely up 
to no good. Lisa’s approach to information is not only as an object receiving, stocking, 
and transmitting information passively. She is able to process the information she 
receives and manipulate it to her own ends. She can even actively produce 
misinformation by restoring the original order in the drawer to make it seem that she had 
never visited the drawer.  
If Les Halles produces a fundamental conflict between two classes and their 
opposing visions of utopia, Le Ventre de Paris seems to present a third fault-line between 
the objects containing information and the subjects that manipulate and process the 
information. This fault-line maps to the hybrid historical moment in science when Zola 
wrote (Serres, Feux et signaux 32). The traditional view of the world at that time was 
Newtonian, a view already shown in connection with Balzac’s writing, but which, it 
should be noted, excelled in the non-vitalist context of inanimate objects. Under the 
Newtonian view, all such inanimate objects could be reduced to discrete points, centers 
of mass exerting forces on each other in ways that could be performed, undone, and 
repeated predictably regardless of the experiment’s timing (Bergson 215-217; Brillouin, 
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32-34 discusses this as a distinction between mathematics and physics). The overall 
system, then, was lossless, able to be restored to previous states. With each such 
movement, human beings could serve an empirical scientific role, observing their 
surroundings in an entirely attainable quest for knowledge. As each object could be 
reduced to little more than an abstracted point, the same laws could apply equally well to 
stones or turnips, a moving wagon or an ominous still (See generally L’Assommoir). With 
the advent of Carnot’s thermodynamics, however, this view of the world began to 
crumble. No longer could an engine cycle perpetually, as the heat exchange driving the 
engine also means an increase in entropy. No longer could things be put back the way 
they were and repeated (Brillouin 8 and Meyerson Identité 241 – “Le principe de Carnot 
se distingue nettement, par sa forme extérieure, des énoncés habituels de la science. 
Principes ou lois se formulent généralement comme des égalités ; or, il n’est pas possible 
de réduire le principe de Carnot à cette forme.”). Le Ventre de Paris straddles this 
scientific moment generally, and Lisa straddles it more specifically in the cited passage. 
In a reflection of modern thermodynamic science, she is an object that stocks and 
transmits information in a system tending to lose information to entropy and error. But 
she is all the more a participant in the traditional Newtonian world – she is the mythical 
Maxwell’s demon (Serres, Hermès II 98). Just as the latter figure can restore two bottles 
of gas that have mixed to their original unmixed state, so too can Lisa restore Florent’s 
papers to their exact state, leaving no trace of her intrusion. This contrasts well with the 
prior reading of Balzac’s La Peau de chagrin, published a little over forty years prior to 
Le Ventre de Paris (1872), where pre-scientific and vitalist theories tended to exceed 
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reduction to science in conflict with the overarching Newtonian tendencies of the time 
period. There, no daemon was necessary to enable perfect restoration of a system because 
the undefinable life force or vitality might accomplish that purpose on its own. For Zola, 
rallying to Bernard’s scientific clarion call means rejecting such vitalist forces in favor of 
the reduction of even literary phenomena to strict determinism. The Newtonian flow and 
restoration of information in Les Halles seems part and parcel of this determinism – Lisa 
as Maxwell’s daemon serves just such a deterministic purpose. Determinism is far easier 
to imagine in a scenario where a system does not decay when changing states, where the 
forces of revolutionary disorder scrawled on Florent’s papers may be manipulated 
predictably at any moment, as many times as necessary, without risk of being discovered. 
The disordered is still subject to the control of the determinate here. Yet, as already noted 
above, Zola did not, and indeed could not, always achieve his stated objective in Le 
Roman expérimental. Long before Félicité’s incineration of Doctor Pascal’s notes and 
findings on the Rougon-Macquart family in an act of preservation against the potentially 
damning material that such notes contained, the disorder in Florent’s notes remains, a 
vein of entropy and decay threatening to mine the deterministic order just below its 
surface and, as in the case of Félicité’s incineration in Le Docteur Pascal, to obliterate 
organized genealogy and taxonomy. It is little coincidence, then, that Lisa’s act of 
violence, the blow of a stone against Marjolin’s head, took place in the bowels of Les 
Halles (Serres notes as much in Feux et signaux 231). Beneath the order ostensibly 
promoted and preserved by Lisa is the subterranean threat of error, chaos, and entropy 
eluding the strict determinism of Le Roman expérimental.  
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Through the study of the circulation and transformation in Le Ventre de Paris 
proposed here, then, it can be shown that the conflict between the gras and the maigres is 
not merely a question of the bourgeois against the outsiders, the landed order against the 
revolutionaries, or the “loquaces” against the “taciturnes” (as Viti puts it, at 81). That 
conflict is also a question of the forces of traditional science, embodied by the daemonic 
Lisa, seeking to know and control a post-thermodynamic set of objects, embodied by 
those like Florent, caught in the chaotic noise of Les Halles and shuffled by the 
rummaging hands of others.  
 At the very beginning of the text, Les Halles, or Paris more generally, is not 
immediately the site of information, chaos, and error. The very first sentence of the text 
tellingly states: “Au milieu du grand silence, et dans le désert de l’avenue, les voitures de 
maraîchers montaient vers Paris, avec les cahots rythmés de leurs roues, dont les échos 
battaient les façades des maisons, endormies aux deux bords, derrière les lignes confuses 
des ormes." (Zola, Le Ventre 31). The outset of the text, for half a sentence, is bathed in 
silence, complete silence; the street is empty, a desert. There is nothing to be seen or 
heard, no information to be perceived, and nothing that might pass from order to disorder 
or vice versa. But as Bergson points out, imagining disorder does not make sense in a 
vacuum. Disorder is merely an écart from a certain system of order (Bergson, L’évolution 
233). He approaches absence as similarly implicating something affirmative – an 
undetermined contrary that might fill the alleged void (Bergson, L’évolution 287-289). So 
too must Zola shy from absence of sound and sight here, for even a blank page is not an 
absence. A fortiori, there can be no absence when the physical structures of language, its 
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letters, are set off in black against the page’s white background. Zola emphasizes the 
false absence of information by using an “et” to link the silence and desert mentioned 
here – as if absence could be subjected to an additive function, the nothing piling on 
nothing to remain nothing.  
 Les Halles are immediately destined, then, to fill with auditory and visual content 
as Zola’s text itself occupies pages. If silence or absence is necessarily a transitory state, 
how the text achieves a more stable state is important. Rather than replace the silence 
with coherent communication, the only perceptible sound is the rhythmic lurching of the 
merchants’ carts entering the city. Very little information can be gleaned from this 
rhythm – perhaps the speed of the cart based on the size of the wheel and the period of 
the sound, or the distance from the cart based on the sound’s strength. Beyond this, the 
only information is the presence of a noise-producing object. Already the system has 
filled the apparent void with limited negentropy, but that state proves transitory, as well. 
The rhythmic lurching has soon yielded to the echoes of the original sound bouncing off 
the building façades. As the sound of a single cart fades in time, the clear rhythm of its 
movement blurs in the residual sound of past movements. And as other carts add their 
own versions of the sound to that of the first cart, the distinct rhythmic sound waves are 
reduced to echoes – completely non-descript background noise revealing no information 
at all. Discrete points of energy and information seem to cancel each other out in Zola’s 
surprisingly modern city street, where entropy leads to a noisy equilibrium consistent 
with the second law of thermodynamics.    
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 An interpretation of Zola as reflecting the scientific divisions between traditional 
physics and thermodynamics concepts nascent at the time of his authorship is not new. 
Michel Serres has proposed as much in Feux et signaux de brume as part of a larger 
tendency to engage questions of literature and philosophy as mirroring scientific concepts 
(see also Serres Hermès II, for example). Christopher Prendergast has echoed this reading 
of Le Ventre de Paris in a separate article (Prendergast 70-71). If certain theoretical 
ground is retread here, new space is also explored beyond the prior readings of Zola as 
the embodiment of thermodynamics and information theory. Neither of these prior 
readings closely engages the actual language of the text to hold the theory to closer 
scrutiny, and each is more or less limited to a study of the field of thermodynamics. 
Serres, in fact, barely mentions Le Ventre de Paris at all in Feux et signaux de brume, 
opting instead to focus his energies on texts like Le Docteur Pascal, La joie de vivre, 
L’Assommoir, and Le Rêve.13 The present chapter aims to fill in, and elaborate upon, this 
lacuna by placing the analysis in closer contact with both the text and the evolution of 
scientific history and epistemology as expressed here and elsewhere in this Dissertation. 
The present chapter further shows, by adding both the concepts of information theory to a 
closer reading of Zola’s text, that the hybrid scientific views that may be postulated 
generally prove more rigorously sound. From this, a new conclusion appears – that the 
division between Newtonian and post-Newtonian science traces the class divisions that 
Zola establishes between the gras and the maigres. Yet even more, a reading of Le Ventre 
                                                        
13
 While I have not conducted a thorough quantitative study of Serres’ text, I suspect that of the 
twenty Rougon-Macquart novels, only Son Excellence Eugène Rougon is mentioned less than Le 
Ventre de Paris in Feux et signaux de brume.  
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de Paris as a scientific artifact of its time period tends to show Zola’s hybridity as an 
author, a hybridity already discussed in his equivocal relation to the novel as pure 
experiment.  
Bloodied Hands, Information, and Error 
Much as the environment of Les Halles cannot remain in its initial state absent of 
all sight and sound, so too can it not remain in a state of completely information-less 
entropy. Two scenes centered on blood coating a character’s hands show how 
information later comes to function in Les Halles, and thereby cast in sharper relief some 
of the intricacies of information theory present throughout Le Ventre de Paris in its 
tenuous straddling of the Newtonian and the post-Newtonian. In one such scene, 
Auguste, the employee of Lisa and Quenu at their butcher shop, describes how he 
predicts the quality of blood sausage based on the character of the blood as it drains from 
a pig (Zola, Le Ventre 140). Auguste is able to acquire this knowledge firsthand, as it 
were, by directly visiting the slaughterhouse and allowing the pig’s blood to coat his 
gloved hand (Zola, Le Ventre 139-140). Where the blood coats his hand with the same 
red hue, in a way that makes the hand seem as if it has been greased (“comme graissée”), 
Auguste can confidently predict that the blood sausage will be good (“le boudin sera 
bon”) (Zola, Le Ventre 140).  
The second scene centered on bloodied hands brings Florent’s backstory to the 
fore in a flashback, through a description of his mostly passive participation in the 
revolution of 1848 (Zola, Le Ventre 41-42).  Caught in the midst of a skirmish, Florent is 
thrown to the ground, and passed over by the crowd (in a scene reminiscent of Balzac’s 
  
111 
Colonel Chabert, whose time spent in a pile of bodies on a battlefield is succeeded by an 
equal period of amorphous, legally structured exile from the society to which he returns). 
As Florent tries to arise, he finds himself pinned down by the body of an anonymous 
woman who has fatally received two bullets in the head or neck.  In Florent’s haste to 
escape from this morbid embrace, the wounds cover his hands in blood (Zola, Le Ventre 
42). A brief report of this blood to judicial authorities, after its discovery by certain 
sergents de ville, suffices to see Florent condemned to an initial exile in French Guyana 
(Zola, Le Ventre 43). In each of these scenes, the dynamics of information theory assume 
dramatic importance through the capacity of both objects and human beings to serve as 
information artifacts by receiving, stocking, and transmitting information – on one hand, 
that this particular blood will make good blood sausage, and on the other(s), that a man is 
sufficiently dangerous to be exiled. Such information necessarily represents a point of 
purported order or negentropy amidst the turbulent flow of blood or the chaotic 
circulation of revolutionary crowds. Yet this information behaves in fundamentally 
different ways in the two scenes. Where Auguste’s bloodied hand leads to the error-free 
certainty of a deterministic outcome, that the sausage will be good, Florent’s incidentally 
stained hands lead to an error-plagued certainty, that Florent is a revolutionary criminal 
when he has in fact committed no crime. Auguste’s prognostications appear immune to 
the entropy inherent in typical information systems; Florent’s condemnation reflects 
nothing but seemingly entropy-driven error. In this way, these two scenes track an 
important distinction in the control and behavior of information in the world of Le Ventre 
de Paris, where the gras can act as subjects that ensure the temporal and spatial 
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propagation of usually-unstable negentropy, while the maigres like Florent are relegated 
to being passed along as objects over a noisy network of errored conclusions.  
 It is overly simplistic, however, to qualify Auguste exclusively as a subject 
controlling information in the blood sausage scene. The scene actually seems to work 
through all three permutations of subject-object relation noted by Michel Serres in 
Hermès II. In the first of these permutations to appear historically, Serres proposes a view 
of Descartes’ philosophical moment that turns on what Serres terms subject-subject 
relations, where human beings, via the inherent subjectivity of their thought, relate with 
other thinking human subjects (Serres, Hermès II 107-108). The objects that might come 
between these subjects, like the candle wax melting on Descartes’ stove, exist only to 
reflect human subjectivities that observe and interrelate (Serres, Hermès II 86, 107-108). 
The object conveniently drops out of this system for all other purposes. In Serres’ second 
permutation, implicitly part of the same tradition as the first, the object anchors one half 
of the ecosystem as something to be observed and tested by the human subject (Serres, 
Hermès II 87, 99, 107-108). In this subject-object relation, the candle wax that formerly 
facilitated human subjectivity on Descartes’ stove now has an existence of its own that 
can be probed by X-rays, bathed in chemical treatments, and generally exposed to 
scientific scrutiny so that the human subject may gain knowledge (Serres, Hermès II 87). 
This is the scientist in the laboratory engaged with both method and a sort of 
phénomènotechnique, to borrow Bachelard’s term. It is also, at an earlier historical 
period, the alchemist in a study manipulating various salts and powders in the quest for 
gold or the philosopher’s stone. We have previously highlighted in passing the alchemy 
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of Balzac in the context of La recherche de l’absolu, but Serres extends the image here, 
describing the site of the bloody hand scene as “la cuisine aux relents d’alchimie où 
Quenu remue le boudin” (Serres, Feux et signaux, 230). The comparison is not misplaced 
– even if the reading proposed here differs somewhat – as it further highlights the object-
subject relation between the sausage blood and Auguste. The latter human subject is 
eliminated from Serres’ third permutation, where only objects exist and interface with 
other objects. These objects act as intermediaries, transferring and receiving each other’s 
information, and stocking information that reflects their disparate pasts (Serres, Hermès 
II 99, 107-108). As a plumb bob drops into the melted candle wax, it may uncover the 
depths of that wax’s history, such as the traces of the bees and fields that it carries with it 
through time; all while the wax may reveal the metallurgic past of the lead bob in probing 
feedback. A closer review of Auguste’s retelling of the bloodletting reveals, in varying 
measures, all three of Serres’ proposed relations between object and subject.  
 Serres’ third permutation, objects interfacing with objects, offers an initial lens for 
analyzing Auguste’s story. The primary information object in this scene is the blood, 
which passes from the pig over the glove to the bucket and then to the blood sausage just 
as a message would be transferred down a wire. As the blood flows through this 
transmission, it is encoded at all times with information. In Les Rougon Macquart, blood 
as a medium of familial relation is ever a critical stocker and transmitter of information, 
passing drunkenness to Coupeau and lameness to Gervaise in L’Assommoir, a blind 
desire to kill a woman to Jacques Lantier in La Bête humaine (Zola, La Bête humaine 77-
80), or a malformed sickliness to Dubuche’s children in L’Œuvre (Zola, L’Œuvre 357-
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58), just to name a few examples. The pig blood, however, offers more limited 
information, depending on who is decoding that information. It hypothetically could 
relate to the pig’s diet or health, but here the critical information imprinted is the blood’s 
adequacy for use in sausage. The blood serially comes in contact with other objects as it 
is transmitted, from the knife that pierces the pig’s hide and the bucket that gathers the 
blood to the casing of the sausage where the blood will be heated.  
While each of these encounters might entail the transfer of information between 
the objects involved, the text focuses only on the information interaction between the 
blood and another object - the glove. The glove is doubly an object in the economy of 
information in Auguste’s story – it absorbs the blood from without while assuming the 
shape of the hand that wears it from within. Each of these effects marks a transfer of 
information. The latter might enable the glove to give clues as to the identity of its 
wearer. The former, through the process of consistent coating, facilitates a prediction as 
to the quality of the blood sausage. However, the information transfer seems bilateral 
here – if the coating of the glove by the blood imprints the glove with information as to 
the blood’s quality, the blood seems equally converted in leaving a greasy layer on the 
glove. The blood thus assumes a more viscous character once in contact with the glove. 
The very temporality of the information (how long it can be found) conveyed by the 
blood is increased; by becoming part of a solid glove it is able to hold information more 
durably than a fluid whose ability to stock information is limited in some respects by the 
changing container in which it is placed (Serres, Hermès II 78). The movement to the 
solid would be, in Bergson’s view, a move that reflects the very basis of human logic – a 
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logic of solids. By coagulating and coating the glove as a solid, the blood of the pig 
shapes and conforms to the mind analyzing it, a move that overcomes the artificial 
intermediation of rationalism (treating science as construction of the mind applied to 
nature) to provide a convincing illusion of realism (that the scientific construction is 
reality itself). The experimental object is directly accessible for the human subject, 
literally à portée de main. We will later have occasion to return to a passage in the 
opposite direction – from solid to liquid states – when discussing Houellebecq’s Les 
particules élémentaires, in the context of a move from the Cartesian to the post-Cartesian 
and relativistic. Here, it suffices to note that the text remains solidly Cartesian, subject to 
a method reflected not in the Bergsonian image of the blood flow, but the coagulation of 
the flow reducing it to a solid chain of premises intertwining from one to the next.  
Before focusing on Auguste’s possible subjectivity in this scene, however, it 
should be noted that through his hand, he equally completes the triangle of information 
objects in conjunction with the glove and the blood.  As Auguste tells his story, his hand, 
it is revealed, is “toute rose, avec des ongles vifs” (Zola, Le Ventre 140). His hand 
accordingly embodies a surface imprinted with information that betrays what the hand 
does. Further, the blood that has coated the glove passes through the glove’s membrane to 
stain the hand; the hand that gives shape to the glove firms the surface for the “graisse” 
to form (Zola, Le Ventre 140); and the glove acts as an intermediary for the other two to 
communicate through a process of condensation and coagulation. Auguste’s story 
instantiates a closed system of three objects, each in information exchange with the other 
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two. From this perspective, the higher level act of telling a story about blood could be 
interpreted as Auguste acting as an information object that transmits what he has stored.    
 Yet storytelling is, even in a form as simple as the one presented here, a mental 
exercise. This suggests the possibility that Auguste - as possessing agency, thought, and 
judgment - can serve as a subject as he tells his story. His listeners, too, seem equally 
capable of acting as subjects, a capacity suggested by Quenu who “avait approuvé de la 
tête” Auguste’s story (Zola, Le Ventre 140). This specific moment in the retelling marks a 
rupture in the interaction between objects to allow the emergence of Serres’ first 
permutation, where subjects interface with subjects. The knife, the pig, the blood, and the 
bucket all assume secondary positions in this relationship. They merely serve as a means 
to cement the relation between Quenu and Auguste as subjects that think and judge – 
Auguste by reading the blood and Quenu by applying a positive value judgment to such a 
reading. It is only fitting that Quenu’s approval comes from his head, the very locus of 
his agency. This is, again, highly Cartesian, an elevation of the mind over the body, 
which serves only to transmit sensations and signals to be decoded according to a 
repeatable and predictable method. Whenever Auguste concludes that the blood sausage 
will be good, it will in fact be good.   
 Viewing Quenu as possessing any subjectivity in Le Ventre de Paris is a less than 
convincing conclusion, however. As early as his adolescence, Quenu bounces aimlessly 
from apprenticeship to apprenticeship (Zola, Le Ventre 84). Once settled and married, his 
wife constantly manipulates him to her ends, slowly driving a wedge between Quenu and 
his half-brother. When Florent brings Quenu to his nightly political meetings, Quenu 
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quickly learns to parrot what he has heard without any understanding of its political 
import (Zola, Le Ventre 230). And Quenu certainly has no subjective agency in 
preventing his brother’s return to exile; he does not even learn of his arrest, in his own 
building no less, until after the arrest has occurred (Zola, Le Ventre 416).  
 If a reading of Auguste’s retelling as the relation between subjects seems strained, 
this may owe in part to the possibility that a hybrid subject-object reading of the scene 
best traces its structure. In his article considered the source of information theory, Claude 
Shannon diagramed the components of an information system, including an information 
source, a transmission medium, and a receiver (Shannon 381). For a so-called correction 
system, he also included an external observer who can monitor the information 
transmission, and discern the proportion of error and original information transmitted in 
order to correct that error (Shannon 409). Auguste, in addition to serving as an object to 
be imprinted by blood, fulfills this role of observer as the blood passes information to his 
glove. His description of the process of reading blood reveals this - “je retire ma main 
et… je la regarde.” He then fulfills a second aspect of the observer in his capacity to 
apply critical judgment to the information transfer. That judgment takes the form of 
decoding in Auguste’s case. He, in an application of a skill particular to him among the 
butcher shop staff, is able to decode the application of information in the form of blood to 
his glove. In some respects, this decoding process underscores an analogy between 
Auguste’s knowledge of blood and Zola’s own interest in the genetics encoded in blood, 
only to be decoded and revealed in later progeny. 
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 Auguste’s status as observer here maps closely to Serres’ idea of the subject in a 
subject-object relation (Serres, Hermès II 87). The subject, as noted above, is capable of 
acting on objects to obtain information – by exposing candle wax to X-rays or other 
chemical treatments in an attempt to gain information about the wax. Auguste’s hand 
beating the air as he tells the story, echoed in his narration by the repeated “je bats, je 
bats, je bats,” underscores this subjectivity. Auguste’s role is not that of a passive 
observer watching information flow into a bucket of blood; rather, he is able to expend 
energy as an input to the system to promote the output of information in the form of 
negentropy (Brillouin 35). He is a subject, a scientist in the sense given the term by 
Bernard, exposing an object to tests to determine the latter’s fundamental quality, its 
ability to serve in blood sausage. The distinction was critical for Zola himself in his 
allegiance to Bernard, for Zola highlights the very observer-experimenter distinction 
offered by Bernard and already mentioned in the discussion of Balzac (Zola, Le Roman 
expérimental 50-52). For Zola, the novelist is both observer of society and experimenter 
within that context. Here, Auguste is similarly both observing the blood and 
experimenting on it, all to the end of a deterministic conclusion. Those who critiqued 
Zola for his obsession with the osé would have been correct, and probably quite happy, to 
see a miniature of Zola in the character of Auguste.  
 It is precisely through such rigorous determinism that Zola’s text remains distinct 
from modern, post-Newtonian scientific theory, and this distinction is critical for both the 
class dynamics of the story and the scientific hybridity of the text. According to modern 
theory, the cost of Auguste’s activity should be entropy (Brillouin 35). By gaining 
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knowledge about the blood at a specific place – the slaughterhouse – and a specific time – 
the moment of the pig’s bloodletting, he should pay for his expenditure of energy with a 
greater propagation of chaos according to the basic tenets of thermodynamics (Brillouin 
35). The blood should not necessarily behave according to Auguste’s certain knowledge, 
even at the moment he whips the blood, as the now-whipped blood that imprints 
information on the glove is separated from the more chaotic, turbulent blood filling the 
bucket. A fortiori, the information already fragile at the moment of transmission in the 
slaughterhouse should not necessarily hold in other settings and other moments in the 
story. The blood that has informed Auguste might change character, by potentially 
congealing in transit, denaturing due to exposure to excessive heat or cold, or simply 
spilling on the ground in a moment of accidental waste. Nor should the error generated by 
entropy simply take the form of the loss of information irrelevant to Auguste – that is, 
that by learning about the blood’s capacity for use in blood sausage Auguste would pay 
in other information about the blood that did not concern him. Entropy should have 
applied generally here, placing an insurmountable obstacle between Auguste’s prediction 
at the slaughterhouse and its subsequent veracity at the butcher shop. 
 No such décalage occurs here, however, as the text clarifies that Auguste’s 
predictions about the quality of the blood sausage always prove correct (Zola, Le Ventre 
139: “le boudin était bon, toutes les fois qu’il disait ‘le boudin sera bon.’”). Why this 
should be so flows from the scientific moment of Le Ventre de Paris, a moment that 
recalls Bergson’s example of the réchaud (Bergson, L’évolution 215-217). According to 
this example, a portable stove may heat water to the point of boiling in a pan at a certain 
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time (Bergson, L’évolution 215). Human imagination, aware of this basic process, 
extrapolates its possible occurrence to other times in the past or future – the stove that 
boiled water today will do so just as well tomorrow, as it would have done yesterday 
(Bergson, L’évolution 215-216). This extrapolation, as Bergson highlights, relies on two 
assumptions, the simultaneity of time and the identity of form in the parts of the system 
(Bergson, L’évolution 217). While these assumptions should not necessarily hold in the 
real world, they do in the limiting and abstract case of Euclidian geometry, where time 
and space can be collapsed into a series of analogous and repeatable occurrences. The 
triangle with two known sides and a known shared angle will have the same third side 
regardless of when or where that triangle is located. And by extension to Auguste’s story, 
the blood that Auguste whips at the slaughterhouse will be the same blood that goes into 
the blood sausage at the butcher shop. Auguste is not just a scientist; he’s a geometer, as 
well.      
 Auguste’s geometric ability to predict blood sausage is a consequence of the 
frame of reference in which he and the other gras (like Lisa, as noted above) exist, a 
Newtonian frame. This, in turn, allows them to establish and control the opinions held 
about others. If a certain person conforms to a certain behavior, necessary judgments may 
be passed on them, just as a pre-thermodynamics scientist could pass judgment on blood 
or Euclidian right triangles predictably. If, for example, a man has survived on limited or 
substandard food for a period of time, as Florent does during his exile (Zola, Le Ventre 
144), that man may be predictably labeled an outcast or a threat to the social order of Les 
Halles. If a woman pokes around the butcher shop hoping to overhear gossip, as Saget 
  
121 
does, the gras may subject her to her own type of opprobrium (Zola, Le Ventre 126). For 
the gras, people, like objects, can be classed predictably, honnêtement (as the text 
repeatedly describes Lisa), based on their observable characteristics. The result is the 
gras’ instantiation and perpetuation of an arbitrary, non-scientifically-based power to 
circulate and dispose of information and identities in ways that are superficially certain, 
but profoundly errored. If the Newtonian is not typically wielded as a means of exile or 
coded judgment, it too may lead to similar sorts of error as a matter of approximation.       
      As a maigre, Florent does not enjoy the luxury of controlling information and 
passing judgment in the way that Auguste and the other gras do. This much may be 
demonstrated through a close review of Florent’s own bloodied hands scene, where the 
coating of Florent’s hands with the blood of the anonymous woman suffices to condemn 
him to exile. In fact, such a review reveals an almost exact counterpoint to the control and 
predictability manipulated by Auguste in his whipping of the pig’s blood. Where Auguste 
is symptomatic of the gras inasmuch as he is a subject observing and controlling an 
object through space and time, Florent himself falls more squarely in the category of 
object when the text recounts the story of his initial arrest.  Auguste’s certainty, socially 
immune to error and entropy, gives way to the profound uncertainty and error for Florent 
as he is tossed chaotically through the crowd and then apprehended for a crime that he 
has not committed.    
 Even prior to Florent’s curious encounter with the anonymous woman, he is 
nothing more than a particle subject to the whims of the terrorized crowd around him. 
“Lui, poussé, jeté à terre, tomba au coin de la rue Vivienne ; et il ne savait plus, la foule 
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affolée passait sur son corps, avec l’horreur affreuse des coups de feu.” (Zola, Le Ventre 
41). Unable to move in a direction of his choosing, Florent is instead “pushed, thrown to 
the ground” where he falls. This sifting more closely recalls the Brownian motion of 
particles, randomly colliding in a suspension, than the observation of the scientist who 
views such motion from the outside. Reduced to particulate status in this way, Florent 
already suffers from a profound incapacity to act as a subject in this scene. Florent’s fall 
into “objectness” has, as an immediate consequence or symptom, the complete loss of 
knowledge – “il ne savait plus, la foule affolée passait sur son corps” (Zola, Le Ventre 
41). Not only is Florent unable to exercise judgment to organize and explain what is 
going on around him, he does not know anything at all. Predicting future behavior, as 
Auguste does in the case of the pig’s blood, is necessarily impossible for lack of any 
information about the past or present. Florent is nothing more than a body for the crowd 
to pass over, a potential surface to receive, stock, and transmit information. In this way, 
the crowd symbolically stands in for society at large controlled by the gras, repressing 
the maigres and reducing them to the status of things. 
    Florent’s twin incapacities - to exercise a choice or make a prediction – are 
immediately brought to the fore as he tries to extricate himself from the post-skirmish 
pile - “Quand il n’entendit plus rien, il voulut se relever” (Zola, Le Ventre 41). Florent 
requires complete silence to develop so much as a desire to re-arise. The error and 
incomprehensibility of chaotic noise, beyond the scope of Florent’s comprehension, 
eliminate his subjectivity. The result seems tautological – it is only completely outside 
the information network that Florent may cease to be an information object himself. Yet 
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as with the analysis of the first line of the text above, such an escape from the information 
network must prove short-lived in a system necessarily animated by noise and 
information; and his desired agency quickly extinguishes under the weight of new 
information – the fatally-wounded woman. This information takes the literal form of the 
blood, which serves the same general purpose as the pig’s blood for Auguste – it flows 
through the scene carrying potential information to be imprinted on a hand or hands. But 
where Auguste can interpret the pig’s blood in the closed, collapsed system of sausage 
production, Florent must confront a far more cryptic blood - that of an anonymous 
woman whose identity (and whose killer’s identity) will never be known. This transfer of 
blood lends itself to an immediate interpretation, a shared symbolic loss of virginity 
between Florent and the woman; for, as she bleeds, the text equally clarifies that Florent’s 
timidity is such that “il n’osait regarder en face les visages de femme,” (Zola, Le Ventre 
41), let alone have previously initiated a romantic relationship with a woman. Echoing 
this interpretation is the text’s use of the word “doucement” (Zola, Le Ventre 41) to 
describe Florent’s removal of the woman from his body, a seeming moment of post-
embrace tenderness. The blood that might indicate this love comes to assume a different 
meaning later, however, insofar as it indicates Florent’s possible violence and criminality. 
Undoubtedly, other interpretations of the blood transfer here are possible. Colette Wilson, 
for one, has seen the death of the anonymous woman as an echo of the historical shooting 
of the pétroleuses during the Commune (Wilson 84). Regardless of the specific 
interpretation, however, none seems the exclusively correct view, and the information 
system quickly opens on an infinite set of potential, yet fundamentally unknowable states 
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in the nature of Duhem’s excess of hypotheses. Auguste’s ability to overcome entropy in 
the name of error-free certainty thus yields to a probability field of potentially errored 
conclusions whose knowledge remains beyond Florent’s limited, bloodied grasp. The 
blood amenable to decoding in contact with Auguste’s hand becomes an encoder, a 
screen to block or distort information transfer once on Florent’s hands, with no decoder 
available, at least not to him.  
 Zola’s use of the gaze in these two scenes further emphasizes their fundamental 
differences. Auguste, it may be recalled, looks at his hand after withdrawing it from the 
stream of blood to discern information about the blood (Zola, Le Ventre 140). This 
information inevitably proves reliable for the competent observer, mapping a certain 
input to a pre-determined output. For Florent who “n’osait regarder” women’s faces, 
there is no subject looking. So even if this scene offered Florent the possibility of 
standing in as a scientist or observer who could monitor and process the information 
fluxing chaotically around him, he is too afraid to exercise his own sensory perception. 
He is instead made the object of a gaze himself. As he later falls asleep on the barricades, 
he dreams that he “voyait les deux trous de la guimpe blanches à petit plis, qui le 
regardaient comme deux yeux rouges de larmes et de sang” (Zola, Le Ventre 42, 
emphasis added). The difference in the two verbs here – voir and regarder – suggests a 
related difference in the experience of the two actors in this short dream sequence. 
Florent is only able to “see,” to absorb his surroundings visually in a non-specific way, 
while the phantom of the anonymous woman is able to “look,” to choose the object of her 
gaze and to discern the information that it contains (which appears to lead to an 
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emotional reaction, the tears). The artificial gaze here proves more revealing than the real 
one, and Florent is once again relegated to a state of object-ness, stocked with 
information to be revealed, as he fails to learn any concrete information about his 
surroundings.     
 The bullet holes that can look as eyes do also bear on the state of animation of the 
various people and objects in this scene. If Auguste’s hand acts as an inanimate 
information object in its ability to serve as a receptive surface for a permanent reddening, 
that hand also “vivait” in the buckets of blood. Even parts of Auguste’s body are able to 
take on a metonymic life of their own. Not so for Florent, who is essentially inanimate as 
his hands are stained. This man, who “ne savait plus,” “avait sur lui une jeune femme” 
(Zola, Le Ventre 41), a discovery that reveals a complete lack of conscious purpose. 
Thereafter, he wanders, “la tête perdue,” only to find himself (“il se trouva”) at a wine 
shop sometime later (Zola, Le Ventre 41). He follows the revolutionaries he meets there 
and helps them pull up some paving stones, but he follows this momentary activity with 
prolonged inactivity – by sitting down on the barricade and eventually falling asleep 
(Zola, Le Ventre 41-42). This series of events reveals a character who exercises no will or 
judgment, who seems to wander aimlessly in a sort of twilight. Even when he acts by 
destroying public property, he does so only as a follower of others that he has fortuitously 
met. From this perspective, the inanimate object that covers Florent, the body of the 
unknown woman, seems more animate than he. Beyond her two bloody eyes that 
continue to reduce Florent to an object of her gaze, her face bears an “étonnement d’être 
morte, là, si vite” (Zola, Le Ventre 41). The emotion fixed on her dying face has 
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persisted, and promises to continue to persist, in a residual sort of animation imbued with 
a life force stronger than Florent’s lost-headed wanderings.    
 As an extension to Florent’s lack of animation, a further critical change in polarity 
in Florent’s scene follows from the presence - or more appropriately, absence - of energy 
exerted by the soon-to-be-exiled. In order to overcome entropy in a system and to 
discover information in the form of negentropy, a scientist must expend energy (Brillouin 
35). This is what Auguste does in whipping the blood that he is considering. It is 
similarly what the four sergents de ville do when they awaken Florent to a frenzy of 
punches (Zola, Le Ventre 42). Indirectly, this violent expenditure of energy leads to an 
immediate discovery of information, the blood on Florent’s hands (Zola, Le Ventre 42). 
This, in turn, leads to a perfunctory trial where a note declaring that Florent was found 
with blood on his hands suffices to earn him exile to South America (Zola, Le Ventre 43). 
Auguste’s scientific certainty vis-à-vis the blood sausage is thus applied to Florent – the 
man with the blood on his hands is a criminal and shall be exiled. The classifications are 
unchanging in time and space, and foreordained for those who have the control to 
interpret and apply them. As much cannot be said of Florent, who traverses this scene in 
various states of limited energy. After his fall due to the crowd’s force – already a move 
to a lower potential energy-level -- Florent can muster the effort to push only 
“doucement” the woman’s body (Zola, Le Ventre 41). When he later sits on the 
barricades, he is “las de sa course dans les rues,” a lassitude resulting from nonproductive 
energy expenditure (Zola, Le Ventre 41). When his energy is finally exhausted, he falls 
asleep, never to stock energy meaningfully as he awakens to police brutality (Zola, Le 
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Ventre 41-42). Through his consistently low energy levels, Florent is not capable of 
investing the necessary energy to overcome entropy and discover information. Florent is 
instead an information object himself; but in the final brutality scene, he has shifted from 
a place as an object in Serres’ object-object paradigm – interacting with objects like 
paving stones and corpses, to an object in the object-subject paradigm – forced to 
confront the structure of power that can predictively act on him.  
 Perhaps the most telling sign of Florent’s lack of agency compared to that of 
Auguste is a tense change – between the conditional and the future – that summarizes 
these two characters’ relation to the future. “Le boudin sera bon” is Auguste’s conclusion 
about the blood (Zola, Le Ventre 140). No equivocation in meaning or outcome is 
possible, and the certainty in language translates directly to certainty in outcome. One can 
compare this use of the future with Florent’s thoughts on the barricades, “se disant qu’il 
se battrait, lorsque les soldats allaient venir” (Zola, Le Ventre 42). There is no certainty 
that Florent will fight in the revolution; his engagement is conditioned on the arrival of 
soldiers. The use of the conditional has the further practical effect of putting off a final 
decision on action until the condition has occurred, a moment of différant suspension. 
Even at that later time, Florent could hypothetically decide not to act. In other words, the 
conditional statement must hold into the future until the occurrence of the condition to be 
realized as an if x, then y relation in a Cartesian or Newtonian mode. The conditional 
tense accordingly establishes a conditional probability that may not be satisfied, even if 
the once-stated conditions are met. The conditional statement is doubly predicated on two 
degrees of uncertainty: the occurrence of the condition and the ongoing validity of the 
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conditional statement at the time of the condition’s occurrence. One might suspect here, 
based on Florent’s general fecklessness, that he never would have fought, even if the 
condition had been satisfied. At best, his participation remained a question of 
probabilistic uncertainty to be determined by the unpredictable events of revolution. 
Florent behaves as a modern gas particle, not a traditional Newtonian mass, in the 
entropic sifting that he ever undergoes, coupled with his existence as a mere point in a 
distribution, fundamentally fungible. Auguste, by contrast, avoids this uncertainty 
through a traditionally deterministic and Newtonian viewpoint – if he says the blood 
sausage will be good, it will be good now and ever.        
 Given this background, Florent, as an object in object-object and subject-object 
relations, resembles a post-geometric form of Bergson’s réchaud (Bergson, L’évolution 
215-217). Rather than obeying the temporally and spatially collapsed form that functions 
identically in all settings, Florent’s action varies probabilistically in time and space. 
Sometimes he behaves in a meaningfully revolutionary manner – by spending money on 
uniforms (Zola, Le Ventre 314) and delegating to Logre the organization of a 
revolutionary force (Zola, Le Ventre 355), for example; sometimes his revolutionary 
tendencies are limited to the empty scrawl of a child ignorantly copying the word 
“tyranniquement” (Zola, Le Ventre 210). This reality does not fit well within the 
traditional Newtonian world of Les Halles, and Florent’s reception in the community 
must be re-arranged to fit this fixed frame of reference. The necessary result of this fixed 
opinion applied to a changing subject is error. As Florent’s exile for a death that he does 
not cause propagates an image of him inconsistent with his identity, so too does Lisa 
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maintain the respect of others as “honnête” even as she regularly and knowingly spreads 
falsehoods (for example, that Florent is her cousin [Zola, Le Ventre 106]). Such error, 
unlike the unpredictable error occasioned by entropy, is systematic in nature. It does not 
follow from a misinterpretation of the ever-changing concentrations of negentropy and 
entropy, information and noise; it is the result of a fundamental mismatch between the 
system used to analyze reality and the reality analyzed thereby. It is the subject in the 
subject-object relation incapable of appreciating the movement of information between 
objects; the scientist incapable of knowing. Or put according to a more rationalist 
construction, it is the scientist creating a model that is more aesthetically pleasing for the 
gras than empirically accurate.   
The takeaway from these two bloodied hand scenes is more a matter of 
information control than of information veracity. Those who control the reception, 
dissemination, and storage of information in Les Halles’ social network – whether called 
the gras, subjects, Newtonian scientists, or bourgeois – also control those who are 
rejected – whether called the maigres, objects, or experimental matter. The result can be 
viewed from two perspectives.  
First, the gras’ control of the maigres recalls the concept of doxa, the popular 
opinion that serves to structure society, here, by sifting the acceptable acts and actors 
from the unacceptable ones. There is a curious chiasmus of sorts when Newtonian doxa 
comes into ultimate contact with Florent’s thermodynamic loss – Florent is ever destined 
to be wrongfully arrested. That is, the Newtonian forces of social authority are the ones 
subject to entropic error, while the entropic particle Florent remains in a state that should 
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be strictly deterministic – he is not meaningfully criminal. In the end, the chiasmus 
resolves through sheer force. The designation of Florent as criminal, which should have 
qualified as an error, is not one for the simple fact that the Newtonians still control 
information in Zola’s text and ultimately apply the approximate frame of reference by 
which truth is measured. Bernard seems to have his revenge, after all, but not without 
being exposed to the risk of error and energy loss. And if Florent and his 
thermodynamics-motivated frame of reference have already returned once from exile, the 
possibility of a curiously dissipative eternal return cannot be dismissed. Zola’s textually 
confused chiasmus here speaks to the challenging, fundamentally intertwined nature of 
the two primary scientific tendencies of the historical moment.    
Second, the gras’ information control represents a different means to reach 
Richard Shryock’s reading of the Florent’s retelling of the story of “l’homme mangé par 
les bêtes.” In that article, Shryock explored the narrative ineffectiveness of Florent’s story 
on his listeners (Shryock, generally). Where Florent attempts to appeal to a sense of 
justice and sympathy in this latter group, that appeal is completely lost on Pauline, who is 
not old enough to appreciate the appeal; Lisa, who refuses obstinately to receive the 
message; and Quenu, who pays no attention to the story as he goes about the fabrication 
of sausage (Shryock 50-51). This refusal to receive information, which is highlighted in 
Shryock’s article, marks a different permutation of the control of information already 
observed in Auguste and other gras. The gras are capable of applying fixed frames of 
reference to changing objects; and of refusing to receive any information that would alter 
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that frame of reference. The result is more than control; it is an arbitrary, unchanging 
control of the general opinion held of others. 
Such control in the opinion of others also offers a different path to two key 
historical realities observed by Serres in Feux et signaux de brume. First, Serres 
comments that the prevailing science of an author’s time and place cannot help but 
osmote into the author’s work (Serres, Feux et signaux 32). This conclusion resonates 
more strongly in the case of Zola, who – beyond the mere passive transmission of the 
science of his time – actively immersed himself in such science as a means of organizing 
the family tree of the Rougon-Macquart. By the end of the series, Pascal has classified 
the totality of science captured in the tree – the exhaustive permutations of genetic 
transmission that vary from family member to family member (Zola, Le Docteur Pascal 
generally). Even the combustion of l’oncle Macquart is advanced as a scientific 
phenomenon, the human body saturated with, and rendered unconscious by, alcohol to 
the point that a loose flame might ignite human flesh and coat the room with a mix of 
grease and ash (Zola, Le Docteur Pascal 320-325), an information-producing coating that 
mirrors the blood on Auguste’s glove. Yet for the purported empirical certainty of the 
Rougon-Macquart genealogy and the incineration of Macquart, among others (like the 
père Fouan in La Terre), the late nineteenth century was a liminal moment in science, as 
the idealized perpetual motion machine gave way to the thermodynamic limits of Carnot, 
and point-driven Newtonian physics prepared to cede to Einstein’s more dynamic 
relativity. This moment of scientific transition is captured clearly in the information 
theory consequences of the bloody hand scenes. The gras hew to the traditional scientific 
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perspective, which is capable of knowing with certainty, of ignoring the undiscovered 
effects of entropy to perpetuate a message without energy loss or system change. The 
maigres, meanwhile, fall victim to the limits of the nascent scientific order, as they tend 
to lose energy and transmit erroneous information. If the latter theory has begun to take 
shape, it is clear, however, that the former group still represents the socially and 
scientifically dominant thread.  
Also flowing from the bloodied hand scenes is the value of productivity 
highlighted by Serres. Quenu can “approuve de la tête” Auguste’s story because that 
story speaks to a socially acceptable productive activity. Auguste retrieves and tests 
blood which will then be included in blood sausage for later consumption by the other 
productive residents in the neighborhood. (One may note, in this respect, the Quenus’ 
disapproval of Saget’s potential business, as the latter vieille fille picks over their 
afternoon scraps with the aim of learning gossip, not producing anything of value (Zola, 
Le Ventre 126).) A chain of determined events, linked in chronology and productivity, 
marks this process. Florent, by contrast, sees his hands bloodied in a fundamentally 
unproductive moment. He expends no energy in the scene, as noted above, aside from 
pulling up a few paving stones, and generally loses energy in the aimless friction of the 
crowd shuffling over his body. He does not act; he is acted upon, whether by the blood or 
the weight of the crowd. That the Quenus may view Auguste’s story positively while 
dismissing or ignoring Florent’s speaks to the historical social value of productivity 
observed by Serres. It equally casts in sharper relief the social or sociological aspects of 
science as a cultural institution. Latour’s study in La vie de laboratoire offers a 
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framework relevant to this, where he highlights a taxonomy of scientific énoncés 
following five levels spanning the purely speculative to accepted truth (Latour 72-81). 
The goal of the scientist is, according to Latour’s observation, to generate énoncés that 
climb the taxonomy to levels of accepted truth while often through argument limiting the 
énoncés of rival scientists to lower rungs of uncertainty. What is happening in the two 
bloody hand scenes, if not just such a forced classification of énoncés? Whatever Florent 
says or does is dismissed as not credible; whatever Auguste says is unfailingly accepted 
as an embodiment of scientific truth.        
 
Coded Messages 
The gras’ consistently erroneous interpretation of Florent is amenable to a view 
from a different angle – that of the coding and decoding of messages transmitted in Les 
Halles. In seeing what happens in a scientifically successful or unsuccessful transmission, 
we can see how in this text society functions or, alternatively, goes awry. Coded 
messages, omnipresent in Le Ventre de Paris, are an integral part of Shannon’s proposed 
information system (Shannon 409). During transmission in such a system, messages pass 
through an encoder at the moment of transmission to enable passage down the wire 
(Shannon 399). When the encoded message reaches its destination, it passes through a 
decoder that hypothetically returns the message to its original form (Shannon 399). The 
abstract takeaway from this system is the existence of a key shared by the encoder and 
decoder. This key assigns fixed relationships between the symbols comprising encoded 
messages, on one hand, and those comprising decoded messages, on the other. A key in a 
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binary system could state, for example, that the number “13” (a number of some 
importance to Queneau, as will be seen in the next chapter) corresponds to the encoded 
binary sequence “1101.” For an encoder receiving “13” as an input, “1101” should be the 
encoder’s output. For a decoder leveraging the same key, the opposite transformation 
should hold – with the received “1101” being converted back to a “13” upon receipt of 
the transmission. If only one end of the message transmission holds the key, or 
alternatively, if the two ends of the message transmission are subject to different keys, 
then a coded message will not meaningfully transmit.  
According to the first of these possible scenarios, the message will undergo only 
one transformation, rendering the output either the decoded result of an un-encoded 
message or the encoded result of an un-decoded message. In the second scenario, two 
transformations will likely increase the error at each phase – from the message encoded 
consistent with one key to the decoding according to another. If, for example, the 
hypothetical encoder treating “13” as “1101” bookended a system containing a decoder 
that treated “1101” as “23,” a “13” input would systematically result in an incorrect 
output of “23.”  
The widely held opinion of Florent in Les Halles just discussed conforms to some 
form of this sort of erroneous transmission. When Florent attempts to tell his story to the 
butcher shop’s occupants, he encodes certain messages in the story. The “il était une fois” 
(Zola, Le Ventre 141) encodes the story both for easy consumption by the young listener 
Pauline and for a more subtly delivered subtext about human justice for his adult listeners 
(Shryock 50). The latter listeners, however, do not possess the key necessary to decode 
  
135 
this message. They instead possess their own specific key that converts the appeal to a 
sense of justice into varying degrees of disgust and apathy. This is precisely the case of 
distinct encoding and decoding keys converting a “13” to a “23,” an imploring history to 
an importunate oddity.   
 This analogy provides another perspective on the power dynamics that form in the 
scene of Florent’s retold story. Those who have the final say on the story are those who 
possess the decoding key to interpret the story, not the teller who encodes the story in the 
first place. This is, in some respects, a function of numbers, where multiple listeners 
holding similar decoding keys overwhelm the message intended by a single transmitter 
equipped with his own encoding key. Yet a temporal component is also at work here, as 
those who receive the message are not required to transmit meaningful information back 
to Florent. They do pass judgment in the form of indifference or disapproval; but the 
retransmission of those opinions to Florent is not important – their very existence is. The 
gras in this scene are the endpoint of the non-reciprocal, asymmetric information system, 
able to dispose of the transmitted message as their decoding dictates. If Florent is telling 
the story of the man “mangé par les bêtes” (Zola, Le Ventre 140-141) his storytelling 
forces him to play the role of man “décodé par les bêtes.”  
 Errors born of deficiencies in encoding and decoding plague the maigres 
throughout the text. The retelling of his exile in French Guyana does not mark the only 
time when Florent sends an ultimately misinterpreted message. Even when he is making 
no attempt to send a message of any kind, his body is a surface susceptible to incorrect 
decoding. Consider, for example, Florent’s arrival in Paris from his time in exile. For lack 
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of sleep and nutrition following the long return trip, Florent collapses in the middle of a 
Parisian street where Madame François’ wagon comes upon him (Zola, Le Ventre 33). 
The text depicts Florent at this moment as “une masse noire qui barrait la route” (Zola, Le 
Ventre 32). In his state of unconsciousness, Florent is not intentionally communicating 
anything – a fact reinforced by the darkness of his exterior surface. Yet this does not 
prevent two diverging opinions from emerging on Florent’s state. The first comes from 
Madame François, “qui le crut mort” (Zola, Le Ventre 32) until she is able to dismount 
from her wagon and grab one of Florent’s still-warm hands. One of the other wagon-
drivers forced to wait while Madame François does this proffers a second opinion on 
Florent – “Il en a plein son sac, le sacré porc ! Poussez-moi ça dans le ruisseau !” (Zola, 
Le Ventre 33).  
 Each of these interpretations suffers tellingly from error – Florent is neither dead 
nor drunk. He is just occupying a low-energy state similar to that which he occupied 
during the Revolution – a position that eliminates all possibility that he might discover, or 
even receive, information as a thinking scientific subject. In fact, the opposite is true – by 
existing at a low energy state, others may determine information about him more easily. 
Such information, gleaned from observation and interpretation of Florent’s encoded 
surface, falls to Madame François and the other wagon-drivers. That the former may see 
Florent as dead speaks generally to his lack of subjectivity – he is a mere stocker and 
transmitter of information to be buffeted by the ebbs and flows of error in the information 
system of Les Halles. A charitable demeanor informs Madame François’ initial error – if 
“on n’écrase pas le monde” (Zola, Le Ventre 32), one might equally avoid the conclusion 
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that a man unconscious in the street is not drunk. Fortunately for Florent, Madame 
François’ charitable demeanor also enables her to expend the energy necessary to 
withstand the pressure of the other wagon-drivers forced to wait as she checks Florent’s 
condition (Zola, Le Ventre 32-33). She has soon tossed Florent on to her wagon to ride 
with her inventory of vegetables (Zola, Le Ventre 34) – one could reasonably say, with 
his kind. This half of the scene provides an important counterpoint to the gras’ 
consistently erroneous interpretation of Florent. Where Madame François initially 
believes Florent to be dead, she demonstrates the ability to change the way she perceives 
him. Her frame of reference is not fixed; her search for truth actually minimizes error, 
even if Florent remains an undecipherable black surface in some respects, a vegetable 
that Madame François is never fully able to comprehend (See, for example, the exchange 
in Zola, Le Ventre 44-45). In further promotion of the elimination of error, the very hands 
that had betrayed Florent in having him wrongly labeled a criminal actually communicate 
correct information to Madame François here – that he is alive. 
The other wagon-driver’s interpretation falls more closely in line with the 
predominately errored frame of reference adopted and transmitted by Lisa and others. 
Here, the statement that “il en a plein son sac, le sacré porc” doubly devalues Florent’s 
humanity in a profusion of p’s, s’s, and c’s (and in a reminder of another information 
object, Auguste’s pork blood). He is relegated to the status of a “sac” that serves only to 
contain alcohol (an image that recalls Macquart in Le Docteur Pascal or Coupeau in 
L’Assommoir). The informational capacity of Florent is symbolically impoverished, as 
well. His “sac” contains a volume of liquid that might alter the container’s shape as liquid 
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fills it. As Serres notes, fluids represent a non-durable medium for stocking information, 
since their informational content changes with each new container (Serres, Hermès II 78). 
But in conjunction with a container that changes with the content, as a bag might swell or 
inflate with more fluid, the impermanence of the purported information in this scene 
doubles. In this way, the fluid filling the man who has drunken himself into oblivion 
serves as a metonymy for the man himself, the latter equally incapable of remembering 
information in a state of stupor or unconsciousness. He is what is filling him. Yet Florent 
is not, in reality, a “sac” for alcohol, as he rarely drinks in the text, and has not drunk 
prior to passing out in the Parisian gutter. The opposite is true – Florent’s problem is not 
an excess, but a complete absence of nourishment. More than just an object believed to 
be dead, Florent incorrectly designated as a “sac” is objectified by the error applied to 
him. An impermanent, indecipherable, opaque mass propagating error replaces the solid 
or visible human that might have transmitted information with minimal error. Florent is 
reduced to the state of a thing, “chosifié,” but without value as a commodity. In this 
scene, it is not just that the wagon-driver does not possess the code to decipher the object 
Florent; the former takes no steps to do so (by jumping from his wagon, as Madame 
François does, for example). Whether Florent is or is not a “sac” does not matter to the 
wagon-driver, the time delay in getting to work interposed by Florent’s body does. The 
designation of Florent as a “sac” thus reveals at once a lack of decoding that creates error, 
and a lack of motivation on the part of the errored party to correct it. It also reinforces a 
certain Newtonian view of Florent. Rather than interpret Florent as a living object 
encapsulating a specific vital or vitalistic whole that cannot be subdivided or fully 
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understood, the wagon driver reduces Florent to the highly abstracted and easily 
decipherable sac, an idealized, formless, inanimate object capable of complete 
identification in a mechanical and mechanistic way. Reinforcing this view is the text’s 
description of Florent as a masse noire, a typically Newtonian characterization of an 
object where reality’s infinite variety is eliminated in favor of artificial identity capable 
of manipulation.  
Coupled with the literal error in labeling Florent a “sac” is, however, a certain 
figurative truth. As Madame François and the anonymous wagon-driver apply two 
distinct external interpretations to Florent, he becomes in a certain sense a container for 
such interpretations. This fortuitous figurative truth is a reminder that mismatched 
encoders and decoders are still capable of transmitting some information, if 
unpredictably. To return to the example above, if the “13” encoded at the message source 
ends up a “23” upon decoding, the message suffers from error, but it also contains a 
certain accuracy – the 3 in the tens column transmits correctly, if incidentally. A similar 
measure of partial truth held, it may be recalled, when Lisa thought about saying that she 
was checking Florent’s dirty laundry when she was really intent on rummaging through 
his drawers. If Florent is not a literal container for alcohol, he does partially resemble a 
“sac” in his general object-ness.14            
                                                        
14
 The labeling of Florent as a sac marks a sharp contrast with Auguste’s glove. Replacing the 
changing bounds of the “sac” filled with fluid is the glove that holds a solid hand giving it durable 
structure in the liquid medium of blood. Paralleling this contrast is a related contrast arising out of 
the instrumental capacities of the two containers. Auguste’s glove, through its utility in predicting 
sausage quality, is an important link in a chain of production. Florent’s “sac,” by contrast, actually 
interferes with the economy of Les Halles by blocking the street used for deliveries. Auguste’s 
glove, then, represents action and efficacy; Florent’s “sac” is inaction and ineffectiveness. 
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Two other aspects of the wagon-driver’s harangue tend to objectify Florent – the 
use of the words “porc” and “ça.” Each tends to reduce Florent to an information object 
by dehumanizing him. Some theorists have labeled the third person a “non-person” 
(Barthes, Bruissement 26) outside of the “je-tu” dialogue, and this lack of personhood 
only amplifies in light of the change from “il/elle” to the generic thing “ça.” It is perhaps 
not a coincidence that the psychological meaning of “ça” maps to the most animal-like 
portion of the brain – Florent here is at best an animal, “un porc.”    
 This is not the only example of a message that Florent encodes, but whose 
recipients fail to decode upon receipt. His attempts to educate Muche, the Belle 
Normande’s son, necessarily fall victim to non-transmitted messages. When trying to 
teach the child handwriting, Florent asks the child to copy, “tyranniquement, liberticide, 
anticonstitutionnel, révolutionnaire” (Zola, Le Ventre 210) or alternatively, “Le jour de la 
justice viendra… La souffrance du juste est la condamnation du pervers… Quand l’heure 
sonnera, le coupable tombera” (Zola, Le Ventre 210). The meaning of this message is not 
unambiguous - in part because not enough information is provided to decipher exactly 
who the “coupable” is or what the future day of reckoning will entail; in part because the 
lesson is actually effective, if sub-optimal, at driving penmanship practice. To the latter 
point, only five letters - g, k, w, x, and z – do not count among those included in the 
lesson. For Muche’s purposes, this accomplishes the goal of the exercise regardless of the 
potential content of the words, which is not transmitted to its initial audience. This lack of 
transmission speaks to one type of encoding, where the recipient does not possess the key 
necessary to decode information content meaningfully. Taken from Florent’s perspective, 
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however, another type of encoding is at work here. The text notes that Florent “obéissait 
très-naïvement, en écrivant les modèles d’écriture, aux idées qui lui hantaient le cerveau ; 
il oubliait Muche, la belle Normande, tout ce qui l’entourait” (Zola, Le Ventre 210). In a 
moment in which the strength of Florent’s ça recalls his object-ness, he has 
unconsciously proposed the lesson content to Muche in obedience to his revolutionary 
instincts. That content reflects not his intention, but the ghosts, les hantises, which 
occupy his head without clear structure or meaning. It is they, and not Florent, that 
transmit a message, which Florent passes on as an obedient messenger, writing 
automatically, as the surrealists sought to do. Indeed, the message in Muche’s lesson is 
encoded, but Florent does not seem to possess the key, rendering the message foreign to 
him as soon as it is committed to paper.   
 For want of an encoding key, the already-ambiguous message of Florent’s lesson 
cannot be reliably decoded. This is not important for Muche, who does not understand 
any of the possible meanings of the message. He, like Florent (it would seem), exists only 
as a potential means of transmitting the message through reproduction (Zola, Le Ventre 
210). This transmission will not be free from error, as the handwriting of the 
inexperienced child will not match Florent’s “belle main.” Curves may become jagged; 
forms may swell or deflate; connections between letters may rupture.  
The child’s writing, however, falls out of the chain of communication, as the most 
critical indicia of Florent’s guilt are his own handwriting examples. When la Belle 
Normande provides the police commissioner with these examples, “le commissaire lisait 
les modèles d’écriture, d’un air sérieux. Les ‘tyranniquement,’ les ‘liberticide,’ les 
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‘anticonstitutionnel,’ les ‘révolutionnaire,’ lui faisaient froncer les sourcils. Lorsqu’il lut 
la phrase : ‘Quand l’heure sonnera, le coupable tombera,’ il donna de petites tapes sur les 
papiers, en disant : — C’est très-grave, très-grave.” (Zola, Le Ventre 399). A key aspect 
of language as information is implicitly required here – a redundancy in the symbolic 
form that prevents variations in content from affecting the message. If Florent had 
alternated pro-Empire language with his “antityrannique” and “liberticide,” the 
commissioner might have struggled to decipher a message as unequivocally as he does. 
An additional aspect of redundancy, where language meets with legibility, must appear 
from Florent’s “belle main.” However Florent has specifically formed the word 
“coupable,” his handwriting still communicates the associated language, while his 
personalized variation on the language remains in the excessive margins of the letter. If 
his “b” in coupable is more bulbous than another’s, it is still intrinsically susceptible to 
reading. Through these two dimensions of redundancy, either the surrounding letters or 
the flexibility of a letter itself, build in sufficient error correction possibilities to enable 
some form of decoding of a potentially errored message.      
 What remains is the actual decoding step, in marginal misalignment with the 
encoding process. From the point of view of the latter, the words on the page in Muche’s 
lesson serve a dual purpose: one in which their actual meaning is unimportant as long as 
the child has practiced making letters, and another in which the words communicate an 
ambiguous, but likely revolutionary, message.  To decode the message according to the 
first purpose is merely to appreciate the lesson for what it is, and (possibly) to verify that 
the lesson contains enough letters to provide functional practice. The act of reading the 
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words on the page, appreciating the letters’ symbolic value, is of no utility in this 
potential decoding. Florent’s lack of control in encoding the message symmetrically 
traces the lack of importance in this context of the message’s content upon decoding. 
Seen from this perspective, this first type of decoding presents a certain aversion to error 
for lack of a message to be transmitted.  
The commissioner does not limit himself to such a decoding, however, opting 
instead to pursue the second process. Due to the ambiguous content of the message to be 
decoded, the commissioner must choose among a variety of possible interpretations to 
determine the message’s meaning. The text does not share his exact reading at this stage, 
but it does reveal a secondary step in the decoding, his judgment on the content of the 
handwriting lesson. The “c’est très grave – très grave” (Zola, Le Ventre 399) marks a 
condemnation of the lesson’s content, from which it may be inferred that the 
commissioner has at least concluded that Florent stands in a potentially violent position 
of conspiracy against the authority of people like the commissioner himself. This 
decoding by the commissioner suggests two contrasting takeaways. On one hand, it 
presents another case of authority condemning Florent on less-than-unambiguous 
evidence, as Florent’s first exile results from a simple sheet of paper, unaccompanied by 
testimony, declaring him dangerous. This view points to an erroneous reading of the 
lesson based on insufficient evidence. This is yet another example of the chiasmus 
highlighted above, where the Newtonian applies despite its thermodynamics-driven error, 
while the entropic, yet accurate, content is left in a state of apparent, but threatening, 
dormancy. On another hand, the commissioner’s interpretation of the handwriting lesson 
  
144 
fits as a reasonable, if not dispositive, induction of meaning in conjunction with the 
numerous other denunciations and troubling indicia in Florent’s police dossier. If 
everything else known about Florent points to his revolutionary tendencies, it only 
follows that his handwriting lesson should be interpreted consistently. The redundancy of 
the lesson’s language, both generally and in handwritten form, reflects a miniaturized 
form of the redundancy of testimonial language proffered against Florent at the time of 
his arrest. The lesson is redundant within a larger redundant structure - a mise en abyme 
of redundancy. This level of redundancy promotes a minimization of error in the 
decoding. Florent is planning an uprising (if extremely ineffectively), after all, so a police 
decoding of his handwriting lesson content as “very grave” does not seem to be 
completely in error. Because of this, Florent remains a marginal figure – all the more 
literally here, as his existence depends on the seemingly marginal, but repetitive, letters 
lining various documents.  
With respect to language’s communicative capacity as a function of probability, 
the concept of a handwriting lesson represents a point of confluence between conveying 
no message and conveying a stylistically distinct message. As Serres and Shannon both 
note, language can be analyzed as a function of the probability of appearance of certain 
letters or sequences of letters (Serres, Feux et signaux 122; Shannon 388). Over a 
sufficiently large sample size of language composed in a certain language, letters will 
eventually conform to a predetermined frequency where, in French, for example, “e” and 
“s” appear most commonly, while consonants like “w” and “z” remain highly irregular 
(Shannon discusses English; I retrieved these figures from Wikipedia). To provide an 
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effective handwriting model necessarily means breaking with this probability distribution 
– the naturally less frequent letters must become artificially more frequent for purposes of 
practice. This has an unintended implication in the case of Florent’s handwriting model – 
it means that the writing takes on what Serres’ terms “style,” or a measurable break in the 
frequency of appearance of certain letters when compared to the language-average 
frequency of letters (Serres, Feux et signaux 122-125). Whether or not unconscious in 
origin, Florent’s relatively comprehensive handwriting model belies Florent’s writing 
style, and thereby becomes a marker to identify him. By ostensibly anonymizing his 
writing to serve as a generalized form of practice, he is simultaneously giving it – and 
himself – an identity. The commissioner would not seem unjustified, from this 
perspective, in drawing conclusions from Florent’s lesson.       
Error may still be present in the commissioner’s conclusions, however, if one 
considers the possibility of systematic error in the social network of Les Halles. Indeed, if 
everyone who has denounced Florent to the authorities did so in error, then this error 
would represent a system-wide bias. The decoding of the handwriting lesson would, in 
turn, reflect further propagation of such bias. As noted in the earlier discussion of the role 
that error should have played in Auguste’s blood whipping, the inflexible certainty of 
views held in Les Halles applied to changing objects leads directly to a systematically 
biased error to which the denunciations of Florent might fall prey.  The structural 
similarities between the blood whipping and the decoding of the handwriting lesson run 
deeper than Les Halles’ tendency to promote systematic error. The commissioner’s 
“petites tapes” applied to the paper containing the handwriting lesson mirror the 
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movements of Auguste’s hand in the blood. Where Auguste expends manual energy to 
discover information that will subsequently be corroborated by the sausage itself, the 
commissioner also employs his hands to accompany a decoding process that leads to the 
generation of information (that is already corroborated by a file on Florent). In neither 
case is entropy meaningfully increased. Far from it, entropy is repressed through a fitting 
of the unknown and unknowable into a fixed frame of reference - the prevailing 
authorities reach a certain conclusion that maps precisely to the current or future state of 
affairs.  And once again, Florent is reduced to liminal or object status – a revolutionary 
correctly designated as such in some respects, yet also a victim of the fixed, potentially 
errored frame of reference wielded by the social and governmental authorities in Les 
Halles. This victimization only increases in view of the control in decoding messages that 
the gras exercise.  
 Florent’s unconsciously encoded message destined to suffer decoding at the hands 
of authority finds further reflection in the machinations and arrest of Florent’s co-
conspirator Gavard. On two separate occasions, the text notes Gavard’s tendency to put 
“dans ses poignées de mains des confidences maçonniques” (Zola, Le Ventre 110 and 
174). Gavard constantly engages in ornate secret handshakes which serve a double intent 
vis-à-vis the handshake’s recipient - to seal social relations and to communicate a 
revolutionary political philosophy. The text does not explicitly state whether the recipient 
of the handshake appreciates the secret message, but there is reason to believe that 
Gavard’s gesture is not understood at all by the recipient. Gavard is not a Freemason; nor 
are his potential co-conspirators; they do not tend to speak in code during their nightly 
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rendez-vous, preferring instead to denounce government and society directly. And 
because these characters take such little care to keep their views confidential, such views 
are quickly broadcast throughout the neighborhood, converted into a sort of secret de 
Polichinelle. In view of this background, it seems fair to conclude that the elaborate 
encoding that Gavard applies to his handshakes is not the sort of algorithm that the 
handshake recipient can decipher. There does not appear to be a fixed key to encode the 
handshake, and even if there were, the recipient does not possess it to bring about a 
decoding. Once again, the hands of Auguste and the commissioner that expend energy to 
discover and transmit information find a counterpoint in the hands of Gavard (and 
Florent, of course) in a futile expenditure of energy and a complete loss or alteration of 
message and information. Whether by resort to a hand soaked in blood or another 
contorted into random byzantine shapes, the latter maigres do not even control so much 
as the encoding of their messages, let alone their transmission and reception.       
The figurative lack of a key that plagues Gavard’s handshakes assumes a more 
literal, but similarly errored, form when he is arrested.  At this moment in the text, “la 
Sarriette et madame Lecœur étaient accourues. Quand elles eurent demandé une 
explication, la marchande de beurre se mit à sangloter, tandis que la nièce, très-émue, 
embrassait son oncle. Il la tint serrée entre ses bras, en lui remettant une clef et en lui 
murmurant à l’oreille : — Prends tout, et brûle les papiers” (Zola, Le Ventre 408). 
Gavard’s murmur reflects a clear intent to control the disposition of his belongings – both 
intellectual and financial – by limiting the audience of his message to his niece, la 
Sarriette. By extension, his sister, Madame Lecœur, would not be able to enjoy his 
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money, and the government would not be able to enjoy the evidence captured in his 
personal papers. This encoding of sorts fails to accomplish the desired result on both 
counts. As the message transmitted ostensibly in secrecy is overheard, Gavard’s money 
ends up split among the one intended beneficiary, La Sarriette, and three other women, 
including the pretermitted Madame Lecœur (Zola, Le Ventre 410-412). Following some 
delay in the distribution of the money, the four women neglect to burn Gavard’s papers 
lest the arresting authorities catch them (Zola, Le Ventre 412). The scene marks an almost 
diametrically opposed counterpoint to the end of Le Docteur Pascal, where the proposed 
theft of a key replaces the rightfully acquired key here (Zola, Le Docteur Pascal 474), 
and where a demonic fire of personal papers replaces the unharmed papers of Gavard, 
those that should have been burned. Perhaps the critical distinction is the final victory of 
destruction and entropy in Félicité’s fire in Le Docteur Pascal. Entropic thermodynamics, 
granted a privileged position in the last book in the Rougon-Macquart cycle, is not yet 
realized in the cycle’s third installment, Le Ventre de Paris. 
It is, however, the similarities in these two scenes that highlight a shared source of 
error – women seeking personal fortune. In neither case does the initial key holder, Pascal 
or Gavard, desire what ultimately befalls his papers. Pascal seeks preservation for the 
benefit of science; Gavard seeks destruction in the interest of secrecy. Yet once Pascal’s 
armoire is drilled, Félicité is able to preserve what she views as the glory of the Rougons 
(Zola, Le Docteur Pascal 484); and once Gavard’s key is taken, his sister is able to 
abscond with a substantial portion of his wealth. If the keys do not serve as literal 
encoders in the sense that they encrypt the meaning of the writings of Pascal or Gavard, 
  
149 
they fulfill the same purpose by physically securing sensitive information from 
consumption by just any observer in Shannon’s information system. Losing a key means 
sacrificing this security; as does relying for security on a container, like Pascal’s armoire, 
that may be broken into through an alternate key – a drill. Gavard and his co-conspirators 
ultimately do not control the security and audience of their messages; the demonized 
women of Les Halles do – from Lisa’s suspicions and denunciation of Florent to la belle 
Normande’s transfer of Muche’s lessons to the police. Even Saget’s discovery of 
Florent’s prior prison stay comes tainted with a double female transgression – that of 
Saget herself in snooping and that of a literally sullied
15
 Pauline giving up the 
information (Zola, Le Ventre 324). If Félicité’s fire remains absent in Le Ventre de Paris, 
the symbolic castration of the erstwhile key holder, and the seizure of information control 
by a group of women, is equally evident in both texts.          
In addition to highlighting the information control of a certain group, the handling 
of Gavard’s key reflects a potential metaphor for the relation between Zola himself and 
the text. The act of writing represents Zola’s effort to provide the reader with a key to 
decode his text, but the control of that key immediately transfers to the reader to dispose 
of the text as the reader sees fit. By publishing a novel, Zola, like Gavard, is surrendering 
control in encoding, transmitting, and decoding his own papers. Nothing can prevent 
those papers from falling into unintended hands, being subject to unforeseeable 
interpretations, or even being burned, just as Gavard’s papers surely find their way into 
the hands of authority looking to condemn him. Here is yet another subtle victory for the 
                                                        
15
 In this respect, it may be recalled that Pauline unwittingly reveals Florent’s secret past 
immediately after Muche has made a game of dirtying her new dress. 
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entropic and errored over the Bernardian and determined. Zola may claim as much as he 
likes that the structure of his text is fully determined based on a set of initial conditions, 
that he is a mere observer and experimenter with respect to the society of his time; he is 
fundamentally unable to control the reception of his text among his readership. Indeed, 
his inability to control reader reception in the way that he desired is precisely his 
motivation for writing aspects of Le Roman expérimental (see the responses to critics, for 
example, in Zola, Le Roman expérimental, 271-82). What Zola deems to be error outside 
the text must overwhelm the wholly determined phenomena within the text itself.  
 
Conclusion 
The two sections above have attempted to demonstrate how, over the course of Le 
Ventre de Paris, the gras control the circulation of information in Les Halles, 
manipulating perceptions to their own ends. These manipulations may involve something 
as simple as the whipping of blood to predict deterministically the character of sausage, 
but they also often target the maigres, who are thereby reduced to the status of 
information objects tossed like flotsam in the currents of opinion. Thus is Florent reduced 
to the status of criminal and outcast, initially for a crime that he does not commit. The 
failure of the maigres to exercise control over information in Les Halles relegates them to 
the passive roles of information reception, storage, and transmission. The gras, by 
contrast, can actively alter these means of information movement, by changing them mid-
stream, like the assessment of so much blood flowing over a hand. The control exercised 
by the gras critically extends to encoding and decoding functions. When the gras encode 
  
151 
information, they can be certain, in the luxury of their deterministic framework, that other 
gras hold the same key to decode the information. What they insert on one end of the 
system is certain to come out at the other end, like meat through a sausage grinder (or like 
Zola’s texts themselves). Not so for the maigres, who when attempting to control 
information by encoding it, are almost certain to be ignored or misunderstood at either 
the gras’ or their own decoding step. When they share their stories in an indirect form 
with the gras, the latter are in a position to receive the story in the way that they see fit, 
and to apply their own negative judgments without appeal for the maigres. Even the 
handshakes the maigres exchange amongst themselves are more obfuscation than 
manipulation, where the one hand’s masonic contortions cannot speak to the other’s 
neutral grip.  
This division between the gras as empowered subjects and the maigres as objects 
reflects the rift in science at the time that Zola wrote Le Ventre de Paris. The traditional 
framework, embodied by the gras, was Newtonian, where future behavior could be 
predicted based on past performance, initial conditions, and mathematically-based 
legality. There, matter remains constant in time, amenable to repeatable, precise 
reactions. The maigres, on the other hand, presage a new era in science driven by 
thermodynamics, entropy, and information theory. They tend away from knowable 
information in the form of discrete peaks and valleys in energy, as they follow a path to a 
shared equilibrium, a turbulent mass of society colliding in the Brownian motion of 
revolution. The maigres are only artificially knowable from this perspective, Florent’s 
low energy level tending to match that of the other masses, dead or alive, piling on top of 
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him during the revolution or accompanying him on a sometimes deadly escape attempt 
from exile in French Guyana. The maigres are mere information carriers, but limited 
even in this capacity; the gras are information observers, unlimited in the energy they can 
expend to know and rearrange.     
 In view of this background, the information dynamics of Florent’s demise at Le 
Ventre de Paris’ conclusion are not surprising. After Lisa’s denunciation joins the 
numerous other indicia – gathered from the north of France to Paris – in Florent’s police 
dossier, the hapless maigre is once again arrested:   
“Deux mois plus tard, Florent était de nouveau condamné à la déportation. 
L’affaire fit un bruit énorme. Les journaux s’emparèrent des moindres détails, 
donnèrent les portraits des accusés, les dessins des guidons et des écharpes, les 
plans des lieux où la bande se réunissait. Pendant quinze jours, il ne fut question 
dans Paris que du complot des Halles. La police lançait des notes de plus en plus 
inquiétantes ; on finissait par dire que tout le quartier Montmartre était miné” 
(Zola, Le Ventre 419-420). 
 
The first sentence returns to the controlled and deterministic framework of the bourgeois 
in its air of inevitability and finality. Nothing could be so simple or so expected as 
Florent’s condemnation to another exile – that result is only a question of the passage of 
time. Such, at least, is the one-sentence view from outside Bergson’s boiler, where a 
revenant exile input to the system at time a, the beginning of the text, is certain to be an 
output exile at a later time b, the story’s end.  
 The remaining sentences in the paragraph peel back the shell of the closed boiler 
system to reveal internal behavior consistent with the exterior view. There, the initial 
state is an agitated form of the system’s steady state in the first scene – one of noise 
seemingly without discernable content. The entropy evident in that first scene – the 
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tendency to system-wide average behavior devoid of information – is broken 
immediately here. Yet instead of returning to the moment of complete silence on an 
empty désert of an avenue, the system evolves towards a growing turbulence and din, 
particles colliding faster and faster, capable of providing more and more information to 
the observer. The newspapers latch on to increasingly minute details which they then 
send ricocheting from focus to focus, and all points in between, in the Parisian ellipse. 
Here, there is no Heisenberg uncertainty principle, no limit to what can be known. There 
is no trade-off between what is learned in the form of information, on one hand, and the 
chaos that is created and energy lost thereby, on the other. Information begets 
information, and all can be known – the four corners of a building plan framed by the 
four corners of the newspaper page.  Once known, this information can be circulated in 
single-minded frenzy without loss. The ejection of the modern particle, Florent, subject to 
the limits of entropy and error, leads to a full restoration of the Newtonian world. In a 
system-wide energy equilibrium, the low energy of a Florent or Gavard finds a 
counterbalance in the gras’ excessive energy. 
 Yet this passage also signals the possibility of a new beginning - scientifically, 
and perhaps, societally. The seemingly infinite supply of information to be received, 
stored, and transmitted, the perpetual motion machine of stories feeding stories, has a 
limit in its precision. It ends up spiraling off its axis, turning potentially accurate 
blueprints and pictures of the revolutionary uniforms, into a literal minefield of error – 
“tout le quartier Montmartre était miné.” No closed system can continue to feed its own 
frenzy indefinitely. As the runaway train at the end of La Bête humaine must eventually 
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stop, Serres notes (Serres, Feux et signaux 140-143), so too must the seemingly entropy-
free transfer of information in Les Halles give way to an excess-driven error. Such error 
suggests deep-lying, irreparable fissures in the system, where a new social order might 
bring an end to the gras’ stranglehold. Perhaps that post-gras order would be more 
precise in its communication of information; or perhaps - consistent with the scientific 
concept of modernity taking hold when Zola wrote – that order would recognize the 
necessary presence of entropy and error, and reimagine the limits of what can be learned, 
known, and controlled. What may be said of the society of Les Halles in Le Ventre de 
Paris applies equally to Zola’s texts themselves. The Bernardian certainty, determinism, 
and truth that Zola preached in Le Roman expérimental was just as mined as the 
Montmartre neighborhood in Florent’s trial. Just beneath the surface, as shown in the 
introduction and through the information theory-motivated reading of Le Ventre de Paris 
offered here, error and chaotic loss inevitably remain. As much as Comte and Bernard 
sketched the 19
th
 century as the beginning of the realization of human scientific and 
social ideals, Carnot and Clausius had other ideas – information that could not be 
retrieved for lack of energy, engines that would not cycle perfectly or produce optimal 
output, chaos inevitably growing over time throughout the universe. And Zola’s texts 
were not immune to this, sliding on a minefield of error, often only to end in a 
thermodynamic conflagration (in addition to Le Docteur Pascal, see also La Conquête de 
Plassans, La Terre, and La Débâcle for texts in the Rougon-Macquart that notably 
conclude with a raging inferno).    
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CHAPTER THREE: QUENEAU 
In the transition from Zola to Raymond Queneau, the deep engagement of each 
author with scientific theory as a tool to structure the text remains. Where Bernard’s early 
medical science furnished Zola with a method to develop the text as a reflection of a rule-
bound reality based on a set of laws and initial conditions, Queneau similarly hewed to a 
more general application of scientific rigor and rigidity as an inspiration for his text. But 
that rigor and rigidity does not derive from the rules that govern the world that the text 
was intended to depict; instead it is implemented as a form of structure within the text 
itself. Where Zola attempted to order his texts based on his observations of pettiness in 
the bourgeoisie or violence in a farmer, Queneau often ordered his texts based on 
numbers, graphs, and constraints divorced from the outside world, but as thoroughly 
determinant of the textual skeleton as anything that Zola used.  As Queneau said of his 
first novel, Le chiendent, “I established rules for myself as strict as those for the sonnet.” 
(Guicharnaud 19). In the case of a later text Un rude hiver, Queneau proposed to 
structure the text according to a graph of an Archimedean spiral, elaborated to include 
equations for the spiral and the roots where it crossed the x-axis. (Souchier 145). So even 
if Queneau’s application of science and mathematics to his texts was not intended to 
reflect a sort of Zolian determinacy, it is still reasonable to conclude that “La démarche 
quenienne est avant tout scientifique”16 (Souchier 110), and as will be shown in this 
chapter, that it resonates well with many of the trends already touched upon in the two 
previous chapters. 
                                                        
16
 Technically, it probably should read “quenellienne,” instead of “quenienne.” We will adopt the 
former in its English form here. 
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 The consequence of generating text based on rigid mathematical or scientific 
structure leaves Queneau’s works in an equivocal relation to textuality or literature more 
generally – a relation that ties closely to Quenellian epistemology undertaken here. In his 
rupture with Surrealism and one-time friend André Breton, Queneau sought, as 
Emmanuël Souchier contends, “à démythifier, voire à démystifier la littérature.” 
(Souchier 124). This argument seems correct in a certain sense, in that Queneau viewed 
his literary creation as diametrically opposed to the Surrealist ideal of generating text 
directly from l’inconscient through automatic writing techniques. Queneau’s use of 
explicitly conscious rules as a means of generating text was intended to reflect the 
intentionally created content of the text itself.   
 The argument that Queneau sought to demystify the novel should not be 
interpreted to mean that Queneau viewed his task as limited in creative possibility. By 
limiting the rigidity of his text to certain skeletal structures, Queneau was still able to 
deploy a highly creative and fanciful vision in the interstices of the structure. Many 
aspects of his text exceed any accepted notion of boundary or scientific determinacy. The 
text may obey a formula, but the formula is not that of an asymptote slowly approaching 
a limit in the blockage graphed by Zeno’s paradox, but an explosion of possibility beyond 
such limits. Cent mille milliards de poèmes follows rules of poetic structure, but it still 
enables the reader to create the titular number of poems, an amount that by definition 
cannot be read in a lifetime. Les fleurs bleues – a title that already evokes both 
sentimentality and the infinite through the symbolic meaning of “blue flower” - follows 
an alternating format where each chapter dedicated to the Duc d’Auge alternates with a 
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chapter on the life of Cidrolin, but the two appear for much of the text to be the same 
person, each living in the other’s dreams.17 Passages not typically possible are 
accomplished freely in Queneau’s textual universe. The constraint imposed on writing 
may serve as a limit along certain dimensions, as a means of defining where the text 
cannot go; along other dimensions, the text may produce beyond the (supposedly) 
deterministic space of Zola’s texts.   
This has the consequence that the Quenellian text is not only generative within the 
structure of science as textual constraint, but also generative in spite of the limits of 
modern science. As has been stated of Les Enfants du Limon, a text to be touched on later 
in this chapter, “le roman réalise la quadrature de l’Histoire.” (Souchier 130). As an 
amateur mathematician, Queneau knew that the circle cannot be squared, but his texts are 
able to accomplish this very feat. Queneau also understood the irreversibility and 
necessary decay of a thermodynamically-bound world, yet his texts, in their cycles, 
repetitions, and eternal returns, ever seem to flaunt this reality. And Queneau was well-
apprised of the growth and development of relativity, but that did not exclude his texts – 
as we shall see – from presenting a view less than favorable to Einstein’s doctrines, and 
far more favorable to a pre-scientific sort of alchemy. Through the generativity of his 
texts between and against science, Queneau “conveys the impression that everything is 
possible when one writes.” (Guicharnaud 30).  To explore this further, this chapter 
proposes three sections. The first, a close textual review of Queneau’s 1936 novel Les 
                                                        
17
 By doubly coding the lives of both Cidrolin and the Duc d’Auge as both “dream” and “reality,” 
Queneau’s text has accomplished a Figure-Figure shift. (Hofstadter 68-70). Where normal 
imagery relies on an appreciation of a certain scene as the “Figure” and the rest of the image (the 
background, items between the figure) as “Ground,” certain images, like many of the tessellation-
inspired drawings by Escher, also contain figures where only ground is normally included.   
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derniers jours, elaborates on the tenuous relation between the Quenellian text and the 
doctrines of modern science. The second, pursuing further investigation of Les derniers 
jours, highlights some of the points of resonance between the text and epistemology more 
generally. In this respect, this section builds on our discussions already begun in the 
context of La Peau de chagrin and Le Ventre de Paris. Finally, the third section casts a 
brief glance at Les Enfants du Limon, a text that partially chronicles the fous littéraires 
that attempted to square the circle in the 19
th
 century, and a text alleged to have attempted 
to square the circle itself. The suggestion seems reasonable, as Les Enfants du Limon 
reveals a tendency to undertake the apparently impossible passage à la limite, not only 
between the area of the circle and the area of the square (mathematically incapable of 
constructive equality), but also between insanity and sanity, author and character, and 
scientific impossibility and the unlimited space of the text.  
 A word on methodology is in order before beginning the body of this Chapter. 
The two previous chapters have applied a certain scientific and epistemological lens to 
texts that lent themselves to such a reading, inasmuch as the texts used scientific legality 
and determinacy predominately in the service of a scientific end. In Balzac’s case, this 
meant exploring the bounds of scientific method and the unknowns that (necessarily, if 
the texts are to be believed) fell within science’s purview. In Zola’s case, this meant 
using scientific constructs to generate a rule-bound universe. As this introduction has 
noted (and as the main introduction to this Dissertation mentioned), Queneau’s use of 
science is for entirely non-scientific ends – to promote creativity within the self-imposed 
structure, to generate comedy (particularly of the absurd variety), and ultimately, to 
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obliterate the very structures of rule-bound determinacy. In view of Queneau’s shifted 
use of science as compared to his predecessors, we must exercise more care not to be too 
stilted in our application of science to his texts. When using a scientific lens to show how 
Queneau’s texts exceed the boundaries of the institutionally accepted science of his time, 
we run the risk of not seeing what the excess beyond science means in terms of 
aesthetics, affect, comedy, and undoubtedly many other dimensions. There is still a 
constructive value in noting those bounds, however, in that they observe very real 
conflicts in the space of the text. And perhaps the greatest attribute of applying a 
scientific structure to Queneau’s own self-imposed scientific structure is a form of 
Oulipian revenge – to use Queneau’s very own tools and constraints in feedback with 
their source. If Queneau’s work constantly closed loops in infinitely generative eternal 
returns, then use of a constrained, Oulipo technique to analyze Oulipian literature is a 
fitting way of paying tribute to this. Like Hofstadter’s example of music whose pitch 
might break the very phonograph playing it (Hofstadter 82-84), use of Oulipian critical 
techniques on Oulipo text tests at least one possible frequency of self-referentiality to see 
if the system might break here, as well.        
 
Les derniers jours and the Tenuous Relation of the Quenellian Text to Modern 
Science 
Just as Zola’s Le Ventre de Paris was situated at a certain crossroads in scientific 
thought, so too does Les dernier jours confront opposing tendencies in science and 
epistemology. Historically, there is reason to believe that the fault lines in the two texts 
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would be different as a matter of scientific development. For Zola, the text presented a 
hybrid of the traditionally Newtonian and discoverable set against the backdrop of a 
tendency to disorder characterized by the field of thermodynamics’ early understanding 
of entropy. In the roughly seven decades separating Zola’s third entry in Les Rougon-
Macquart from Queneau’s own third novel, science underwent remarkable changes 
unrivaled in its prior history. Not only did thermodynamics gain a foothold as a 
legitimate field of study – the late nineteenth century witnessed the discovery of genetics 
by Mendel, a shuffling-through of the ultimately sterile field of Ostwaldian energetics in 
confrontation with Boltzmann’s more successful mechanics, and the growth and adoption 
of electromagnetism based on Maxwell’s theory. With the beginning of the twentieth 
century came experimental proof of Avogadro’s number,18 and with it, evidence of the 
existence of atoms as a building block composing all matter. With atomic theory as an 
established platform, the field opened up for the development of quantum mechanics to 
study the make-up of the atom and the closely intertwined relation between the 
experimental subject and object. Perhaps the most substantial discovery of the early 
twentieth century, however, was Einstein’s relativity, which placed all objects in their 
own frame of reference as compared to one universal constant, the speed of light. This 
means that Earth’s gravity is no longer accurately captured in a single constant, and all 
objects in space are no longer simply and equivalently subject to Newtonian equations 
measuring interacting forces. Rather, all objects occupy their own space-time, a 
                                                        
18
 Avogadro was an early nineteenth-century scientist who hypothesized that any gas at a given 
temperature and pressure occupying a given volume will contain the same number of molecules, 
regardless of the gas’ composition (Perrin 54). Avogadro’s number, approximately 6.022 X 10
23
, 
is the number of constituent particles in a given mass of a substance, defined as a mole.  
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calculation that depends on their mass and velocity. These factors, in turn, determine the 
shape of space and the rate at which time passes. We will have occasion to revisit these 
concepts further – both very soon in this chapter and in the next chapter on Houellebecq. 
At a high level, however, it seems that the substantial changes in scientific theory that 
took place in the period between Zola and Queneau did not result in a corresponding 
change in their literature. If anything, the two seem to relate in a sort of chiasmus with 
respect to one another. Where Zola matched traditional science with a tendency to adopt 
more modern concepts like thermodynamics, Queneau’s text, perhaps consistent with the 
author’s own skepticism, recognizes modern developments like relativity while hewing to 
traditional epistemological concepts as a seemingly better marker of truth.  
Or perhaps Queneau’s text goes one step further: through an odd combination 
exposing both traditional and novel scientific theories in a setting that leads to highly 
improbable results on all counts, the text itself becomes a sort of extrascientific space 
where commonly understood, predictable phenomena unfold in a manner that belies any 
typical expectations. In Saint Glinglin, the Ville Natale enjoys years of uninterrupted 
sunny weather – possibly due to its chasse-nuages – before the dismantling of the latter 
device leads to years of uninterrupted rain; only for the installation of a new chasse-
nuages to inaugurate another period of sun. In Les fleurs bleues, Cidrolin and the Duc 
d’Auge seem to alternate existences, where one is conscious during the other’s dreams, 
until their dual existences cross at the end of the text. Le vol d’Icare features characters 
that bounce in and out of texts and texts within the text, while Loin de Rueil’s Jacques 
L’Aumône seems able to enter and assume the existence of other people, from boxing 
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champions to characters on a movie screen. To a reader seeking a sort of verisimilitude, 
textual developments like these make no sense. There is no such thing as a chasse-nuages 
that could exclusively determine the weather. When replaced, the chasse-nuages seems to 
be no more than a lobster trap hung as a wind-sock, a device that ought to be exclusively 
affected by the weather, and not vice versa. To the extent that the change in weather is 
merely coincidental with the presence or absence of the chasse-nuages, under a 
hypothesis similar to the one proposed for Raphaël in his relation to La Peau de chagrin, 
then it is immeasurably improbable that rainy or sunny weather would continue unabated 
over a period of years at a time. In most climates, the probability of twenty consecutive 
days of rain would be effectively zero; the probability of twenty-one days of rain after 
twenty such days immediately prior would be even less; and so on until the nth day of 
unchanged weather. As for the other texts, it is close to axiomatic as a matter of science 
and philosophy that human beings can pursue their individual existences only through 
their own conscious interface with the universe, without enjoying direct access to the 
mind of other human beings or the universe as a whole (see, e.g., Brunschvicg, 
Introduction 47-8). The fluid transitions in Queneau’s textual universe obliterate the 
traditional limits of Cartesianism to allow passage between existences, textual layers, and 
even media. The text, for Queneau, is a space where the predictable legality of the 
observed universe dissolves in favor of constructs that exceed science. What is the 
chasse-nuages, if not a perpetual sun machine operating without loss? What is a passage 
from one spirit to the next through dream or movie screen, if not a refusal of relativity’s 
subjective turn? At the very high level discussed to this point, Queneau’s work suggests 
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at once a knowledge of modern science and a rejection of its tenets within the text. 
Entropy and relativity might exist in the text as a matter of theory, but they do not exist as 
a matter of reality. Anything goes between the covers of a novel, including a return to 
Bachelard’s esprit préscientifique, an alchemist’s mixing of characters and invention of 
machines.       
 From the beginning of Les derniers jours, this very sort of pre-scientific mixing is 
at work. As Tolut wanders through the rainy streets of Paris, he directs his vitriol at the 
various means of transportation around him: “Tout ce qu’il espérait encore, c’est que par 
un de ces temps vaches qui graissent les pavés, un de ces instruments chavirerait, se 
transformant sous ses yeux en miettes boueuses, écuyer compris.” (Queneau, Derniers 
jours 10). With due respect to the melting root of the marronnier in La Nausée, this hope 
is at once scientifically unrealistic and perversely prophetic. (It is also humorous, of 
course, we are staying in Oulipian character for the moment.) Tolut is not content to wish 
an accident on a passing vehicle in his flight of sadistic fancy; he hopes for a reaction 
with no precedent in the observed world. A horse-drawn carriage and its driver, operating 
within the normal range of speed, could not possibly be reduced to so many miettes 
boueuses - the force necessary to produce such a transformation is lacking. That a 
carriage might tip and be damaged, that its driver might be wounded or even die in such 
an accident, such are the possible sequellae of an accident on a wet street. That the 
victims of the accident would be atomized in a muddy explosion is another proposition 
entirely, one that seems beyond reasonable likelihood. Yet this hope, for its deranged 
desires, serves as a reasonable reflection of a certain traditional epistemological view. If a 
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carriage and its driver will not become mere atomic subparts in reality, they might do so 
in theory by means of a simple equation, according to which the carriage and driver are 
no more than the sum of their sub-parts. Under this basic mechanical relation, an identity, 
linked by an equal sign, is established between the whole carriage, driver and mud on the 
ground, on one hand, and the tiny sub-parts of mixed carriage, driver, and mud, on the 
other.  
This relation reflects the tendency oft cited by Meyerson to find equality not only 
in different points in space, but also over the course of time, as Tolut’s desire specifically 
could take shape as reality as he watches, or during any other de ces temps vaches. 
Meyerson describes this as a tendency to exceed seeking mere legality – the relation of 
objects moveable to different portions of space – in favor of causality – a relation that 
might transfer within space and time without change (Meyerson, Identité 34-41). 
Causality is hardwired into human processing in Meyerson’s view (see generally, 
Meyerson, Identité), but that does not mean that it reduces to a simple question of 
observation or theory. Rather, the two must enter into close interaction – with human 
reason seeking stylized truths like “an object in motion must stay in motion unless acted 
upon” or “mass must remain conserved” in the face of an ever-varying reality in which 
very careful observation is necessary to overcome the superficial appearance that objects 
in motion do not stay in motion and mass might be gained or lost in a given reaction. The 
empirical and the intellectual enter into a feedback cycle under this arrangement, but the 
basic human desire driving the development of science is, in a curious way, exactly what 
motivates Tolut in this scene. From a causal perspective, all carriages and their drivers 
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are no more the sum of their violently obliterated parts, wherever the reaction is situated 
in space or time – their mass is conserved, if separated, their motion stopped only due to 
outside force.  
Buttressing this relation is Tolut’s further implicit reliance on a rapport 
d’intelligibilité, to borrow Brunschvicg’s term (Brunschvicg, Introduction 73), in which a 
total object like a carriage or human being, is decomposable as a matter of mechanics into 
smaller atomic (or perhaps even infinitely divisible) parts without sacrificing a certain 
equality between the part and the whole. The result is Newtonian, with an established 
pedigree in the pre-Newtonian. The transformation of lead into gold for the alchemist is 
at once possible as a theoretical construct, and nearly impossible as a practical matter for 
lack of energy and tools. The same may be said of Tolut’s inverted, abject form of 
alchemy, where the transformation of a carriage and driver into little muddy crumbs is 
possible intellectually, if unlikely as a matter of actual execution. From this first example 
in Les derniers jours, one can already begin to see how the mind, and the text that 
presents that mind, is a space that potentially exceeds the laws of loss inherent to entropy 
and limit related to energy. Cartesian doubt was traditionally a means of moving from an 
origin point - proof of individual existence due to the mind’s existence - to a chain of 
accurate propositions about reality; in Queneau’s texts, the mind serves an intermediary, 
distorting role between real and imagined spaces. For Tolut (and Queneau’s imagination-
fueled distortions more generally), any reaction might take place without loss in the 
transformation, without suffering any lack of energy in the text’s theoretically infinite 
reservoir.             
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Yet Tolut’s desire is also perversely prophetic in a way, for if it represents an 
unrealistic hope as a matter of execution, it serves as a foreshadowing of Tolut’s own 
premature demise. He will, in a suicidal élan near the text’s conclusion, step in front of a 
car and meet his own end, though perhaps not in quite so many miettes boueuses. A 
single coincidence like this is perhaps unremarkable on its own. There is a non-negligible 
chance that a character that hates all forms of conveyance with a passion would die at the 
wheels of one. That probability falls much closer to certainty when the death is the result 
of an apparent act of suicide (such is Alfred’s view in Queneau, Derniers jours 292). 
Taken within the larger ecosystem of Queneau’s textual creation, however, it is just one 
example among a myriad of inter-textual dialogues, involutions, and reflections that 
characterize his work, and suggest a textual reality that is too coordinated to be the 
product of simple chance. It is no coincidence, of course, that Queneau’s name appears in 
a number of odd variations in his work, from the title Chêne et chien – a play on quêne 
and quenot, traditional words for “oak” and “dog” (Thiher, Raymond Queneau 23-24) 
and Le chiendent – quenotte is a word for tooth - to his re-writing of the word “knockout” 
as “queneau-coutte” in Les derniers jours (Queneau, Derniers jours 80), and his creation 
of the “Ramon Curnough” film company as a springboard for Jacque L’Aumône’s/Jack 
Charity’s success in Loin de Rueil (Queneau, Loin de Rueil 262). A character named 
“Queneau” even appears at the end of Les Enfants du Limon to propose to take the 
character Chambernac’s rejected manuscript of an Encyclopédie des fous littéraires 
(Queneau, Les Enfants 334). That manuscript (Queneau developed a similar one in real 
life that publishers also widely rejected), the character Queneau states, would serve as 
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fodder for a novel on the topic – the very novel that is ending as Queneau arrives in yet 
another example of “the hand writing itself” circularity. Through techniques like this, 
Queneau’s texts are animated not by a linear respect for scientific boundaries, but a 
playful freedom allowing for eternal returns without loss, and free passage in and out of 
text and imagination.   
 This results in more than a dedication to an alchemistic sort of causality, it leads 
to a warped sort of causation itself.  As Tolut and Brabbant meet for the first time, shortly 
after Tolut expresses his violent desire for carriage and driver, Tolut attempts to explain 
the rainy weather to his new acquaintance, “- Que voulez-vous, depuis la guerre, c’est 
comme ça ; les obus ont fichu les saisons en l’air. … Tandis que maintenant, tout est 
mélangé, les torchons avec les serviettes et la Noël avec la Saint-Jean d’été.” (Queneau, 
Derniers jours 11). To blame major climatic change solely on the use of artillery during 
World War I seems a thoroughly unsupported and absurd suggestion. It simply does not 
seem possible that the one could lead to the other as a matter of causation; and plainly, 
the hypothesis is untested when uttered by Tolut. In Queneau’s text, however, Tolut’s 
hypothesis is lent a certain legitimacy - in his reply, Brabbant agrees that “canons” are to 
blame for the change in weather. At worst, the seemingly absurd statement continues in 
force as another example of Popper’s statement-function, left potentially acceptable until 
formally falsified, and all the more acceptable due to its shared approval. The openness of 
hypothetical musings matches the openness of textual reality. With an accepted warping 
of causality comes a further warping of time – Christmas mixing with Saint John’s day, 
which falls on the Summer Solstice. Such is not a merely entropic mixing - as might be 
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said of the mixing of rags and napkins – it is a fundamental and systematic change that 
recalls the meteorology of Saint Glinglin. Whether the cycles of the seasons have 
changed, or the seasons no longer exist in a prolonged rainy season, both the behavior of 
the climate and the cause of its change have become highly improbable. Shortly after this 
scene, the text provides another example of contorted causality, as the young playboy 
Rohel proposes his own improbable explanation for his ejection from his friend’s father’s 
party: “M. Brennuire m’a foutu à la porte parce que je savais par cœur un poème 
cubiste.” (Queneau, Derniers jours 25). The claim also seems entirely unfounded, as the 
elder Brennuire’s anger is more reasonably explained by the fact that Rohel intruded 
upon his liquor cabinet and consumed one of his finest bottles. Once again, the claim is 
not without merit. Rohel’s recitation of a cubist poem to a traditional literary salon of the 
1920’s might have provoked a certain aesthetic displeasure among his listeners, which in 
turn, may have made him more likely to be ejected from the party. Even if the poetic 
recitation may not have been a sufficient cause in and of itself, it could plausibly have 
factored into the decision to remove Rohel as a part of the cause in some sense of the 
term “causality.” In other words, if a minor change in a phenomenon can affect numerous 
subsequent phenomena distant in space and time – the so-called “butterfly effect” in 
Chaos Theory
19
 is an example of this – then Rohel’s recitation is all the more within the 
realm of causation as that very behavior brings about a change proximate in both space 
and time.  
                                                        
19
 Or as Pascal put it, “Le nez de Cléopâtre, s’il eût été plus court, toute la face de la terre aurait 
changée.” (Pascal 243). 
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 The suggested causation in each of these scenes remain plausible in part because 
they remain outside the bounds of traditional scientific method. Neither is particularly 
testable as a hypothesis, due to a lack of repeatability. As the events of Les derniers jours 
unfold between 1920 and 1922, there has yet to be another substantial use of modern 
artillery such that an effect on the climate could be linked to such weaponry. Rohel, for 
his part, will not get the opportunity to return to another literary party thrown by 
Brennuire where he can change one aspect of his behavior while keeping the remainder 
of his behavior the same – by reciting the Cubist poem without stealing liquor, under one 
possible test. Due to this lack of repeatability, any investigation into the causation 
underlying each of these hypotheses must remain limited to a juridical or historical 
method – precisely the method that Bergson highlights in L’énergie spirituelle when 
addressing research into telepathy (Bergson, ES 94-99). What is essential in the latter 
phenomena arises precisely from a lack of repeatability, from an element that is particular 
to a specific place, time, and mental state. According to Bergson, an investigation into 
such a phenomenon cannot possibly reproduce the conditions that led to its first 
appearance, so rigorous testing of such conditions is not possible. Rather, the 
investigators must behave as a historian or a legal fact finder and gather as many facts as 
possible with the objective of understanding the alleged event discretely. A juxtaposition 
between telepathic investigations and the sort of speculative hypotheses offered by Tolut 
and Rohel is useful as it highlights a further sub-type of causality implicated here: 
efficient causality (Meyerson, Identité 284-87). As acts of human will ill accommodate 
reduction to scientific law, scientific method must artificially shift the impenetrable (and 
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theological) to an intermediary space where such impenetrable extra-legal activity fits 
within science’s legal framework. Efficient causality is Meyerson’s term for this move, 
and it applies equally well to the hypotheses proffered by Tolut and Rohel. In each case, 
as an act of human will mediates the proposed outcome – be it a change in climate 
through warfare or a removal from a party due to the host’s anger – science could review 
the potential causal relation only artificially, with an understanding that portions of the 
phenomena remain beyond its grasp. The latter point should be taken with a grain of salt, 
of course, as this contorted form of causation is more a reason to laugh than to engage in 
epistemological debate. Providing the Oulipo-esque analysis proposed here is as much a 
means of plumbing the causes of laughter as it is a means of plumbing causality itself.    
There is still one final disconnect between pure scientific method and the 
purported causation in each of these quotations – each implies an aesthetic statement. 
Tolut’s concern with the weather flows from a fairly typical displeasure with rain, as 
compared with sunny weather, and his personal aversion to the indistinguishability of 
times of year that he feels should be distinct. Rohel is accusing his former host of acting 
out of disdain for a modern form of poetry, presumably because it does not obey 
traditional rules of rhyme and meter. These are aesthetically-motivated conclusions, 
beyond the scope of scientific inquiry (Brunschvicg’s chapter on “La vie esthétique” is 
separate from his chapter on “La vie scientifique” for this very reason. Brunschvicg, 
Introduction 96). It is interesting to note that in each case, the aesthetic judgment reflects 
a rejection of the modern, be it in the form of a new form of war or poetry. For 
Queneau’s adoption of pioneering techniques in literature – from periodic phonetic 
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spelling of written language to his later influence on, and adhesion to, Oulipo – one 
already may wonder based on these two citations if Les derniers jours reflects a textual 
commitment to skepticism, be it skepticism of the rigorously scientific or the strictly 
novel and modern. Whatever the case, these two citations are again a source of humor on 
still another level in their preference for the extra-scientific and the pre-scientific through 
loose method and alchemistic, quasi-theological content.          
 Alfred, the Parisian café waiter who arguably serves as the central character of 
Les derniers jours, extends this very tendency in favor of the pre-scientific and extra-
scientific. As he explains in the following dialogue with his customer Martin-Martin (or 
Dutilleul or Blaisolle or Brabbant, as Martin-Martin uses all of these names as aliases), he 
is planning a system to earn back the money that his father lost at the horse track:  
“- Mon père se ruina, monsieur. Je dirais même mieux : il se suicida. Ce fut 
terrible. A son lit de mort, je jurai de ne jamais jouer aux courses. J’avais quinze 
ans. J’ai tenu ma promesse jusqu’à ce jour, mais… 
- Mais ? 
- Je prépare en secret un système infaillible pour gagner à Longchamp, 
Vincennes, Auteuil et Enghien. Et lorsque ce système sera bien au point, je 
regagnerai tout l’argent que perdit mon père, en tenant compte de la hausse du 
coût de la vie, naturellement.  
- Et sur quoi basez-vous votre système ?  
- Tout d’abord, sur la situation géographique des champs de course et 
l’orientation des courants magnétiques qui les traversent ; puis, sur la marche des 
planètes ; enfin, sur des recherches statistiques portant sur les quatre-vingt-onze 
éléments constitutifs du sport hippique.”  (Queneau, Derniers jours 37-38) 
 
We will return later to the success or failure of this system; for now, it is sufficient to 
investigate Alfred’s somewhat irregular project, and the even more irregular means he 
plots to accomplish it. The project itself is an odd hybrid of the irreversibility of entropy 
and the eternal return of a lossless system. As for the entropic, no amount of money 
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earned at the racetrack will resurrect Alfred’s father. There is no reversibility in death as 
mechanics might predict (even if it is understood that what is being modeled is 
irreversible as a matter of time’s procession), but there is equally a certain lack of 
commutativity in the ordering of events. That Alfred might recuperate his father’s 
gambling losses after his father’s death does not lead to the same result as a hypothetical 
scenario where he might have won back the gambling losses before his father’s death. In 
the latter case, his father likely would not have committed suicide. If there is a certain 
tendency to find such bi-directional, commutative identity in scientific fields, such 
identity is not possible here – the entropic and irreversible stands in the way. Despite this, 
however, there remains the other aspect of the system, the simple return of lost money, 
plus any excess due to cost of living, “naturally.” This is a strictly mechanical and 
syllogistic equation – 1) a person loses x dollars at a certain point in time, 2) x dollars at 
that point in time is worth y dollars at a later point in time, then 3) a person that initially 
lost x dollars at the initial point in time may be made whole with y dollars at the later 
date. The syllogism is reversible in time, as well, as it easily could be presented in the 
opposite chronological orientation and still satisfy the required equality. Taken as a 
whole, then, the concept of Alfred’s project straddles the boundary between the 
traditional Aristotelian and the more modern thermodynamic.   
 The substance of the system evidences a similar hybridity. At the least scientific 
end of the spectrum, Alfred’s system considers planetary movement. As the remainder of 
the text reveals, a substantial number of Alfred’s predictions are based almost entirely on 
the birthday of the person whose future is to be predicted, coupled with other strictly 
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astrological considerations. As a matter of strict science, Alfred is engaging in the 
entirely discredited practice of producing horoscopes. Meanwhile, Alfred’s horse-racing 
system considers other factors that might have some actual effect on horse performance – 
the magnetic fields of each track and their geographic location. The first is a little hard to 
argue, particularly in a sport where so few objects are magnetized, but perhaps a horse’s 
metal shoes, coupled with that horse’s mass, leads to a different mechanical movement? 
As for the geographical location of tracks, it is unclear that Vincennes’ location to the 
east-southeast of Paris would be a meaningful factor as compared to Auteuil’s location to 
the southwest. But if geography is understood to consider climate, then the temperature 
and precipitation at a track could affect equine performance. Again, some strain is 
necessary to frame this factor in a scientifically probative light. To this point in the 
review of Alfred’s system, the text is operating in the same speculative conjecture (and 
turn of absurd humor) characteristic of Tolut’s belief in artillery-caused climate change 
and Rohel’s ejection when blamed on his evocation of Cubism. Some combination of 
pre-scientific and extra-scientific concerns motivate these factors. Yet Alfred’s system 
also purports to include certain “recherches statistiques portant sur les quatre-vingt-onze 
éléments constitutifs du sport hippique.” Inclusion of such factors seems doubly modern 
in its scientific grounding – first, by considering in substantial detail the actual elements 
of the sport to be predicted. While the text does not disclose the identity of the 91 
relevant elements, there are undoubtedly at least 91 such elements that meaningfully 
affect the outcome of a race - from track composition and condition to breed and age of a 
horse to experience of a jockey. As noted in the chapter on Balzac when discussing the 
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predictability of roulette, the greater the level of information known prior to a 
probabilistic event, the less substantial the degree of uncertainty that that event 
comprises, presuming that such information can be properly processed (Laplace discusses 
the possibility of an underlying cause favoring certain outcomes at 17-18). Alfred’s 91 
elements could work to diminish such uncertainty.  
The second factor to commend Alfred’s system is its focus on statistics. Even 
with knowledge of the 91 factors, Alfred’s system acknowledges that a given race 
behaves probabilistically, rather than deterministically. This shifts analysis from the 
emotion or intuition of a gambler’s hunch to a more objective view where bets may be 
placed in a manner most mathematically conducive to winning. A return is not certain 
under this scenario, but a long-run performance may be oriented favorably to what 
statistics labels an “expected value.” This would all be consistent with a modern attitude, 
but for Alfred’s use of the words infaillible and regagnerai. The certainty in the system 
implied by these words belies the very statistical basis on which the system relies. Alfred 
clearly sees himself as a latter-day incarnation of Laplace’s daemon (Laplace 4), who, in 
view of the infinite scope of his knowledge of initial conditions, is able to predict future 
events with complete certainty. Laplace viewed this construct as hypothetical, an infinite 
limit that would be reached whereby probability could shift to pure predictability. There 
is no reason to believe that such a passage à la limite could occur in the real world, 
however, due to an inability to capture infinite information. Improved understanding of 
probabilities is all that human beings can aspire to in a world plagued by the sorts of 
necessary error observed by a Malebranche or a Brillouin. In a text, however, and in 
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Queneau’s texts specifically, any passage à la limite is possible, between texts, dreams, 
and screens. In that context, perhaps Alfred actually can behave as Laplace’s daemon.     
 As a final point on Alfred’s system, the importance of the number “91” in 
Queneau’s texts should not be neglected. Not only are there ninety-one elements of the 
“hippic” sport, a number 91 bus passes Tolut on a couple of occasions as he walks to the 
Port-Royal station. (Queneau, Les derniers jours 198-99). Consistent with the scientific 
hybridity of Alfred’s system, commentators believe that Queneau adopted his own hybrid 
attitude towards numbers and numerology in his work, particularly during the period 
when Les derniers jours was written (Andrews 291-92). Numbers for Queneau were both 
a formalistic means of structuring a text and a means of evoking a deeper symbolism. 
The former tendency is particularly in evidence in a text like Les Enfants du Limon, 
where Queneau divided the book into 8 parts, each containing 21 chapters (which is equal 
to 7x24, the number of hours in a week
20
). In Queneau’s view, such rigid structure was 
generative of content as a matter of conscious technique (in direct distinction with the 
subconsciously-oriented Surrealists, whose work Queneau came to ardently reject) within 
the numerical scaffolding, all while offering the potential to tap into a “Lumière 
Universelle” (Andrews 293). Numbers might not only serve as Platonic ideals in and of 
themselves (Brunschvicg, Les étapes 43-44), but they could even generate further ideals 
within the text that they constrain. Setting aside this Platonic leap, Queneau’s expression 
of a more neutral, formalistic attitude towards numbers is reflective of modern 
mathematical theory, where numbers are not endowed with any inherent power or 
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 Thanks to Professor Dan Weiner for pointing this out.  
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symbolism on their own. This attitude is distinguishable from Queneau’s pre-modern 
mathematical tendencies, where numbers retain just such symbolic power. The number 
“91” is an excellent example of this. As Queneau himself acknowledged (Andrews 291), 
“91” doubly decomposes into the symbolically coded number “13” – in one manner, 
through the multiplication 7x13. In this decomposition, the “91” links back to Queneau 
himself, who viewed “7” as his personal number – his first and last name containing 7 
letters (Guicharnaud 11). In another decomposition of 91, “13” appears through the 
additive series 1+2+3+…13 = 91. “13,” beyond its association with bad luck (perhaps 
cancelled by the first decomposition’s “7”), also symbolizes the turning of the calendar 
from the 12
th
 month to the 1
st
 month of the New Year, and by extension, a death and 
rebirth cycle. Such a cycle is exactly what Alfred is trying to accomplish with his system. 
He is seeking to cycle from his father’s death into a new life with an exact equality 
between what was gained and lost. Through a subtle numerical symbolism, the text has 
exerted a certain force against a partially entropic reading of Alfred’s system. The rebirth, 
via the system’s use of 91, is a reversal of time; the money regained promises to return 
the universe to a prior state. Again, the text is dabbling in a pre-modern sort of science, 
all while recognizing the existence of more modern fields of study like statistics and 
magnetics. One is almost inclined to find what Hofstadter called “A Strange Loop” – an 
ascending and descending effect that, at least within a text, can connect the future with 
the its preceding past in a paradoxical loop (Hofstadter 15).   
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 There are myriad examples of this philosophical attitude in Alfred’s periodically 
recurring entries. Before considering the ultimate success or failure of Alfred’s system, 
one additional example in this vein bears notice: 
“On a commencé à démolir la Grande Roue et puis le printemps est venu et M. 
Einstein est venu aussi, ce qui a excité pas mal de gens. Des messieurs graves 
remplissaient le café en parlant avec exaltation de la relativité, de la courbure de 
l’espace et des coups de canon qu’on tire dans l’infini et qui vous reviennent six 
cent ans après avec des contemporains qui ont tout juste une barbe de quinze jours 
à se faire raser. Moi j’écoute leurs histoires et je ne ris même pas en dedans, car 
j’ai du respect pour la science, bien que de la science comme celle-là, ce ne soit 
pas mon genre. Je ne base pas ma science sur des hypothèses et sur des calculs où 
il n’y a que des lettres, je la base sur des faits solides et réels et sur les calculs où 
il n’y a rien que des chiffres.” (Queneau, Derniers jours 155) 
 
From statistics and magnetics in the previous conversation, Alfred has moved to an even 
more current field of scientific study, Einstein’s relativity. He is historically accurate in 
providing the example of a cannonball fired into space at nearly the speed of light 
carrying a human, where the human would have aged substantially less over the course of 
his journey at high-speed motion than the inhabitants of Earth moving at a far lower 
velocity. This phenomenon lies at the heart of Einstein’s relativity. Because the speed of 
light is a universal constant from which all motion is measured, the movement of objects 
in space must be measured in relation to a beam of light. To the extent that an object can 
be referred to as “at rest” (a dubious proposition, perhaps, in a universe of relative 
motion), then that object’s relation to the speed of light requires no correction. As a 
system begins to move, a coordinate transformation that takes the speed of light into 
account must be applied. This results in a correction of time in the moving system, such 
that time dilates as it passes in the moving system compared to the system at rest. A clock 
on the cannonball will seem to advance more slowly than a clock on the Earth, and the 
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cannonball’s passenger will age less over the course of his voyage than the relatively less 
mobile inhabitants of Earth. And as time dilates, space contracts for the moving object 
(for a description of the general bounds of this, including the applicable coordinate 
transformation, in the context of the Michelson-Morley experiment, along with some 
helpful pictures, see Bergson, Durée et simultanéité 1-9).  
It is clear from the passage above that Alfred is less than convinced by Einstein’s 
grand theory. Based on his insistence on the regularity, predictability, and cyclicality of 
movement around him, Alfred undoubtedly would have adopted Bergson’s contrary 
interpretation of relativity. Where Einstein seems to state that time is an individual 
construct depending on an object’s motion relative to the speed of light, Bergson counters 
that time is relative only from a perspective that crosses to a different frame of reference. 
That is, if Peter remains on Earth watching Paul leave on a cannonball, then Peter takes 
his own temporal frame of reference as an absolute, and the passage of time for Paul will 
seem to be slower when compared to Peter’s frame of reference. The reverse is possible, 
where Paul could view his own time as the absolute frame of reference, and thereby view 
Paul’s time as elapsing more quickly as he remains on Earth. In Bergson’s view, this 
change in systems of time is the artificial effect of treating one frame of reference as 
absolute and viewing a different frame of reference from its perspective. When viewing 
Paul, Peter has not entered into Paul’s life or existence, he has merely applied a label to 
him, wherein Paul must surrender his conscience and existence in a reduction to a mere 
scientific construct (Bergson, Durée et simultanéité 74). When the life of both Paul and 
Peter are considered together at the level of the universe, neither is given priority as a 
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frame of reference, and the simultaneity of their existences can be reconstructed. What 
happens to Peter on Earth after 300 years measured in time on Earth is occurring 
simultaneous to what happens to Paul at the midway point of his cannonball journey, 
provided a universal view is taken that does not privilege one system of time comparing 
itself to another. Bergson’s view may not be widely adopted; but as we shall see in 
Alfred’s further writings, Bergson undoubtedly has an acolyte in the café waiter. Alfred 
adopts a universal view – his own existence happens to be that point of view in a form of 
apotheosis - so the mid-point of a 600-year journey on a cannonball would take 300 years 
from his perspective, and that would serve as the truth.  Indeed, la science comme celle 
d’Einstein, ce n’est pas son genre.  
Alfred has a more direct critique for Einstein here, as well, "Je ne base pas ma 
science sur des hypothèses et sur des calculs où il n’y a que des lettres, je la base sur des 
faits solides et réels et sur les calculs où il n’y a rien que des chiffres.” This complaint 
speaks to a deeper rupture between two fundamentally distinct scientific methods. 
Einstein’s method, described at a high level in the first portion of the complaint, relies on 
hypothesis and mathematical symbolism. Bachelard frames, and lauds, this double 
tendency in Le nouvel esprit scientifique, and in a work specific to relativity, La valeur 
inductive de la relativité. In the second half of the sentence, Alfred endorses a traditional 
Cartesian view of scientific inquiry. Beginning with a description of the latter method, let 
us trace the sense of this fundamental rupture in theory. 
As mentioned previously in this Dissertation, traditional Cartesian scientific 
theory proposes to seek absolute “truths” which flowed first and foremost from a 
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deductive method. Such truths aligned like so many links in a chain to be added 
sequentially to cover ever-increasing portions of the observable universe. In that manner, 
Descartes’ Principes de la philosophie begins with no more truth than Descartes’ own 
existence as a thinking being, and comes to attempt a description of the entire universe of 
mechanics, from the origin of the universe to the rotational motion that divided the 
primordial block of matter into separate elements, some spherical and others cannelées. 
Descartes was even able to conclude by deduction that atoms could not exist due to the 
infinite divisibility of matter, and that different substances are only the result of different 
configurations of the same underlying matter. All of these theories have more or less 
fallen by the wayside as a matter of currently held scientific thought, but the method of 
linked deductions subsisted. To serve as a basis for the sequence of deductions, Descartes 
(and his disciples like Malebranche) claimed, only real, solid truths were admissible. In 
addition to the truth that the thinking being exists, truth specifically included concepts 
that could be envisioned as strictly abstract – geometric relations and number-based 
arithmetic.  Of course, the generation of geometry, numbers, and the sense of self all 
required some empirical observation. Meyerson would argue that mathematics and logic 
never entirely lose contact with the real world – “L’esprit n’opère qu’à l’aide de notions 
abstraites, notions qu’il a créées lui-même ; mais cette opération même, il ne peut que 
l’observer dans le réel, l’emprunter au réel.” (Meyerson, Du cheminement 360). Bertrand 
Russell defines each number in terms of set theory - as the “class of all those classes that 
are similar to it”21 (Russell 15), which in turn requires an observation-based form of 
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 This definition is linked to Russell’s paradox, already discussed elsewhere here, in which an 
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extension. This is all entirely consistent with the method that Alfred propounds. He 
favors des faits solides et réels and les chiffres. Yet his method relies on a degree of 
empirical observation – as we have already seen, he takes account of observable, largely 
measurable, phenomena like magnetic fields and planetary motion to structure his own 
system. Like Descartes, from a relatively limited set of observations, Alfred is able to 
predict the unfolding of the entire universe, in his own answer to Les Principes de la 
philosophie.  
The alternate scientific method that draws Alfred’s disapproval is Einsteinian, 
based on hypotheses and more opaque mathematical symbolism. The hypothesis bears 
mention because it marks a move away from a combination of the empirical and the 
deductive as a basis for scientific reasoning. As Bachelard points out, relativity as a 
theory serves as a hypothesis to which reality bends. This is a polarity shift from the 
observation of reality bending theory to a form governed by the “real.” With relativity, it 
is the theory that bends reality to itself. (Bachelard, La valeur 99-100). Due to its 
comprehensive nature that expands well beyond the observable, relativity constructs its 
own set of universal realities. Where Alfred observes planetary motions and builds a 
system on that basis, relativity exists on its own, and instructs the planets how to move 
accordingly. If Bachelard’s view is to be believed, relativity accomplishes Alfred’s 
project better than Alfred can himself. In addition to the mention of hypothèses, Alfred 
equally decries the lettres, the symbolism of Einstein’s theory. For modern 
                                                                                                                                                                     
overarching set which contains itself as a member creates a perplexing divergence in the 
understanding of that set (Hofstadter describes the problem as a set that at once is “run-of-the-
mill” and “self-swallowing.” (Hofstadter 20.)) 
  
182 
mathematicians, this is a pure, unequivocal form of communication; for Alfred, it is a 
source of needless opacity and complexity. This difference of opinion follows from a 
difference already highlighted in this Dissertation – that Cartesian thought seeks to distill 
the ostensibly complex to the fundamentally simple; the nouvel esprit scientifique seeks 
to transform the ostensibly simple into the fundamentally complex. Mathematical 
complexity is one important form of reflecting the fundamental complexity of reality. 
One can take, for example, the following passage from Le nouvel esprit scientifique – 
“qu’on accepte pour un instant le formalisme absolu ; tous ces beaux objets de la 
géométrie, toutes ces belles formes, effaçons-les de notre souvenir, les choses ne sont 
plus que des lettres ! … [Vo]ici alors l’effort poétique des mathématiciens, l’effort 
créateur, réalisateur : subitement, par une inflexion révélatrice, les syllabes associées 
forment un mot, un vrai mot, qui parle à la Raison et qui trouve, dans la Réalité une chose 
à évoquer.“ (Bachelard, Le nouvel esprit 35). With mathematical symbolism, human 
scientific thought moves beyond geometry, the traditional domain of the Cartesian, into a 
domain where mathematics itself structures reality in much the same way that Bachelard 
claims that relativity structures reality.
22
 But Bachelard seems to go further here, 
suggesting that modern mathematics on its own serves as a sort of Platonic ideal, or a 
reflection of a noumenon hiding behind the phenomenon. Alfred, of course, would not be 
willing to join Bachelard in this conclusion. Yet at the level of text, perhaps the 
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 This is Bachelard’s view, which is almost certainly unfair to Descartes, the creator of analytical 
geometry and accordingly avid user of mathematical symbolism. One might reasonably argue 
that Bachelard subscribed to a sort of cult of modern science that eschewed out of hand all 
science prior to 1800 (and possibly even 1900).  
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Quenellian universe offers just such a perspective – one which bends reality to its own 
contours.  
Reticence towards mathematical complexity speaks in some form to Queneau’s 
own varied relationship to mathematics. Queneau was an amateur mathematician in 
parallel with much of his literary career, even going so far as to publish an article in the 
Journal of Combinatorial Theory on what he dubbed “suites-s-additives” (Andrews 297).  
Yet the main character in Odile, Roland Travy – a character considered by critics to be a 
reflection of Queneau himself (in a text where numerous other characters are claimed to 
serve as reflections of real historical figures like André Breton and Tristan Tzara) – 
concludes his own dabbling in amateur mathematics with the lament: “Je croyais que 
j’étais mathématicien. Je viens de m’apercevoir ces jours-ci que je ne suis même pas un 
amateur. Je ne suis rien du tout. Je n’y connais rien. Je n’y comprends rien. Je ne sais 
rien. … Des calculs et des calculs à perte de vue à perte d’haleine sans but sans fin et le 
plus souvent complètement absurdes.” (Queneau, Odile 163-64). As Les derniers jours 
was published not long before Odile’s first appearance, Alfred’s criticism lofted at 
Einstein’s mathematical method may reflect Queneau’s own frustration with his inability 
to make sense of the field despite a profound interest in it.          
 Despite his explicit distaste for the structure of Einstein’s system, perhaps 
Alfred’s passage subtly suggests the scientific transition to come, whether he approves of 
it or not. “On a commencé à démolir la Grande Roue et puis le printemps est venu.” In 
the deconstruction of a Ferris wheel, perhaps at the end of an exposition, there is a second 
meaning – an accidental Bachelardian doubling – where the Ferris wheel is literally the 
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“great wheel.” If Alfred sees himself as the single center of a universe that revolves 
around him (“[j]e laisse les gens tourner en rond autour de moi,” 291), the demolition of 
the Ferris wheel spells the end of such circular movement with a unique center. There can 
no longer be so many Ptolemaic epicycles tracing perfect circles in a helio-centric, geo-
centric, or Alfred-centric universe. In place of the outmoded construct arises Einstein’s 
relativity, which posits a necessarily de-centered universe. Each object occupies its own 
space and time, distinct from that occupied by all others. Each can be viewed equally as 
the center of the universe in an extreme subjectivist interpretation of the doctrine. Or, 
more realistically, no object can serve as the universe’s center. If Bachelard is to be 
believed, this transition is a sort of spring, a mathematical rebirth after centuries of fallow 
Cartesian thought. The text of Les derniers jours may not approve of the change, but it at 
least acknowledges it.  
 Acknowledgement of the scientific transition to come may be the most that can be 
said of the text, however, as the overwhelming success of Alfred’s semi-scientific system 
ultimately attests. At various points in the text, Alfred correctly predicts a wide variety of 
events. Against the expectations of his fellow countrymen, Alfred knows in advance that 
Jack Dempsey will win his 1921 bout against Georges Carpentier (“Je le savais d’avance, 
je l’avais vu dans les planètes.” Queneau, Derniers jours 81). He similarly tips off 
Brabbant that the great Senegalese boxer Battling Siki will hand Carpentier another 
defeat in 1922, again, against popular expectation (Queneau, Derniers jours 207-08 - 
Queneau, it should be mentioned, was an amateur boxer and fan of the sport.). 
Successfully predicting two boxing matches is not significant – even if the predictions cut 
  
185 
against expectations, the probability of success, in both of what amounts to two slightly 
skewed Bernoulli trials, will likely still fall in the range of 15-20%. Alfred’s system gets 
more interesting when his ultimate success at the horse track is taken into account. 
According to his own account, Alfred shows up during the third race at Longchamp, too 
late to place a bet on, but early enough to witness Cesare Ranucci win. As he had 
predicted that win, he proceeds to implement his system, beginning with a 10-franc 
wager on Léonora to win the fourth at a little over 30:1 odds. He pockets three francs of 
his 303 francs in winnings, and places the remaining 300 francs on Arlinde at 64.5:1 
odds. After correctly placing that wager, Alfred ends up with 19,600 francs in winnings. 
He immediately reinvests 10,000 francs from those winnings in Avalanche at 18.2:1, a 
successful bet that nets him 201,643 francs, precisely the amount lost by his deceased 
father, re-calibrated for inflation and cost of living adjustments. Consistent with his plan, 
Alfred immediately walks away with his winnings.  
Based on the numbers above, it is possible to make a rough calculation of the 
probability that Alfred would enjoy such remarkable success in one visit to the track. 
This much can be accomplished by taking the reciprocal of the odds placed on each 
horse, plus one in the denominator – so if a horse has 30:1 odds, that means that the horse 
will win roughly 1/(30+1), or 1/31 of the time that the same race is run. Of course, the 
odds placed on a horse do not necessarily reflect a reciprocal of the exact probability that 
a horse will win a race. It is possible that the track will calculate the odds such that it 
takes a certain percentage of the wagers. Gambling odds also reflect the distribution of 
wagers between horses, such that losing wagers will offset any payments for winning 
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wagers. That means that the gambling public, with its varying levels of expertise and 
interest, is, to an extent, setting the odds of a horse winning. Finally, by assuming that the 
reciprocal of the odds reflects the actual probability of success is to assume that a bet is 
entirely neutral as a matter of expected outcome. If a 30:1 horse is expected to win one in 
31 times, then the expected return for a 1-franc bet is artificially set by the betting to 1 
franc. (Laplace 24-25). Due to the factors already mentioned, that artificial equality likely 
will not exist, with expected outcome falling somewhat higher or lower than actual 
amount wagered. With those words of caution in mind, if the individual races where 
Alfred wagers are treated as independent events, then his probability of success is simply 
a multiplication of the reciprocal of the odds for the three races – (1/31) * (1/65.5) * 
(1/19.2) ≈ .0000256505 or .00256505%. If his prediction that Cesare Ranucci would win 
were credited as well, that would likely drop the probability by at least another factor of 
3, depending on the unknown odds applied to that horse. The consequence of this, by way 
of rough calculation, is that Alfred’s success at the track was likely to occur around 1 in 
100,000 trips to the track. This is not the equivalent of winning the lottery, perhaps, but it 
is quite rare. To put it in perspective, it is roughly akin to flipping heads with a fair coin 
17 times in a row or rolling a total of 3 with two dice, four straight times. If this sequence 
of events is unlikely on its own, that it would happen during Alfred’s only trip to the track 
to gamble only magnifies the improbability of the outcome. Put differently, a day like 
Alfred’s would be reasonably likely to occur if he went to the track every day for fifty 
years; but over the course of that long time and large sample size, his earnings would 
theoretically approach some much lesser long-term limit, an expected value. But where 
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the latter is akin to viewing all of the gas particles in a bottle and taking the average of 
their behavior to calculate a pressure and temperature, Alfred’s trip to the track is more 
the Brownian motion of a single particle in that bottle, subject to much higher variance, 
alone and operating in the short term. Whether Alfred is simply really fortunate or his 
system works remains something of a riddle. Adding to this uncertainty is the martingale, 
or distribution of money that he carries from wager to wager. At each stage, Alfred sets 
aside some portion of the winnings, 3 francs after the first bet and nearly 10,000 after the 
second. This practice could be viewed as either a hedge against future potential losses, in 
which case Alfred is implicitly admitting that his system is not as perfected as he claims, 
or he could simply be using the money in a manner to acquire the exact amount of money 
that he seeks to compensate for his father’s loss. An element of unknowability necessarily 
remains in the machinations of a character who claims to know it all.  
Before venturing an argument as to the efficacy of Alfred’s system, a certain 
comparison with Balzac’s La Peau de chagrin, discussed in the first chapter, may be of 
some utility. It may be recalled that the very beginning of Balzac’s text features 
Raphaël’s desperate trip to the gambling hall, where he wagers, and loses, his last dime 
on a game of roulette. The story comes full circle here, where the complete financial ruin 
of an initial fruitless bet in Balzac’s text becomes the complete redemption of a series of 
successful wagers that restores a long-suffered financial loss in Queneau’s. What has 
changed between the two scenes to bring about such diametrically opposed results? For 
one, the characters make wagers that involve substantially different probabilities. While 
in Raphaël’s case the reading of the text underscored a certain vitalist or animist 
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unknowability that exceed simple scientific observation, that reading only applied to 
Raphaël’s relation to the skin. At the gambling house, he has yet to acquire the enchanted 
skin, so his performance is theoretically predictable - a simple 50% chance that his first 
roulette play will succeed (or a little less than 50% in modern roulette in view of the 
green, i.e., not black or red, spaces). Alfred, meanwhile, faces much longer odds 
throughout his series of bets, but those odds may be offset in Alfred’s specific case by his 
own stock of additional knowledge. If he is in fact Laplace’s daemon, his probability of 
success is actually 100%. Without making an argument due to the necessary unknowns 
within Les derniers jours, this point of comparison is hard to establish. A better 
alternative follows from what Laplace terms espérance morale (Laplace 28-29). The 
concept of espérance morale is defined in contrast with absolute expectation. The latter is 
simply the amount of return expected on a wager as an absolute matter – the example of a 
1 franc return on a 1-franc bet already offered is an example of this. Espérance morale, 
by contrast, takes into account the amount wagered relative to the overall fortune of the 
gambler. If the gambler hypothetically has an infinite fortune, then the absolute 
expectation of a bet is equivalent to the espérance morale. As the gambler’s fortune 
decreases and the total wagered increases from this limit case, the espérance morale 
decreases, while the absolute expectation remains fixed. Even without understanding 
Alfred’s system, his wagers come with a much higher espérance morale than Raphaël’s 
because the former is gambling a very small proportion of his overall wealth in a game 
where he at least has a higher than average expectation of winning, while the latter 
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squanders his entire fortune on a game of pure chance. In Laplace’s view, Alfred’s 
wagers would be “moral”; Raphaël’s wager, “immoral.”  
While the improbability of Alfred’s wager leaves some uncertainty, it is hard not 
to view the comparison between Alfred’s and Raphaël’s wager as an endorsement of the 
superiority of Alfred’s system on some level. Where Raphaël’s experience throughout La 
Peau de chagrin is marked by an inherently unknowable interaction between success and 
failure, life and death, which nonetheless trends in a downward spiral based on an 
imbalance in the overall equation, Alfred immediately overcomes long odds via unique 
insight and knowledge to rebalance an equation with a positive form of financial growth. 
Alfred may or may not be an incarnation of Laplace’s daemon, but some force is indeed 
guiding his success. It is ironic that he should win with a wager on a horse named 
Avalanche; for in a snowy Lucretian field of vertical flow, Alfred is the clinamen, the 
non-equilibrium exception to the rule. (It should be noted in passing that the clinamen 
would become “une des pierres de touche de la théorie oulipienne.” Souchier 135.) The 
guiding force, whether or not the result of Alfred’s superior knowledge, is again the 
author’s pen. As Alfred notes as he awaits the outcome of the first race, “Ça me faisait 
pitié de voir tous ces pauvres types qui s’agitaient dans le noir et qui ne savaient pas que 
c’était Léonora qui allait gagner. C’est beau tout de même la connaissance : je n’ai même 
pas regardé la course, je n’ai même pas regardé le tableau d’affichage, je me suis avancé 
vers le guichet et j’ai touché trois cent trois francs.” (Queneau, Derniers jours 290). The 
anonymous crowd in the text is a space of agitation, noise, darkness, and error. It behaves 
according to something like an entropically-bound mean. Alfred, meanwhile, is the island 
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of pure neguentropy, the disembodied esprit whose system requires the body and its 
sensory perception only to reap a reward, not to succeed more generally. He need not 
watch the race; it may as well have occurred as a simple abstracted result, or even better, 
solely within his mind with a later, perfect reflection in the universe. The very 
geometrically-motivated construction that informed Auguste’s certainty regarding blood 
sausage in Le Ventre de Paris has returned here, but with the proletarian Alfred playing 
the role of the bourgeois gras. But where Zola’s text allowed for the maigres captured in 
a downward cycles of entropic loss, Queneau’s text is a site of an idealized return, a 
constant exception to the modern trends of thermodynamics and relativity.      
 Some of the backlash against modern scientific trends is the result of a well-put 
skepticism. As Alfred notes elsewhere with respect to Einstein: 
“Pour revenir à Einstein, j’ai entendu des jeunes gens qui disaient comme ça : ça 
bouleverse toutes les conceptions admises jusqu’à présent. Mais je connais 
l’antienne, et dans dix ans d’ici, je sais bien que leurs jeunes frères viendront 
boire des cafés-crèmes en se sentant le cœur déchiré par quelque cruelle ou par 
une grande ambition et ça ne sera pas la relativité qui y changera grand’chose.” 
(Queneau, Derniers jours 56). 
 
Alfred certainly has a point here. Relativity may be a necessary correction to understand 
an astronomical curiosity like the changing perihelion of Mercury (Einstein 120), a 
phenomenon that could not be understood under traditional Newtonian mechanics. 
Because relativity also reduces nearly to Newton’s equations in simple cases, it would 
appear to envelop and supplement Newtonian theory with a new, more comprehensive 
framework. Relativity also offers seemingly unlimited fodder for philosophers and 
literary critics (ahem) seeking a different lens for their pursuits. Yet for the day-to-day 
and the typically terrestrial, Alfred is correct to conclude that the theory of relativity does 
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not change much. Newtonian mechanics continues to serve as an excellent approximation 
in the dimension and setting of normal human life, where objects do not move at any 
meaningful fraction of the speed of light. That the most correct construct has changed 
does not affect the perception of the unchanged setting to which that construct applies. 
Additionally, an overly stilted scientific focus neglects Alfred’s deeper point – that 
human sensibilities and social organization, even if limited in some way by the reality in 
which they unfold – are certainly not determined by something like relativity. People will 
continue to consume the same drinks; they will feel the same disappointments; all in a 
seemingly endless cycle that continues regardless of current scientific thought, least of all 
a type of thought less favorable to such cycles in favor of a more open dynamism. 
Alfred’s attitude is consistent with Queneau’s own attitude – one of a general skepticism. 
Le doute méthodique practiced by Queneau and modeled on the method of one of his 
literary inspirations, Flaubert, applies not only to the practice of writing, but the very 
science of Queneau’s era (Souchier 100). 
Also of some relevance here is Queneau’s endorsement of Jarry’s fictional field of 
“pataphysics,” defined as the science of the particular. (See Guicharnaud 44-45). The 
concept is absurd, of course, as the very concept of science, as Brunschvicg explains, 
implies the use of the faculties of analysis and synthesis to establish fixed relations – lois 
de substance and lois de causalité – which necessarily condense the variety of the 
specific into general classes (Brunschvicg, Introduction 58). The study of the specific as 
an end in and of itself is entirely anathema to the concept of science, a playful absurdity 
to place alongside Jarry’s other absurdities. Though paradoxical or absurd, pataphysics 
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entails a certain cleverness as a salient criticism of the scientific endeavor. Because 
reality presents infinite variety, science must perform a step of abstraction and 
idealization in order to be applicable to more than a single discrete phenomenon that will 
never repeat itself. The predictive capability of science essentially depends on cutting a 
corner. Pataphysics implicitly criticizes this step by generating a more precise, if entirely 
fruitless and non-predictive, form of scientific study. Queneau’s endorsement of this field 
stands as a rejection of Newtonian or Einsteinian theories as sharp as any concern 
expressed by Alfred in his dismissal of relativity.            
 
Les derniers jours and Epistemology 
In a prolonged discussion of the character of Alfred, his critiques of relativity, and 
his obsession with implementing a system to earn back the money that his father lost, it is 
easy to forget that Les derniers jours contains numerous other characters, and explores 
numerous other manias. On the former count, the text primarily follows two groups of 
males, one group composed of the older Tolut, Brabbant, and Brennuire; another group 
composed of the university student Tuquedenne, recently arrived from Le Havre, and his 
classmates and peers. On the latter count, the text is singularly obsessed with death. It 
recounts Tolut’s ill-fated voyage to mend a broken relationship with his dying brother, 
only for the latter to refuse the reconciliation and die while laughing in his face. 
(Queneau, Derniers jours 204). While Tolut, as already mentioned, commits suicide, his 
odd criminal reflection, Brabbant, dies following a mental breakdown in which he 
consistently claims that the key to immortality is not sleeping fully reclined. (Queneau, 
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Derniers jours 275). Brabbant’s death does not come before he founds a fraudulent entity 
to buy property in Germany in an odd patriotic conquest more than a little reminiscent of 
Aristide Saccard’s scheme in Zola’s L’Argent. The name of Brabbant’s entity? La Société 
Internationale de Gérance Immobilière, or the SIGI. (Queneau, Derniers jours 228). The 
SIGI, or as the text obliquely points out, a wordplay evoking the moribund ci-gît. At the 
text’s conclusion, Brennuire’s abrupt passing completes the disappearance of one 
triumvirate (Queneau, Derniers jours 294). And then there are the numerous speculations 
regarding life after death, with Tolut claiming a separation between body and ghost, 
while Tuquedenne’s friend Hublin dabbles in spiritisme, going so far as to claim 
paranormal communication with Hugo and Tolstoy. (Queneau, Derniers jours 94). A 
closer study of death in Les derniers jours would be worthwhile, but is somewhat beyond 
the scope of this work. 
 Instead, let us turn to a different obsession in the text, one which hits much closer 
to the train of thought pursued here: philosophy and more specifically, epistemology. 
Alfred does not hesitate to label himself “un philosophe.” He is not alone in this pastime. 
Upon his arrival in Paris, the character Tuquedenne struggles with whether he still 
identifies himself as “bergsonien.” (Tuquedenne, it should be noted in passing, is viewed 
by critics as an autobiographical reflection of Queneau himself, as the character’s arrival 
from Le Havre in 1920 and his 1903 date of birth reflect Queneau’s own past. Further, I 
would note that the name “Tuquedenne” is an anagram of “Quene” and “Dent” – two 
words whose importance in identifying Queneau have already been described. So the 
suggestion, while perhaps not of the utmost importance here, seems to have some 
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validity.) Tuquedenne spends most of his time reading and pursuing philosophical 
musings, going so far at one point to create an elaborate philosophical system to describe 
the interaction between the human mind and the material universe. (Queneau, Derniers 
jours 63-65). While a deep review of Tuquedenne’s system is also beyond the scope of 
this study, it is sufficient at a very high level to note that his work seems to be an odd 
mélange of his own theories and concepts taken from Spinoza (the format of the system 
reads like the Ethics, and the insistence on the primacy of intuition in creating a real 
identity between the external material world and the internal material world in 
Tuquedenne’s system recalls Spinoza (in this respect, see Brunschvicg, Les étapes 140-
43)), Kant (Tuquedenne’s focus on la durée and l’extension as “intuitions a priori” recalls 
the synthetic a priori judgment), Descartes (Tuquedenne insists on the existing of a 
constant “substance,” like matter, and the divisibility of complex phenomena), and 
Bergson (the attention paid to la durée highlights this connection), undoubtedly among 
others. Tuquedenne and his university peers attend classes given by Brunschvicg. Even 
the character Hublin’s adoption of spiritisme suggests a certain metaphysical obsession, 
one only magnified in the direction of epistemology by Hublin’s associated obsession 
with scientifically proving that the dead can communicate with the living. The latter is an 
obvious nod to Bergson’s L’énergie spirituelle, which (as we have seen) discussed the 
possibility of just such a proof, and which originally came out in 1919, just one year prior 
to the action in Les derniers jours.                  
  The text’s focus on Bergsonianism represents a reasonable starting point for a 
closer review of certain epistemological concepts in Les derniers jours, in part because 
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Bergson has been such a consistent touchstone in this Dissertation, and in part because 
Tuquedenne’s struggle with the meaning of Bergsonianism is very real. Early in the text, 
when Tuquedenne declares that he has likely finished his phase as a bergsonien, he 
mentions a personal preference: 
“- J’aime la vie. 
- Qu’est-ce que tu connais de la vie ? [asks his interlocutor Hublin] 
- Rien. C’est encore un paradoxe.” (Queneau, Les derniers jours 32). 
 
Such, perhaps, is the reasonable admission of a nouveau venu just having arrived in Paris 
from Province, and completely unaware of the life that he is about to lead. A young 
character undoubtedly raised on – and following in the footsteps of - the classic literary 
model of a Julien Sorel, Frédéric Moreau, Rastignac, Raphaël Valentin, Lucien de 
Rubempré, Octave Mouret, and others would necessarily be aware of the unpredictability 
of such a transition. Yet the paradox confronting Tuquedenne is not specific to his own 
personal experience – he is speaking to either the great flaw or the great attribute in one 
of Bergson’s central theses in L’évolution créatrice. Bergson proposes a dichotomy 
between intelligence and instinct in the behavior of the human mind. Intelligence forms 
the basis for scientific inquiry by enabling the creation of categories that respond to a 
system of laws. The system generated by intelligence, however, necessarily reduces 
everything within its purview to inert matter that it considers strictly from an exterior 
vantage point. This strategy may be successful in predicting the motion of the planets, but 
it fails to take proper account of life and living organisms. Instinct is oriented in a 
direction diametrically opposed to that of intelligence. Where intelligence is cold and 
categorizing, instinct is a “sympathie” that flows between categories in harmony with la 
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durée and le devenir characteristic of life and its inherently mobile process. In its highest 
form, instinct becomes intuition, able to encompass the living and the internal. (See, e.g., 
Bergson, L’évolution 177-78). The great revelation of this dichotomy is also its greatest 
challenge – that the comprehension of life exceeds the use of traditional intelligence. Life 
overflows all categories and abstractions; it is a totality that surpasses any attempt at 
reduction. All of this distills to an increased but necessarily vague awareness of 
something that cannot be defined. Tuquedenne, the recovering Bergsonian, likes life in 
accordance with the deep appreciation for life expressed in Bergson’s philosophy. He 
knows nothing of it in accordance with the inherent indefinability of the term expressed 
in Bergson’s philosophy. Tuquedenne’s paradox is not his own, but Bergson’s.    
 Tuquedenne’s struggles with vitalism continue as he acclimates to his new life in 
Paris. The text presents a detailed balance sheet of almost a week of Tuquedenne’s daily 
expenditures, from the 15 centimes spent on a newspaper each evening and the 1 franc 
spent for periodic tobacco to the slightly variable costs of each of his meals. The balance 
sheet concludes with the single sentence, “ainsi vivait Vincent Tuquedenne.” (Queneau, 
Derniers jours 44). Vivait is the critical word here, as it serves as something of a joke at 
the expense of Bergsonianism. A lengthy list of expenditures, broken down into a series 
of mostly repeating categories, is strictly the work of intelligence that cannot seize the 
vivant. The reality of life, in Bergson’s view, flows between the expenditures and is not 
capable of reduction to a list or a series of periodic repetitions. From the single sentence 
ainsi vivait Vincent Tuquedenne, a critical divergence with Bergson results. The phrase is 
almost a joke at Bergson’s expense, a harsh awakening to the painful banality and 
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disenchantment of a student’s existence. This is not the Paris that Sorel, Moreau, or 
perhaps Tuquedenne dreamt of, but the Paris that those earlier models encounter almost 
never lives up to their hopes. The return to a life reduced to the line item is a familiar one 
to this Dissertation, for it is exactly how Claude Bernard would reply to Bergson. 
Intelligence, in Bernard’s view, and more particularly, intelligence exercised in the 
pursuit of experimental science, is capable of unlocking the mechanism of all observable 
phenomena. The experimenter that provokes an event or changes its initial conditions and 
the scientist who reduces the qualitative to the quantitatively measurable are ultimately 
able to determine causation without exception. In view of this deeply held belief in the 
fundamental determinism and determinability of all phenomena, Bernard specifically 
decries reliance on vague terms like vitalité or its Bergsonian analogue la vie. 
Tuquedenne has come around to this view, to the unsympathetic or cold realization that 
intelligence alone can suffice, that life can be reduced to a series of line items capturing 
no more than money spent and the good, service, or food acquired with it.        
 Most aspects of life can be so reduced, but perhaps not all. As Tuquedenne notes 
in his philosophical system, “Tous les phénomènes sont doués de deux sortes de qualité : 
la durée et l’extension.” (Queneau, Derniers jours 63). This observation or rule 
traditionally reduces to a system of mechanics in the study of inorganic matter. Extension 
is a measurable quantity in the perceived world, whether in the form of the dimensions, 
area, or volume of an object, or through a more complicated proportion like the object’s 
mass (which depends on the relation between force and acceleration in Newton’s 
system). According to the conservation of mass, the value of mass through a reaction 
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remains unchanged, thereby rendering a phenomenon more amenable to meaningful 
calculation and observation. Durée, as Lamarck notes, is for the inorganic an ongoing 
process of decay and decomposition, each of which should be measurable. Again, a 
relation of conservation constructed by human observation – in this case, conservation of 
energy – serves to frame the overall change in the system in time, where energy lost at 
one point is gained elsewhere. Whether extension and durée are amenable to meaningful 
measurement in the organic context is a central conflict - with Bernard following 
Descartes in a belief that the human body is every bit as mechanical as a clock. Durée is 
empirically observable for living organisms, unfolding like so many equally measured 
ticks of the clock or swings of its pendulum, and extension is no more than a series of 
knowable parts interacting deterministically with each other, like the gears behind the 
clock’s face. Bergson would disagree with this, particularly as it relates to la durée, as he 
would contend that the body does not simply decay in time in the same way that a gear 
might rust. Rather, the insertion of life into the equation implies a creative force that 
counteracts decay in a fundamentally unknowable way. For Bergson, la durée is a 
process that necessarily exceeds precise scientific modeling. While we can do no more 
than highlight this fundamental conflict here, there is at least the possibility that 
Tuquedenne’s system views the material universe as susceptible to scientific study in all 
forms.  
In a traditional rupture between the external universe and the internal mind, 
however, Tuquedenne also notes in his system that “les concepts échappent à la durée et à 
l’extension.” (Queneau, Derniers jours 64). This axiom implicates a tremendous 
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complexity, only a fraction of which can be unpacked here. That concepts would escape 
durée and extension speaks to the necessary distinction between the empirically observed 
and the intellectually constructed. The strictly conceptual, in Tuquedenne’s view, can 
have no exact reflection in the observed universe. To offer a geometrical example, a 
circle is a concept defined as a two-dimensional shape where all points on the shape are 
precisely equidistant from the same point. A circle answering precisely to this definition 
does not exist in the observable universe, as even the objects that seemingly satisfy this 
definition are no more than approximations of the concept with their own minor 
imperfections, and otherwise incapable of presenting an infinitesimal boundary. The 
concept of a circle would equally escape la durée by its not having meaningfully evolved 
in thousands of years, while the material embodiments approximating a circle are ever 
subject to change through decay, deformation, or other modifications. It is simplistic, 
however, to maintain that the material and the conceptual exist in parallel, with the 
material pursing an existence of extension and durée while the conceptual floats in a 
strictly intellectual space devoid of both. Rather, as already noted here, the two spaces – 
the empirical/specific and intellectual/abstract – are in a constant feedback cycle, where 
the empirical provides material that the human intellect converts into an abstract form, 
and that abstract form is fed back into the empirical as an approximate model (Milhaud 
16 – “Qu’est-ce à dire enfin, sinon que la pensée ne saurait jamais devenir ni 
exclusivement objective ni exclusivement subjective?”). As the empirical changes, so too 
can the abstract concept, intended to reflect it. In a technical sense, the strictly conceptual 
does not exist as a matter of extension; but it almost does in the sense that empirical 
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objects are ever feeding intuitions and concepts. Gaston Milhaud would add, on the point 
that concepts do not have durée, that a concept is always subject to change in time 
(Milhaud 6-7). Whatever set of essential characteristics are associated with a concept at 
one moment – that water is transparent and tasteless – may be updated later as new 
observations are made and new knowledge gained – how water interacts with portions of 
the unexplored universe. By dividing the conceptual from the material, Tuquedenne has 
adopted a Cartesian view for this portion of his system, but to the extent discussed thus 
far, it is a view to be credited only approximately.  
 A slightly different interpretation of the concept escaping extension and durée 
flows from a hypothesis proposed by Bergson in L’énergie spirituelle. In that text – 
which certainly serves a critical point of dialog for Les derniers jours – Bergson suggests 
that the law of conservation of energy does not necessarily apply to the function of the 
human brain. (Bergson, ES 64-65). That energy is conserved on a universal scale means, 
by extension, that energy is neither created nor destroyed. In all previously observed 
physical phenomena, Bergson concedes that this relation holds true. This is entirely 
consistent with a reading of Tuquedenne’s system where objects having extension and 
durée reduce to a certain mechanically-oriented view. Yet Bergson does not concede that 
a law that has been observed to hold true in general physical phenomena will necessarily 
apply to the function of the human brain. Because humans were at the time of Bergson 
technologically unable to observe the function of the brain in any meaningful detail, 
Bergson took the liberty to propose that the brain might create new energy, if only in 
small quantities. On the basis of such small quantities of new energy, even greater stocks 
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of energy could be unlocked – Bergson compares the phenomenon to the pushing of a 
trigger that will set off a massive explosion. If this hypothesis is to be believed, then the 
brain, the site of the concept, indeed exceeds the fundamental relations that characterize 
material durée and extension. For Tuquedenne specifically, but for Queneau’s texts more 
generally, the concept may be interpreted as entirely distinct from the empirical or 
material because it involves an excess of new energy in Bergson’s sense. That excess 
enables the concept, and the text that carries it, to overcome the asymptotic reaching a 
limit in infinitesimal increments. Where the real-world moviegoer can no more than 
touch the screen, Queneau’s characters may harness the energy to jump seamlessly from 
the theater to the film’s action. They may create energy that breaks traditional equations 
and expands beyond apparent boundaries. Tuquedenne’s system speaks to this very 
specific sort of vitalist excess.        
 The overarching concern with philosophy, and a more specific concern with 
vitalism, in Les derniers jours finds a clever further reflection in the text’s preoccupation 
with billiards. One facet of the text’s cleverness is its play on the dual meaning of the 
word carambolage. There is the traditional sense of the term in billiards referring to a 
combination play, or a play involving multiple balls. In a text where many of the 
characters play the game, it is perhaps noteworthy that of all people, “Tuquedenne rata un 
carambolage.” (Queneau, Derniers jours 181). In the author’s own projection as a 
character in the text is evident an inability to negotiate the combination pool play, and 
with it, an instability in negotiating a stylized set of interactions. The confusion between 
vitalist and more modern scientific readings inherent to Tuquedenne’s system flows 
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equally well from his inability to pass from the geometrically and abstractly precise – the 
balls on a pool table in an arrangement to be solved by strictly mathematical and 
mechanical relations – to the empirical – the actual shot itself that he misses. Put 
differently, Les derniers jours features certain points of passage and communication, 
intersections in the sense of both Hermes (the god) and Hermès (à la Serres), like the 
confluence of events that results in Alfred’s generation of substantial wealth from a mere 
ten francs. Les derniers jours also features points of blockage – where the pool balls are 
not a means to success but an obstacle. Where Tuquedenne struggles with the malaise of 
reading lots of books without being able to do much of anything with the information in 
them, including meeting potential romantic partners. Where Tolut finds himself 
lamenting the fact that he spent a career teaching geography without having traveled 
outside of France, and where such movement, when first attempted, is thwarted by his 
brother’s mocking dying words. Carambolage has a second meaning, of course, as a term 
for a fender-bender (or traffic accident). We have already seen how the text begins with 
Tolut’s expression of a desire to witness a particularly violent version of a carambolage 
where a driver and his vehicle are reduced to muddy shards. Here, too, is a carambolage 
blocked by the inability to pass between the internal desire and the rule-bound, physical 
external space where the desire might unfold. This point of blockage gives way – so to 
speak - near the conclusion of the text, “Alors ce vieillard [Tolut] fit un cocasse petit saut 
de côté. Une automobile qui fonçait le projeta contre un arbre. Ce fut un magnifique 
carambolage. Le corps gisait aplati, la face contre la terre.” (Queneau, Derniers jours 
285). The carambolage here is not raté but magnifique. Tolut’s participation in the 
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suicidal and magnificent carambolage marks a point of passage – the realization of a 
desire immediately embodied in reality, and an irreversible transition from the animate to 
inanimate. In the latter transition, and its more general obsession with death, Les derniers 
jours lends itself to a decidedly anti-vitalist interpretation. Where life is a paradox, a 
point of blockage, and otherwise an uneasy fit within Tuquedenne’s philosophical 
system, death is an equalizer – the great equalizer between the unknowable living and the 
knowable mechanical. Tolut is aplati, flattened; he is no longer mind and body, just 
corps. When the carambolage involves only mechanical objects, bodies, it may be 
captured at a sort of level crossing. When it requires the skill of human input to a pool 
shot or the blessing of a still-living brother, the philosophical obstacle that is life remains.  
   This point finds further reflection and amplification elsewhere in the text. The 
minor character Hector Lanterne offers the following when describing to Tolut what he 
does with the time that his wife cheats on him: “Vous allez rire, monsieur : quand ma 
femme se fait vous-me-comprenez par un client et qu’ils montent dans la salle du 
premier, celle où il y a le billard, un beau billard Brunschwicg avec des bandes 
Champion. Alors je réfléchis. Car je suis un grand cocu, monsieur le professeur.” 
(Queneau, Derniers jours 285). The most evident comic bit here is the introduction of a 
third sort of carambolage, perhaps, involving not an inanimate object and the person 
striking or being struck by it, but two people. The more subtle comedic touch is the 
distorted Brunschwicg, a typical illustration of how Queneau comically presented spoken 
language according to phonetic, rather than proper, spelling. This technique provides the 
liberty of presenting the Brunswick brand name for pool tables in a form that evokes the 
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name of the philosopher Brunschvicg (whose course, it may be recalled, Tuquedenne 
takes). The very first page of Brunschvicg’s Introduction à la vie de l’esprit offers the 
example of an elastic ball striking a wall and bouncing off of it – in a manner not so 
distinct from the movement of a billiard ball bouncing off Champion bands. “[T]el est,” 
Brunschvicg opines, “sous la forme la plus claire à l’œil, le phénomène élémentaire dont 
la répétition indéfinie constitue le cours du monde” (Brunschvicg, Introduction 1). The 
ball rebounding off a wall or another ball on a billiard table is particularly clear and 
elementary because of what it allows – the prediction of a form of movement that 
includes both action and reaction. The relation is fundamental to mechanics (at all levels 
from the macroscopic to the molecular) because it is at the very least legal – in that if the 
velocity and position (and spin, perhaps) of various billiard balls is known, then their 
behavior once they come into contact will be highly predictable according to a set of 
rules, or more accurately, axioms. One is the conservation of energy already mentioned; 
another is the concept of inertia, that objects in motion stay in motion indefinitely until 
acted upon; and a third is that for every action of an object on another, the second object 
supplies an equal and opposite reaction to the first. The billiard table, particularly in view 
of its idealized spherical objects ricocheting on a planar, low-friction surface, is a proving 
ground for the basics of Newtonian mechanics. The billiard table is perhaps more than an 
expression of basic mechanics – its phenomena seem accessible to common sense 
prediction. If a player hits a ball on a straight line to the center of another ball, the second 
ball will continue on that straight line. Everything is simply mechanical, and accordingly 
seems mechanically simple.      
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 Common sense and philosophy do not always align, and the behavior of billiard 
balls is a prime example of such a decoupling. Where common sense sees a phenomenon 
that is predictable and rational, philosophers have long toiled and debated to understand – 
or explain why they do not understand – what is going on when two balls strike each 
other. Malebranche offers one possible suggestion: that observers “ne doivent pas juger 
qu’une boule agitée soit la principale et la véritable cause du mouvement de la boule 
qu’elle trouve dans son chemin, puisque la première n’a point elle-même la puissance de 
se mouvoir, ils peuvent seulement juger que cette rencontre de deux boules est occasion à 
l’Auteur du mouvement de la matière d’exécuter le décret de sa volonté, qui est la cause 
universelle de toutes choses, en communiquant à l’autre boule une partie du mouvement 
de la première… car la force mouvante des corps ne peut être que la volonté de celui qui 
les conserve[.]” (Malebranche 447). This is one suggestion of many, where the cause of 
movement is not simply a transfer of force between objects, but the result of divine will 
animating the object and dispersing movement between objects in contact. Without the 
exercise of such divine will, mechanical movement would be impossible, in 
Malebranche’s view, for inanimate objects lack the power to move themselves. This view 
would not reflect the modern state of scientific thought, but it does begin to illustrate the 
hidden complexity of ricocheting billiard balls.  
Perhaps the crux of Malebranche’s proposal lies in a distinction already discussed 
in the context of Duhem’s Sauver les apparences – that between science as seeking 
legality versus causality. Scientific legality is, in Duhem’s view (not shared by all, of 
course), the establishment of a set of predictable relations in time and space, often by 
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resort to mathematical formulae. Such is the legitimate scope of science, where it falls to 
metaphysics to concern itself with the study of the causes behind the legal relation. 
Because Duhem viewed the latter inquiry as beyond the scope of science, and for this 
reason, he viewed the difference between Ptolemaic epicycles and Galilean elliptical 
orbits an illegitimate inquiry for physicists due to its metaphysical preoccupations. As 
Duhem’s predecessor in thought, Comte, noted: “Nos études réelles sont strictement 
circonscrites à l’analyse des phénomènes pour découvrir leurs lois effectives, c’est-à-dire 
leurs relations constantes de succession ou de similitude et ne peuvent nullement 
concerner leur nature intime, ni leur cause première ou finale, ni leur mode essentiel de 
production.” (cited in Meyerson, Identité 39). Meyerson would clearly contest the 
legality-based view of Duhem or Comte, in his belief that scientific inquiry always seeks 
causality. Even Newton, often put forth as an example of the reserved scientist who did 
not seek to understand the nature of the gravitational force that his equations elegantly 
modeled, is suggested to have sought the causes of gravity (Meyerson, Identité 40). 
Already, the seemingly simple carambolage is far more than the common sense view of 
it – it exists in a hazy liminal space between science and metaphysics, doubled by the 
equally hazy taxonomy separating the two fields of study.  
The conflict between the legality- and causality-based views of science ties into 
further difficult questions of knowability versus unknowability in the interaction of 
billiard balls. The very fact that Malebranche attributes the movement of billiard balls to 
divine will makes such movement necessarily unknowable, at least not in its entirety. For 
the great stroke of genius of Cartesian thought, or perhaps its greatest trick (adopted 
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wholeheartedly by Malebranche as a Cartesian disciple), is to propose that the human 
mind is capable of conceiving of the infinite as a concept, but incapable of conceiving 
what the infinite actually is. Since the divine occupies this site, the divine is not easily 
unseated in what Malebranche would view as absolute truth and what skeptics might 
view as a clever paradox akin to Pascal’s wager. A view on this point need not be 
adopted here; rather, it suffices to note that a construction of the divine is not necessary to 
posit a certain unknowability in the basic interaction of two billiard balls. Even in the 
absence of a deity, the interaction of two billiard balls cannot be taken in a vacuum – the 
phenomenon is, as Meyerson notes, only sensation (Meyerson, Identité 272). To 
understand the phenomenon requires an understanding of the sensation of the 
phenomenon. This equates to the insertion of an additional actor in the reaction who can 
observe the behavior of the billiard balls, who can measure their elasticity, smoothness, 
and other characteristics. This new actor resembles the observer in Shannon’s 
information theory, capturing both errors and packets of information as they propagate 
through a network. Yet the very presence of the observer also necessarily creates error, in 
a replay of the Heisenberg uncertainty problem here - the observer affects the reaction in 
a manner that renders it far less intelligible. Further, the observer, in an attempt to convert 
sensation to movement and vice versa, confronts a transcendent inconnaissable, such that 
even if the observer were somehow able to measure an interaction without affecting its 
development, some portion of the interface between sensation and movement would 
exceed knowability. There are still additional elements of unknowability obscuring 
knowledge of the basic mechanics of a billiard table. One flows from the idealized reality 
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that if two spherical surfaces contact one another, they must do so at a single infinitesimal 
point, a point as difficult to conceive of as the infinite posed by Malebranche and 
Descartes. Finally, the transfer of movement between the balls at the point of contact 
implies a fundamental lack of identity. (Meyerson, Identité 275). While one ball begins in 
relative movement to the other, and the other ends with its own redirected relative 
movement, the seeming equation between the initial and resultant movements belies the 
transfer point where movement becomes a transfer of force and energy, not a movement 
in and of itself between the surfaces of the billiard balls. More could be said on this 
interaction, but it suffices to say that the superficial simplicity of the ricocheting billiard 
balls is highly deceiving, even in its simplest form involving just two balls. That 
Tuquedenne rata un carambolage is not surprising, as Queneau’s projection into fictional 
character was well aware of the complexity that every such carambolage entailed.             
As we shall see in the next chapter on Houellebecq, a layer of complexity built on 
the superficially simple links closely with Bachelard’s nouvel esprit scientifique. Under 
the traditional thinking associated with Descartes, all phenomena may be reduced to a 
simple form. Hidden even within the most complex phenomena were a series of simple 
truths – the existence of the human through the mind, the division between mind and 
body, the deity overseeing all in a non-deceptive manner such that external appearances 
could be trusted in general. Bachelard viewed one fundamental development of modern 
science as the recalibration of Cartesianism, where the phenomenon is essentially 
complex. Even where an interaction seems simple, like the carambolage in Queneau’s 
text, it contains a complex double. The subtle reference to Brunschvicg via a pool table 
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brand name is a nod to this. If Queneau’s texts regularly offer the vision of a passage à la 
limite in the direction of the infinitely generative, there remain elements of the merely 
approximate and complex. The carambolage does not succeed for Tuquedenne because 
elements remain hidden; knowledge comes at best asymptotically to truth; and error 
remains in the slip of the stick or the spin of the cue ball. Like Zola’s Le Ventre de Paris 
before, Queneau’s text straddles the fundamentally divergent tendencies of traditional 
and modern science and epistemology.  
The reference to Brunschvicg is not only an indirect reference to the philosophical 
pedigree of the ricocheting pool balls; it also marks a concern with the reinsertion of 
vitalism in the equation. For having introduced the contact between two balls as the 
elementary mechanical reaction, Brunschvicg immediately notes the additional 
complexity that arises once a living organism interacts with inanimate mechanical 
objects. (Brunschvicg, Introduction 2). At the point where the ball strikes not another 
ball, but a human being, the concern is no longer the point of contact between the balls 
and the resulting dispersion of vectored movement and force, but the physiological 
reaction of the part of the body that was struck. That wound involves the reaction of the 
entire body, so consideration of the entire organism, including the brain, is necessary. 
Brunschvicg conceded that a consideration so broad exceeded the limits of science at the 
time that Introduction à la vie de l’esprit was published (1905), and that will always be 
the case due to the inability to observe the entirety of a single organism due to the energy 
required to engage in such an observation. This is the return of the living organism as an 
entity apart, as Bergson proposes, and as an entity that cannot be reduced to its 
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mechanical parts when the sum of those parts generates a different, ever-fleeing totality. 
Tolut’s suicidal carambolage is fundamentally different from Tuquedenne’s. It offers 
new variables and unknowns which speak to a struggle in Queneau’s text to square the 
similar, but not identical; the traditionally mechanical and the vitalist; the discrete and the 
infinite. Once Tolut has died, however, the passage is accomplished, and one more 
mechanical body may be arranged alongside others ideally just like it. 
 
Squaring the Circle and Les Enfants du Limon 
Struggles to square the inconsistent – be it logical, mathematical, or philosophical 
– are a hallmark of Queneau’s texts. Before we can return to the conclusion of Les 
derniers jours, and with it, a conclusion to this chapter, some attention is warranted to 
Queneau’s Les Enfants du Limon, published just two years after Les derniers jours. Les 
Enfants du Limon follows the various members of the Limon family in their projects, 
including the formation of a nationalist party and the development of an encyclopedia on 
les fous littéraires of the 19
th
 century. The latter is of interest here – not only because, as 
already mentioned, the project had been Queneau’s own in the early 1930’s, only to meet 
with rejection by publishing houses – but because the primary pastime of the fous 
littéraires described in Les Enfants du Limon was the necessarily fruitless attempt to 
square the circle. Such attempts are necessarily fruitless because π is a transcendental 
number, or a number that is not the root of a non-zero polynomial equation with integer 
coefficients. Put more comprehensively, if the area of a circle is πr2 and the area of a 
square is l
2
 (where r is the radius of the circle and l the length of one of the square’s 
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sides), then squaring the circle dictates that πr2 = l2. Equality between the sides of the 
equation would only follow by taking the square root of both sides. This works for l and 
r, but a square root of π also results – a quantity that was long suspected of being 
impossible to construct geometrically since, if π were to be discovered to be a 
transcendental number, it would then have no constructible square root. The nature of π 
had been a point of study since ancient Greece, but only in the late 18
th
 century was π 
proven irrational. Even that was not enough to show that the squaring the circle was not 
possible – that required Lindeman’s proof in 1882 that π was not just irrational, but in 
fact transcendental and accordingly inconstructible. In 1775, despite a lack of sufficient 
mathematical proof, the French Académie Royale des sciences issued a decree stating that 
it would no longer accept submissions on the duplication of the cube, the trisection of an 
angle, perpetual motion machines, or the squaring of the circle. (Meyerson, Identité 188). 
The insanity of those that Chambernac studies distills to the ardent pursuit to reach a 
result that had not even been proven mathematically impossible. The insanity of the fous 
littéraires was simply that they sought something that had not been found in centuries of 
attempts, all while refusing to yield to the social pressure of the scientific community 
(and perhaps other communities) of the time. So it is safe to say that not all who sought to 
square the circle in the 19
th
 century were insane, presuming a definition of the term 
exists, a point to be discussed further. (Meyerson cites Duhem to the effect that not all 
who sought the perpetual motion machine in the 19
th
 century were insane - Meyerson, 
Identité 189).  
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One example of a fou littéraire in Chambernac’s encyclopedia helps to 
demonstrate the hybrid relation between the fou and the quest to square the circle. While 
the anecdote is far too long to reproduce in its entirety, here are a few of the most salient 
and comical highlights:  
“Joseph Lacomme naquit à Craste, département du Gers, le 3 mars 1792, d’une 
honnête famille de laboureurs, mais non moins ignorants que pauvres… en 1836, 
s’étant mis à construire un puits, il désira, quand il fut percé, connaître d’une 
manière précise la quantité de pierres de taille nécessaire pour en paver le fond. Il 
s’adressa, à cet effet, au premier professeur de mathématiques du lycée d’Auch, 
en lui indiquant le diamètre du puits. Le professeur lui répondit qu’il lui était 
impossible de le lui dire au juste, attendu que personne n’avait encore pu trouver 
d’une manière exacte le rapport de la circonférence au diamètre. Cette réponse 
excita chez Joseph Lacomme une vive curiosité, et un ardent désir de résoudre ce 
problème. On eut beau lui dire que les plus grands géomètres y avaient renoncé, et 
que de nos jours on regardait comme fou tout homme qui en poursuivit 
sérieusement la solution, il ne s’en décida pas moins à y consacrer sa vie, ses 
facultés, et son avoir. … [L]e voilà du matin au soir occupé de son problème, et 
presque toujours au fond de son puits, à ranger et à mesurer des pierres de taille… 
[S]es ressources, pour obtenir un résultat si merveilleux, étaient bien bornées ; car 
non seulement il ne savait ni lire ni écrire, mais il ne connaissait même pas les 
chiffres. Aussi, quand on lui disait qu’Archimède avait trouvé que le rapport 
approximatif de la circonférence au diamètre était comme 22 est à 7, Newton, 
comme 3,14 est à 1 et Métius, comme 355 à 113, cela était-il pour lui de l’hébreu. 
…[Après avoir découvert le système de chiffres tout seul et être devenu un grand 
calculateur], il trouva, au moyen de plusieurs expériences pratiques, et en faisant 
construire des solides creux, tels que des cubes, des cylindres, et des sphères, en 
les remplissant d’eau et en les pesant, il trouva, dis-je, que le véritable rapport de 
la circonférence au diamètre est comme 25 à 8, rapport exacte en effet, et qui ne 
donne point de reste après la troisième décimale. [Il subit un échec en présentant 
ses résultats à l’Académie de Toulouse, et se fait arrêter quand il essaie de faire 
une preuve dans une fontaine publique.]  [O]n le conduisit devant le préfet… 
Mais ce digne magistrat… le jugeant beaucoup moins fou que ceux qui l’avaient 
fait arrêter, le fit mettre aussitôt en liberté. … [Il se fait arrêter encore une fois 
pour pouvoir plaider sa cause]… Là, devant ses juges, en présence d’un nombreux 
auditoire, il avoua son stratagème et obtint du président la permission de prouver 
qu’il n’était point fou, en exposant ses découvertes en arithmétique et en 
géométrie. Le tribunal, charmé de l’entendre, l’acquitta à l’unanimité… [Enfin]… 
Ce fut sous [le patronage d’un M. Vinter, commissaire de police] qu’il put se 
mettre en rapport avec le président de la Société des sciences et des arts de 
Paris…qui lui décerna une médaille d’honneur…. De plus un certain M. Husson 
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métreur-vérificateur en bâtiments à Paris lui délivra un certificat qui se termine 
ainsi : « ses expériences sur la Quadrature du Cercle me semblent concluantes, 
et… de plus elles prouvent, chez cet habile professeur, qui ne sait ni lire ni écrire, 
un grand génie porté tout entier sur les sciences exactes.” (Queneau, Enfants 77-
82)[bracketed content added].       
 
Where does one begin with such an exceedingly odd story? One could address the 
rocambolesque series of twists and turns in Lacomme’s life that vastly exceed a simple 
question of the possibility of squaring a circle, but that would require breaking with the 
Oulipian methodology of this chapter. Another obvious point of discussion is the 
pervasiveness of insanity, both as a potential reality and as a form of adjudication carried 
out by an authority. It could be said both that everyone in this excerpt is insane, and that 
no one is. Lacomme is potentially insane for dedicating his life to solving a problem that 
is believed by many (but not yet proven) to be mathematically impossible, an 
impossibility indirectly brought to his attention (“on eut beau lui dire…”). Yet he begins 
his quest not knowing anything about numbers, and finishes it without ever having 
learned to read or write; so expectations regarding his approach to an ancient and 
complex question should be tempered. After inventing a number system and basic 
numerical operations anew, he proceeds to “prove” that π is equal to 3.125. This could be 
deemed insane for its rupture with traditional approximations of π, like those of 
Archimedes, Newton, and Metius, which are all substantially closer to the correct number 
than Lacomme’s. Yet a mathematics teacher informed Lacomme that π had never been 
determined accurately, a testimony which reasonably could merit some credibility from 
Lacomme’s background of very limited education. In this case, Lacomme could presume 
that the previous approximations reflected a false convergence, particularly if his 
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empirically-based experimentation reached a different result. Lacomme may be insane or 
not – most of the time the decision seems to turn on the people hearing his claims. The 
Toulouse Academy views him as insane; the magistrate who frees him views him as less 
insane than those who arrested him; the panel that exonerates him is charmé; and the 
president of the Société des sciences et des arts de Paris and M. Husson treat Lacomme 
as not only sane, but a pioneering genius. The same sort of ambiguity applies to every 
other character in Lacomme’s story. The mathematics teacher that informs Lacomme that 
the value of π has never been determined is at once potentially sane and insane. Sane – 
because his statement is technically correct in that transcendental numbers, due to their 
non-repeating nature, cannot be calculated exactly. Insane – because a convergent infinite 
series for π was known, from Archimedes to Newton to Metius, and thus the numerical, 
decimal value of π could be known, even in the early 1800’s, to an arbitrary degree of 
precision, if not completely exactly (and certainly a degree of precision sufficient to 
measure the area of the bottom of a well, which is only approximately round in the first 
place). Husson, when acclaiming Lacomme as a grand génie, is correct in some measure, 
as Lacomme has managed to independently generate numeric systems and operations that 
originally took centuries to produce. Husson is also insane, in that he treats Lacomme’s 
proof as conclusive of the squaring of the circle. Lacomme’s method is dubious at best in 
its reliance on concrete objects like well-stones that do not satisfy any sort of 
mathematical rigor, so Husson perhaps should not be so quick to welcome the proof as 
conclusive. In this story, people are just like the numbers they seek in this anecdote, 
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seeking the rational in the irrational, and in so doing, demonstrating a little bit of both, or 
perhaps neither.  
The foregoing analysis suffers from a certain oversight – the idea that a 
monolithic definition of la folie exists. This is Derrida’s criticism of Foucault in Cogito et 
histoire de la folie (Derrida 66) – “Mais tout se passe comme si Foucault savait ce que 
folie veut dire.” In order to assign the value of “sane” or “insane,” one must have a 
baseline definition of insanity in mind. This is an Aristotelian truism, and perhaps 
interestingly, the conclusions just offered as to the sanity of Queneau’s characters rely on 
an assumption that a system based on Aristotelian syllogism is sane. (For example, I 
relied on the syllogism that: 1) it was unreasonable/insane to believe that π was not well-
known enough to measure the area of the bottom of a well, 2) the mathematics professor 
suggested that π was not well-known enough to measure the area of the bottom of a well, 
3) therefore, the mathematics professor was unreasonable/insane.) Yet such a syllogism, 
it can be argued, is an empty circularity and a barren form of thought, in that the 
conclusion flowing from the major and minor premise is a tautology. (Meyerson, Du 
cheminement 64, notes “la pensée, dans le syllogisme, apparaît comme foncièrement 
incapable de tout progrès réel, figée en une immobilité parfaite.”) Or, a syllogism is 
plainly incorrect, a contradiction in terms, as the creation of a categorization like a major 
premise is an artificial and approximate construct to which no particular applies exactly. 
In view of these criticisms, one might wonder if and why a syllogism would be 
considered “sane.” Derrida offers a similar conclusion for the similarly “sane” and logical 
cogito, by highlighting the “folie avant l’œuvre” (Derrida 92) hidden within Descartes’ 
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system. Both the humor and the truth of Queneau’s Lacomme story lie in its observation 
that insanity is in the eye of the party deciding what insane means, ideally with an 
associated authority to grant the decision a certain imprimatur – by signing a certificate, 
handing out a medal, or putting someone in prison.
23
  
  This brief jaunt along the blurred margin between sanity and insanity has 
distanced us somewhat from many of the epistemological and scientific topics more 
central to this Dissertation, but it serves as a reminder of the possibility of a different sort 
of passage in Queneau’s work. The story of Lacomme involves characters not only 
negotiating the passage from the circle to the square, but also negotiating the passage 
between empirical phenomena and mathematical constructs. The mathematics teacher’s 
response “qu’il lui était impossible de le lui dire au juste, attendu que personne n’avait 
encore pu trouver d’une manière exacte le rapport de la circonférence au diamètre” is 
correct, as already noted, in part because the number π is irrational and can never be fully 
articulated as it continues indefinitely after the decimal point. Insisting on the use of an 
exact form of π in the construction of a well is a bit comical, as well, as the passage from 
the abstract ratio that implies a perfect circle does not model the empirical reality of the 
well with its rough edges and inconsistent masonry. Inserting π into that equation is at 
best a helpful approximation, a tenuous passage from the abstract to the empirical. 
Lacomme himself approaches the opposite passage, from the empirical to the abstract, 
where he spends his time “à ranger et à mesurer des pierres de taille” as an initial basis 
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 There is a further level of complexity possible here which flows from the already oft-discussed 
Heisenberg uncertainty principle – in this case, the act of being observed and found insane 
changes the very person being diagnosed in a feedback loop.  
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for calculating π. This passage is as comical as the first, as there is no conceivable way 
that a pile of rocks that form the base of a well could approach ideal circularity. So is 
there a divorce between abstract construct and material reality? Not completely – the 
figure 25/8, or 3.125, is only approximately .0166 from the accepted value of π, namely 
3.14159…, which is an error of a little over 0.5%. Les Enfants du Limon, at least in the 
story of Lacomme, provides another example of the feedback loop between the abstract 
and empirical already described, where the empirical supplies an intuition and basis for 
the abstract, and the abstract feeds back onto the empirical. The two may only approach 
asymptotically over time – they never touch, but they are also never out of contact. Such 
is a different way of expressing the paradox of passages at the heart of Queneau’s texts.      
 Les Enfants du Limon provides another example of this paradoxical negotiation 
when describing the character Ast’s cleaning of a room: 
“Ast ayant donc décrit cette ellipse, put regarder enfin avec satisfaction le beau 
balayage qu’il venait de mener à bien, méthodiquement, sans hâte mais avec 
sûreté, tel un laboureur. Il ouvrit donc la porte et sa joie s’augmenta de la 
constatation qu’il fît de la justesse de son coup d’œil : rien ne fut dispersé. Il 
revint avec la pelle et le seau. L’opération se poursuit sans difficultés notables : la 
seule étant la petite marge de poussière qui ne se laisse jamais entraîner dans la 
pelle par le balai. On réussit à l’amincir sans jamais la faire disparaître 
entièrement ; lorsque l’on constate que chercher à la diminuer encore plus serait 
se fixer une tâche illusoire et dénuée de toute portée pratique, le plus simple est de 
disperser le résidu aux quatre coins de la pièce.  
Ce qui fit Ast.” (Queneau, Enfants 207). 
 
Rien ne fut dispersé suggests the possibility of a perfected cleaning and organization. It is 
the orderliness and absolute result of a Maxwell’s daemon, the realization of a system. 
Unlike Maxwell’s daemon, however, Ast is not sorting gas molecules between bottles; he 
is not returning letters to the exact place in Florent’s drawer like Lisa in Le Ventre de 
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Paris. His observation is in relation to an arbitrary underlying expectation. What he 
would deem non-dispersed might be dispersed according to a different type of order. This 
hidden partiality is more explicitly articulated in the passage’s play on Zeno’s paradox – 
the difficulty “étant la petite marge de poussière qui ne se laisse jamais entraîner dans la 
pelle par le balai. On réussit à l’amincir sans jamais la faire disparaître entièrement.” 
The progressively decreasing margin of dust recalls Serres’ Zeno walking around 
decreasing piles of earth at the outset of Hermès V (Serres, Hermès V 12-13), from a 
mountain to a hill to a pile of dirt to an atom. Passe-t-il ? Serres asks, a question to be 
rephrased here as disparaît-elle ? For Serres as for Queneau, the question is initially open 
– will the passage occur or not? Is it possible or not? For Ast in Les Enfants du Limon, 
the answer is at once “yes” and “no.” “No” because he gives up with the continual 
subdivision of his dust pile in ever-decreasing halves as the task becomes illusoire. 
“Yes,” in a way, in that Ast simply makes a passage from the tiny dust-pile to dust 
dispersed throughout the room with a violent sweep. Achilles has reached the finish line, 
perhaps, but at a cost. The rien ne fut dispersé that opened the passage is no longer 
accurate – dust has now been dispersed. To make his passage beyond the infinitesimal, 
Ast has had to pay through the propagation of new chaos and disorder. The room may be 
practically clean, but the second law of thermodynamics sets a limit to the task’s success.      
 
Conclusion 
At the last mention of Alfred, he had just won back all of the money that his 
father had lost gambling on horses – plus interest, and adjusted for the cost of living, of 
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course. The sheer improbability of this sequence of events seemed to belie a purely 
chance occurrence, particularly in view of the perfection of Alfred’s system in its only 
use. By generating precisely the amount of money lost, plus interest, Alfred created an 
equality over time immune to the effects of entropy with the minimal investment of 10 
francs. In view of this apparent artificiality, Queneau’s text lends itself to an 
interpretation that despite Queneau’s grounding in, and acknowledgement of, modern 
science, Les derniers jours stages a form of alchemy, a perfect combination of slowly-
accreted knowledge, individual training, and dedication in Alfred to create excess sums 
of gold with limited input. Roughly one hundred years later, Alfred is the successful 
realization of Balzac’s Balthazar Claës, the passionate but unsuccessful alchemist 
doomed to take his discoveries to the grave.   
 As Les dernier jours reaches a conclusion, an extreme form of entropy occupies 
the text, perhaps as a means of tempering the hope and temporary realization of the 
alchemist’s project.  The following are Alfred’s final observations:  
 
“Je ne me mêle de rien et je laisse tout marcher comme ça veut. Les jours passent 
et les nuits passent aussi et les années et les saisons et l’on pourrait croire que tout 
continuera toujours à tourner ainsi, comme les consommateurs à venir prendre le 
crème ou l’apéro quotidien, mais viendra le moment où il n’y aura plus de saisons 
ni d’années, encore moins de jours ni de nuits, où les planètes auront parachevé 
leurs révolutions, où les phénomènes n’auront plus de périodes, où tout cessera 
d’exister. L’univers entier s’évanouira, ayant accompli son destin, comme ici et 
maintenant s’accomplit le destin des hommes.” (Queneau, Derniers jours 295-
96)  
 
Until the word mais, Alfred highlights an arrangement of the universe consonant with 
Renaissance thought and its Aristotelian heritage. That all might marcher comme ça veut 
highlights an overarching cosmic plan and potentially divine will executing it. There are 
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the days and nights, the years and the seasons which turn, cycles within the cycling voûte 
celeste, undoubtedly tracing a series of circular paths. As Aristotelian thought dictates, 
everything is in its place – just as the four basic elements arrange in space according to 
their weight, the café customers come in and out each day in their assigned place for their 
designated drink. All is repetitive, unchanging, and periodic; a daily eternal return 
without apparent cost. At the center of the eternal eddy currents is Alfred, the image of 
the Vitruvian man at once acting as the focal point of the universe outside his body while 
capturing the entire universe within his mind (hence his ability to predict events perfectly 
according, in part, to the stars and planets). He is also a potential double for Newton’s 
divinity, seemingly watching over the universe’s spectacle without taking further action 
(and implicitly thumbing his nose at relativity). If this system lends itself to an 
exaggeratedly harmonious interpretation that recalls Aristotelian thought, it also recalls 
the rejection of Bergson’s theory already observed. For if the movement of customers in 
and out of the café are reduced to simple periodicity, they necessarily lose the variety that 
underlies life in its excessive totality. Alfred’s exaltation of the periodicity of his 
restaurant is not the sort of mysticism or vitalism that renders Raphaël’s skin so Delphic, 
it is an exaltation of the simply mechanical. Life is not brought to the stars in a 
coordinated animation of the entire universe; the cold, predictable patterns of the stars is 
re-imagined on the smaller scale of a restaurant. The magic for Alfred, if it could so be 
called, is not the generativity of life, but the generativity of the mechanical, periodic 
cycle everywhere.  
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 This overwhelming concentricity and periodicity will eventually end. All will 
collapse – whether damped or undamped - into nothingness, où tout cessera d’exister. 
This state is inconceivable by definition, but is a sort of sublime realization of entropy. 
Not only has all passed to a pure chaos without cycle or information in a confusing 
equilibrium state, it has gone one step farther to complete annihilation. In the meantime, 
however, those teetering on the precipice of cataclysm can cling to their routines, and 
textuality, not yet annihilated, can represent a refuge to provide passage to the infinite in 
the face of modern scientific theories that deny that possibility. In a distorted mirror 
effect (which again recalls the self-referential “Strange Loop” phenomenon described by 
Hofstadter), the nothingness of the textual post-universe reflects back across the posited 
point of destruction to reveal a current textual universe nourished by its infinite 
generativity. Not only does Queneau’s textual universe not destroy itself for having an 
Oulipian lens passed over its surface, that universe reflects the self-referential critical lens 
applied here in the self-referential structure of Les derniers jours.        
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CHAPTER FOUR: HOUELLEBECQ 
From Queneau’s playful relationship with science and epistemology, we come 
finally to the much bleaker Michel Houellebecq. His Les particules élémentaires and La 
possibilité d’une île, examples of a close, if non-Quenellian, engagement with scientific 
and epistemological themes, are both seemingly inexhaustible in the depth and scope of 
their reliance on both modern science and scientific style as a matter of presentation. 
These texts seem randomly to rifle through centuries of scientific development as a 
mechanism to describe events ranging from the extravagant and abnormal to the strictly 
mundane. The remarkable and unremarkable even occasionally meet, as in this 
description offered by La possibilité d’une île’s Daniel 25 regarding the ability of future 
humans to abandon the traditional human feeling of love: “Ils avaient réussi, après des 
décennies de conditionnement et d’efforts ils avaient finalement réussi à extirper de leur 
cœur un des plus vieux sentiments humains, et maintenant c’était fait, ce qui avait été 
détruit ne pourrait se reformer, pas davantage que les morceaux d’une tasse brisée ne 
pourraient se réassembler d’eux-mêmes[.]” (Houellebecq, La possibilité d’une île 314). A 
momentous change in the human (or post-human) condition compares seamlessly to the 
basic mechanics of a broken mug and a related entropic irreversibility. The science/love 
juxtaposition continues elsewhere, as Les particules élémentaires’ Michel Djerzinski 
applies his own scientific spin on marriage in a conversation with a celebrant:  
L’homme de Dieu sourit avec urbanité. [Michel] enchaîna alors sur les 
expériences d’Aspect et le paradoxe EPR : lorsque deux particules ont été réunies, 
elles forment dès lors un tout inséparable, « ça me paraît tout à fait en rapport 
avec cette histoire d’une seule chair ». Le sourire du pasteur se crispa légèrement. 
« Je veux dire, poursuivit Michel en s’animant, sur le plan ontologique, on peut 
leur associer un vecteur d’état unique dans un espace de Hilbert. Vous voyez ce 
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que je veux dire ? – Bien sûr, bien sûr… » marmonna le serviteur du Christ en 
jetant des regards autour de lui. (Houellebecq, PE 173) 
 
With no more than two brief citations, Houellebecq’s texts have reached as far back as 
mechanical problems pertinent to 18th century physicists and expanded as far forward as 
Hilbert space,
24
 20
th
 century quantum mechanics and the EPR paradox that states that the 
wave function is insufficient to describe physical reality.
25
 The questions in each case 
bear on theoretical completeness, but they approach it from highly distinct 
epistemological and substantive stances. In this respect, Houellebecq’s work completes 
the evolution already in evidence in the works of Balzac, Zola, and Queneau in the 
previous chapters of this Dissertation. What began in La Peau de chagrin with a heavy 
dose of the vitalist and animist unknown reflecting the esprit préscientifique was 
reimagined with new threads of Bernardian certainty, thermodynamics, entropy and 
information theory in Zola’s Le Ventre de Paris. With Queneau, scientific doctrines 
continued to advance, with traces of relativity and modern mathematics in evidence, but 
set against a backdrop of a generative text that poked fun at science while violating its 
limits. Houellebecq brings this evolution – built on certain revolutions via Darwin and 
Einstein most notably – to the present day with a profound move away from vitalist 
thought in Balzac and Bernardian medicine in Zola, in favor of a textual gravitation to 
                                                        
24
 Hilbert space is an infinite dimension analogue of Cartesian space. This is worth noting here, 
as we will explore other expansions of the Cartesian in this Chapter.  
25
 “EPR” stands for Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen – the three scientists who proposed the paradox. 
The practical import of the paradox is the potential ability to measure a physical system with 
greater precision than the Heisenberg uncertainty principle permits. This is important for 
Houellebecq, as his texts are more rigorously subject to a set of observable laws than those of 
Queneau or Balzac, for example. A higher degree of precision seems attainable in the textual 
universe of Houellebecq.  
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relativity and quantum mechanical doubling in Houellebecq. We will have occasion to 
explore this tendency in greater detail in this Chapter through the first Section’s 
exploration of the images of the radiator and the ruler in Les particules élémentaires.        
 The link in the two citations between ostensibly objective science and more 
subjective emotion, however, speaks to another sort of complementarity in evidence in 
Houellebecq’s texts. Science might be read on its own, in reflection of the ever-accreting, 
ever-changing monument built over centuries of work by generations of researchers and 
inventors. Yet science also serves as a reference point to understand the fields not 
typically considered strictly scientific phenomena. It does seem a little unusual that 
something as emotionally motivated as love could be explained at its conclusion as a 
simple broken mug, or in its platonic, marital ideal as a formation of two particles 
forming a unique vector in Hilbert space. The cold objectivity of scientific description 
would seem to fit poorly with the warm subjectivity of love, and this is precisely the 
point.
26
 The odd juxtaposition presented here serves a discursive purpose, where the 
distance between the narrative lens and the described subject matter underscores a 
profound disharmony and disorder with humanity generally. Through this lens, the 
decadent side of Houellebecq’s texts is evident. As Section II of this chapter will show, 
Les particules élémentaires in particular hews closely to the structure of Villier de l’Isle 
Adam’s L’Ève future. Houellebecq’s text thereby expresses a fundamental dissatisfaction 
                                                        
26
 While attempts have been made to understand the science of love, I suspect that many readers 
would share the priest’s reaction in this scene, as he brushes off something that is at once 
technically incomprehensible and emotionally out of touch. Humans are far more complex than a 
model for particles in their emotional interactions. And as Michel almost never feels anything even 
approaching love for another person or thing, he seems an unusual choice to venture a model for 
it. 
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with humanity in its naturally occurring, modern form, and proposes a form of extreme 
futurity – the perfection of genetic replication as the basis for a neo-human species – as a 
possible antidote to the condition. Through use of the ostensibly objective technique of 
scientific narrative, Les particules élémentaires drains phenomena like love of their 
subjective, culturally privileged coding. This is a direct shot across the bow at Teilhard 
(discussed earlier in connection with La Peau de chagrin) who would apply a guided, 
enchanted spirit or soul to the entire evolution of the universe. Such content, reduced to 
the purely naïve and speculative, gives way in the face of a scientific description as cold 
as its description of the chaotic, entropic universe and the long-suffering, self-destructive 
species clinging to its rock somewhere among the disorder. 
Scientific discourse in Houellebecq’s texts has clearly moved far beyond a simple 
cataloguing of the advancements of scientific thought over the last several centuries. It 
serves the indirect purpose of critiquing the emptiness and self-absorption of modern 
society in its views on decadence and its clear rejection of Teilhard’s thought. The text 
doubles down on this view in its engagement with epistemological and philosophical 
concepts like determinism. Where thinkers like Bergson and Prigogine have proposed 
models tying existence to profound unpredictability and indeterminacy – in large part 
through their own reliance on scientific theory – Houellebecq’s texts turn such theories 
on their heads. As Section III discusses, the Prigoginian nouvelle alliance exalting human 
free will in elevated parity with nature reduces to a form of pre-determined debasement 
affecting man like any other animal (or particle, perhaps) in Les particules élémentaires. 
La possibilité d’une île, discussed in Section IV as a further data point, fully endorses this 
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de-humanizing, demystified view of modern existence. The outstanding question, in view 
of the shared advances in genetics in both Les particules élémentaires and La possibilité 
d’une île, is whether post-humans will be able to overcome the debilitating limits of their 
predecessors. The answer proposed in the concluding Section V, though somewhat 
equivocal, proposes a possible return to Bergsonian vitalism for the new species, a 
renewed focus on life as movement that cannot be seized in human or post-human 
thought. The parenthesis opened in the first chapter here with Balzac seems to reach its 
symmetrical conclusion, with the increasing control exercised by scientific knowledge 
and theory from the early 19
th
 century to the 21
st
 century finally ceding control to a 
positively coded unknown and irreducible. Yet it would not be a fair reading of 
Houellebecq if we did not remember, at the very end, that simple decomposition and 
decay, the predictable and determinate, are ever ghosts haunting the text. The esprit 
préscientifique has become an esprit scientifique, and the movement of society a drab 
downward cascade overwhelming the vitalist and enchanted eddies of Balzac.              
    
The Radiator and the Ruler 
A careful review of Houellebecq’s texts – both Les particules élémentaires and La 
possibilité d’une île – indeed marks an appropriate closing parenthesis to a study begun 
with an emphasis on Balzac because Houellebecq’s texts revisit some of the very same 
epistemological touchstones as La Peau de chagrin.
27
 By way of just one example, one 
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 It is also an appropriate closing parenthesis due to the sheer volume of mentions that Balzac 
receives in Houellebecq’s texts. In Les particules élémentaires, his work is referred to as that of a 
reactionary (Houellebecq, PE, 184). Daniel 1 in La possibilité d’une île repeatedly mentions that 
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could take the scene in Les particules élémentaires where the scientist Michel Djerzinski 
begins to develop his chef d’œuvre, a series of writings spanning mathematics, perfected 
genetic replication, and philosophy. Having left his research position at a laboratory in 
greater Paris, Djerzinski finds himself with free time to contemplate, or more 
appropriately, meditate:  
Pendant plusieurs jours, il contempla le radiateur situé à gauche de son lit. En 
saison les cannelures se remplissaient d’eau chaude, c’était un mécanisme utile et 
ingénieux ; mais combien de temps la société occidentale pourrait-elle subsister 
sans une religion quelconque ? (Houellebecq, PE 162) 
 
“Meditate,” and not “contemplate,” is a preferable descriptor for Djerzinski’s activity, for 
what is Djerzinski doing, if not replaying Descartes’ Discours de la méthode, the work of 
an author also well known for his Méditations? It was within the heated, solitary space of 
the poêle – a room equipped with a wood stove - that Descartes enclosed himself when 
establishing the cogito (Descartes, Discours 84, “je demeurais tout le jour enfermé seul 
dans un poêle.”). In Les particules élémentaires, the poêle has transformed into a more 
modern analogue for Djerzinski, but he too remains in a similarly solitary space in 
communion with a heat source as inspiration for his own great theory.  
 To the extent of this similarity, Djerzinksi at his radiator in Les particules 
élémentaires and Descartes at his stove in Le discours offer a decidedly pre-entropic, pre-
thermodynamic view of a heat system. To frame this view, it is helpful to understand the 
characteristics of a post-entropic, post-thermodynamic system. In the latter type of 
system, first explored by Carnot in the early nineteenth century, heat was a source of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
his only real activity is his re-reading of La Comédie humaine (Houllebecq, La possibilité d’une île 
100, for example).   
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puissance motrice, not sufficient in and of itself, but part of a larger thermodynamic 
system. Such a system required certain essential elements - highlighted well by Serres in 
Hermès IV, and Carnot himself in Réflexions sur la Puissance motrice du feu - two 
sources at different temperatures and a reservoir of combustible energy to maintain a 
gradient between those two sources (Carnot 17-18). In an ideal form, the sources remain 
separate from each other in the first stage, partially open systems within a larger closed 
system (Prigogine and Stengers, La nouvelle alliance 170-71). Entropy, thereby, is 
minimized as parts of the engine can maintain their own equilibria far from the ambient 
equilibrium surrounding the engine, all while maximizing mechanical output brought 
about through the efficient conversion of heat into work. Through the cycle of the engine, 
the hot source can push a crank or piston towards a cold source, which in turn compresses 
the air at the cold source, which, coupled with transfer of heat from the hot source, flips 
the polarity of the sources, with the new heat source pushing the piston back to the 
original position, with limited energy loss in conversion in an ideal state. (Carnot 9-11 
and Serres, Hermès IV 60-62). A heating process follows a cooling process in periodic 
cycles as long as the motor functions (Prigogine and Stengers, La nouvelle alliance 171). 
The universe, even in its pre-entropic openness, can pay for this conversion on a near-
infinite scale through its own reservoir of energy to be reintroduced within the closed 
engine. Already the essential elements of an idealized motor are evident – two 
temperature sources trading roles through a one-way gradient of heat, an effectively 
inexhaustible reservoir of materials to enable the theoretically perpetual functioning of 
the engine, and the conversion of heat into energy and work.  Such are the three basic 
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mechanical elements whose necessary internal difference finds a double in the difference 
between potential energy and kinetic energy, heat and work. To complete the picture of 
the Carnot engine, it suffices to add entropy more meaningfully to the equation – entropy 
that subdivides into a portion that may be recovered as work and another portion that is 
irretrievably lost to a variety of deteriorative outlets, from corrosion in the engine’s 
cylinder to the loss of heat to the universe surrounding the system. In this way, the 
idealized motor that might operate perpetually is instead condemned to a necessarily 
downward cycle of diminishing returns compensated only by the reservoir’s supply, 
which, in practical reality, remains finite. Indeed, Carnot specifically decried the inability 
of the steam engines of his time period to produce more than 1/20
th
 of their ideal output. 
(Carnot 117.)     
 For the purposes of Djerzinski and Descartes, the stove and the radiator paint a 
pale portrait of the increased complexity and loss of the heat engine. The stove and 
radiator are simple, single sources that provide heat as an end in itself, not a means to a 
further conversion into work. There is an implicit space that remains colder than the 
room, but that space is specifically excluded from the heated room’s closed system – 
Descartes highlights the word enfermer when discussing his passage into a meditative 
space. There is simply no loss of heat to the outside world in the idealized system of the 
stove or the radiator in a larger room. The lack of difference in sources is only 
highlighted by the phrase “se remplissaient d’eau chaude” – almost as if by magic, the 
radiator pipes become hot, with water channeling from some unspecified place outside 
the closed system into the system, without loss. The word remplissaient only underscores 
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the efficiency of the system – the pipes are completely full; the system is operating at 
maximum efficiency in terms of heat production and, again due to the room’s closure, 
heat retention. Remplissaient is in the imperfect tense, meaning that the fullness of the 
pipes is not bound in time to a single moment. The pipes may maintain a state of maximal 
heat perpetually, without cost to the heated system itself. Nowhere to be found in this 
system is a notion of entropy by which the system would lose heat or the radiator would 
cease to function at anything less than a maximum return. Nor is there the challenge of 
converting heat into work and vice versa – all is remarkably static for Djerzinski and 
Descartes, both as between parts of the system at one time and between views of the 
entire system over time. Everything also tends to idealization and abstraction within the 
system. Consistent with traditional Newtonian mechanics, any object having mass may 
be modeled as a single ideal point located at its center of mass; any heat source can be 
imagined as collapsed into a similarly infinitesimal ideal point. The location of the point 
may have moved for Descartes and Djerzinski – from a center of mass to a center of 
thought – as each functions as an initial matter as a fundamentally disembodied esprit 
engaged in no physical work.  With physical idealization comes an associated element of 
abstraction, an abstraction evidenced by Djerzinski’s observation that the radiator is un 
mécanisme utile et ingénieux. Djerzinski is referencing the specific radiator in his room, 
but not as possessing its own unique age, shape, location and other characteristics unlike 
any other radiator anywhere else. Rather, he insists on the most abstract, Cartesian, pre-
entropic characteristics that the radiator presumably shares with every other radiator 
somewhat like it. The radiator is useful – it has done and will continue to do something 
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predictable and effective. The radiator is ingenious – it reflects the work of the human 
mind achieving artificial, perfected mastery over the cold, natural world. Recalling the 
Bergsonian example of the rechaud mentioned in the chapter on Zola, we can easily 
conclude that Descartes and Djerzinski are far from sharing Bergson’s fundamental 
concerns about repeatability in a heating process. The very homo faber (Bergson, 
L’évolution 140) that Bergson views as limited in an ability to seize movement is the 
same homo faber that Djerzinski and Descartes would view as unlimited in a capacity to 
produce loss-less mechanical and thermal results.    
 It is little wonder that Djerzinski and Descartes end up meditating the way that 
they do within an environment like this. Next to the stove, Descartes invests his energies 
in the service of a two-fold process. First, he establishes the Cartesian method, a form of 
argument that begins only with what can be manifestly shown to be true, and proceeds to 
construct further truths on the basis of a chain of logical propositions, thereby promoting 
the deduction of error-free conclusions at each step (Descartes, Discours 90-91). On the 
basis of this method, Descartes claims to prove both his own personal existence and the 
existence of God as a non-deceptive, infinite guarantor of his existence (and everyone 
else’s) (Descartes, Discours 103-07). The idealized and entropy-free space next to the 
stove serves as a mirror for Descartes’ meditations. Put in a manner consistent with 
information theory, the meditations serve as an island of negentropy or information 
within the larger island of negentropy or information that is the room itself.  The infinite, 
abstract truths that characterize the radiation of perpetual heat in a closed system re-
assemble in a coherent, space-efficient, and equally expansive abstract truths in 
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Descartes’ mind. To put an even finer point on the similarities, one need look no farther 
than Serres’ reading of Descartes in Hermès IV, wherein Serres questions the placement 
of a deity at the top of the proposed Cartesian hierarchy above humankind which, in turn, 
sits above nature. Descartes’ great coup, in Serres’ estimation, is to circumvent normal 
relations of power between a maximum and minimum that can easily and dynamically 
switch roles. By generating an all-powerful, infinite deity, Descartes eliminates all 
potential space that nature, as lesser concept, might occupy above humankind. Humans 
are necessarily placed at the center of creation, a maximum maximorum, with the divine 
serving as a necessary makeweight as much as an active power at the hierarchy’s summit 
(Serres, Hermès IV 102). Djerzinski’s praise for the radiator as an embodiment of human 
ingenuity fits perfectly within this hierarchy, where manipulative control by humans, 
combined with the idealized effects of traditional physical modeling, automatically place 
humankind on an apparent pedestal (on this point, see Prigogine and Stengers 63). That, 
in turn, permits Djerzinski to direct his thoughts to a broad religious question - combien 
de temps la société occidentale pourrait-elle subsister sans une religion quelconque ? - in 
the manner of Descartes. For Djerzinski, the question is not whether humanity might be 
at the top of the hierarchy, but whether a divine makeweight is even necessary.
28
 At first 
glance, Djerzinski has done more than just follow Descartes, he seems to want to go even 
farther in the glorification of mankind.  
                                                        
28
 This point serves as an opening for a larger debate, outside the scope of this work, on the 
necessity of “regulation” of the universe, including by a divinity. For greater detail on this point, 
see Canguilhem, Idéologie 103-28. For our purposes, we may just highlight that there was no 
consensus on this point in traditional philosophy – where Newton believed that God constantly 
supplied new energy to overcome loss of mechanical movement, Leibniz held that the universe, 
once put in motion, needed no further input of energy. (Canguilhem, Idéologie 106-07).  
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   The divergence between Descartes and Djerzinski is not a simple question of 
degree, however. A few details from the excerpt cited above tend to demonstrate that the 
inspiration that Djerzinski draws from the radiator differs in more fundamental ways than 
Descartes’ view of the stove. One is the change in heat source – from Descartes’ poêle 
assumedly heated by wood combustion to Djerzinski’s water- and steam-filled radiator. 
The measurable solidity of the wood gives way to a liquid – necessarily assuming the 
shape of its container and heated to a point where it might transition to a gaseous state. In 
such a space, the logic of solids observed by Bergson (L’évolution V) might decompose 
into a form at once more fluid and less limited in its geometric immutability. This 
potentially increased dynamism in Djerzinski’s heat source-cum-muse is further evident 
via the cannelures comprising the radiator. The word cannelure must be emphasized here 
because Descartes’ theory of mechanics posited the existence of parties cannelées - 
small, triangular pieces of matter featuring three spiral grooves which resulted from a 
shaving of the universe’s original monolithic block of matter (Descartes, Œuvres 256-
62). Descartes viewed concentrations of these intermediate pieces of matter as the cause 
of sunspots (Descartes, Œuvres 262-63). As modern science has come to show, of course, 
no such configurations of matter existed. Like the sunlight allegedly blocked by the 
parties cannelées, then, the purportedly transparent and error-free series of Cartesian 
deductions become opaque and imprecise as the chain expands to its farther links. The 
cannelures of Michel’s radiator serve a similarly erosive end with respect to Cartesian 
method, in that the monolithic poêle decomposes into so many sinusoidal twists and 
turns, wrapping around one another in a form hard to square with a linear method of 
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truths linking to other truths. And then there is the subtle phrase en saison. Djerzinski is 
not seeking shelter from a cold German night like Descartes; he is lying in bed on a hot 
summer’s day, living through a sort of saison en enfer. The radiator is not functional as 
Djerzinski contemplates it. This means that the room that Djerzinski occupies will tend 
towards a temperature equal to that of its ambient surroundings outside – there is an 
irretrievable loss of energy and information that is not presented in the Cartesian 
example. In its dormancy, the radiator is also a superfluous accessory whose very 
presence testifies to a certain degree of inefficiency to counter the human ingenuity of its 
invention. Humankind may not be the maximum maximorum for Djerzinski after all – 
beyond Cartesian method, necessary errors
29
 and inefficiencies subsist, and even grow 
with the loss of heat. And then there is the question that Djerzinski is asking – how long 
Western society could last without any religion. It is no longer a question of deity for 
Djerzinski. His question, by contrast, implies a personally held atheism, for how could 
one imagine a world without all religion if there were a God in some form? Whatever one 
could offer to discuss that question (well beyond the scope of this study), Djerzinski’s 
concern with Western society’s ability to subsist without religion speaks to an institution 
that serves not as a makeweight to exalt humankind as maximum maximorum but as a 
crutch without which society would crumble into de-centered abjection. Upon closer 
examination, then, the comparison between Djerzinski and Descartes, while evidencing 
certain points of useful resonance, is not without its critical points of contrast.       
                                                        
29
 Such errors and malfunctions in steam- and water-powered heat systems are not limited to Les 
particules élémentaires La carte et le territoire begins with a complete stoppage in the function of 
Jed’s boiler. (Houellebecq, La carte et le territoire 12). 
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 Indeed, the most telling limit to the comparison links very closely to Bachelard’s 
nouvel esprit scientifique, a form of thought explicitly offered as “non-Cartesian” 
(Bachelard, Le nouvel esprit 139). As Djerzinski contemplates the radiator in his room, 
his half-brother Bruno is doing likewise: “Exactement comme son demi-frère sans le 
savoir, il contemplait stupidement, et pendant des heures, les tubulures de son radiateur.” 
(Houellebecq, PE 166). For Descartes’, the act of contemplation is indivisible – one 
stove, one mind, one God all leading to single, unassailable method and series of truths 
that do not change or decay in time. Houellebecq’s text turns this concept on its head by 
dividing the scene of Cartesian meditation into two distinct forms occurring in parallel. 
To the extent Djerzinski might find some “truth” – a dubious proposition when based 
only on a well-placed question - that truth is no longer stable even at a single moment in 
time. Instead, his stepbrother’s drunken, self-annihilating contemplation of the radiator as 
a means of avoiding his mostly estranged son in the next room serves as a distorted 
reflection for Djerzinski’s own experience with the radiator. What serves as a source of 
inspiration for one person is a source of inane self-destruction and emptiness for another. 
Here is a first fissure in Cartesian thought, criticized by Bachelard for its “reductive” (as 
opposed to “inductive”) tendencies that tend to “entrave[r] le développement de la 
pensée objective” (Bachelard, Le nouvel esprit 142). For Descartes, his chosen method 
could be fully developed on its own; for Bachelard, Cartesian thought is doomed to be 
enveloped as a subset of larger strands of thought. This leads to a theoretical movement 
that precisely traces the doubling in Houellebecq’s text. Where Descartes built the 
monolithically simple from the complex, the modern esprit scientifique has a tendency to 
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decompose the superficially simple into more complex phenomena. Gone are the basics 
of matter reduced only to division, figure, and movement (Descartes, Œuvres 179), while 
in their place appear dualities that complicate the ostensibly understood phenomena. In 
this way, a seemingly indivisible beam of light simultaneously becomes a wave and 
particle, and Descartes’ seemingly indivisible experience with the stove becomes a 
doubled phenomenon in Houellebecq’s text that at once plumbs the depths of the intellect 
and the depths of the abject. The superficially single or simple belies an underlying 
complexity and division. Or as Bachelard would add, “there are no simple phenomena” 
(Bachelard, Le nouvel esprit 152), rather a complex network of relations into which 
seemingly simple phenomena may be placed, precisely the sort of post-dialectical 
network of knots and ropes that Serres describes at the beginning of Hermès I (Serres, 
Hermès I 11-20). Houellebecq’s text, at first glance, envelops Descartes in its own take 
on this modern model of material and intellectual interactions.  
 For a text entitled Les particules élémentaires, the simple juxtaposition of Michel 
and Bruno’s differing relation to the radiator already evokes certain characteristics of 
quantum mechanics. Again - and without insisting too much on the likeness between 
elementary particles and human characters - the doubling of the radiator scene speaks 
both to the Heisenberg uncertainty principle and the Pauli exclusion principle. The 
former, it may be recalled from the discussion of La Peau de chagrin, dictates that an 
electron’s position and velocity cannot be known exactly simultaneously because the 
very act of attempting to measure those two quantities disrupts the experimental system 
in a way that renders completely accurate measurement impossible. The idea that Bruno 
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behaves “comme son demi-frère sans le savoir” suggests just such limits to observable 
knowledge. Doubly so, perhaps. Under the standard meaning of sans le savoir – without 
knowing it - Bruno is unable to observe his brother’s behavior experimentally to achieve 
a complete knowledge of his family’s current state. Something is occurring without his 
knowing it. The phrase sans le savoir, is ambiguous here, however, and might also be 
read to mean that Bruno - comme son demi-frère sans le savoir – is a mirror image of his 
brother without knowledge, without the learning that distinguishes Michel. The limits of 
knowledge are recast in a Bachelardian doubling that matches the known with the 
unknown, the knowing with the unknowing, and the knowable with the unknowable. This 
division maps homologically precisely to the second principle of quantum mechanics 
mentioned above, the Pauli exclusion principle. That principle dictates that electrons in 
the same atom cannot occupy the exact same quantum state at the same time. They must 
instead differ somehow, by adopting a different spin, for example (Smolin 67-68). If 
Bruno and Michel are occupying a similar physical state in front of their radiator, they 
clearly have adopted a mutually exclusive spin in their approach. Where Michel could be 
said to be cataloguing the thoughts spinning through his mind, Bruno has debased himself 
to the point that he no more than watches the room spin around him.  
 An additional question arises as to whether the metaphorical “particles” in 
question here can serve as their own anti-particles without additional interaction. This 
hypothesized reading bears note because Michel’s character arc seems to be closely based 
on the life of the Italian physicist Ettore Majorana. Both the character and his model were 
prodigious scientists who performed their best work in solitude before randomly and 
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inexplicably disappearing without a trace – Michel on the Irish coast (Houellebecq, PE 
304), Majorana on the Italian coast during a boat trip from Palermo to Naples (See 
generally Esposito).  The indirect evocation of Majorana in Les particules élémentaires 
(he is never mentioned by name, it should be noted) suggests a link to Majorana’s notable 
theorization of the existence of a Majorana fermion – a particle that – unlike the class of 
Dirac fermions – serves as its own antiparticle30 (Recami 1444009-7). Bruno and Michel 
might in some sense be antiparticles with respect to each other, or they might be modeled 
as electrons following their own complementary spins. Yet they may also be their own 
antiparticles – their own worst enemies, as it were. That much seems to be true for Bruno, 
who undermines his own advancement at every turn. He adopts a violently racist tone just 
as he begins a poetry career; he makes a pass at a student in the high school class that he 
teaches; he generally wastes his life in an obsessed quest for sex interspersed with periods 
of drunkenness. Michel’s generally contemplative nature marks a departure from Bruno’s 
active self-destruction, but the former still confronts constant struggles with an inability 
to form meaningful relations with anyone or anything at all, from all people right down to 
the canary that he unemotionally keeps until its passing. Bruno and Michel each offer 
sides that make them their own anti-particles, perhaps, in addition to more generally 
serving as antiparticles in their relation with each other. Whatever the relation between 
Michel and Bruno, their metaphorical “particulate” nature seems to illustrate an updated 
view of Zola’s Roman expérimental realized even more effectively than the original. For 
if Zola struggled with the distinction between induction and deduction, between living 
                                                        
30
 An antiparticle is a particle having the same mass as its partner but opposite electrical or 
magnetic properties.  
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organisms and mere mechanical models, Houellebecq’s text arguably presents characters 
as just such modelable phenomena in their reduction to particles.   
 The fundamental rupture between Michel and Bruno – and the implied rupture 
between Cartesian and Bachelardian modes of scientific thought – takes a subtly process- 
and relativity-oriented turn as the text reflects on Michel’s relation to his childhood ruler:  
Enfant, il ne pouvait pas supporter la dégradation naturelle des objets, leur bris, 
leur usure. Ainsi, conserva-t-il pendant des années, les réparant à l’infini, les 
emmaillotant de scotch, les deux morceaux brisés d’une petite règle de plastique 
blanc. Avec les épaisseurs de scotch surajoutées la règle n’était plus droite, elle ne 
pouvait même plus tirer de traits, remplir sa fonction de règle ; cependant, il la 
conservait. Elle se brisait à nouveau ; il la réparait, rajoutait une épaisseur de 
scotch, la remettait dans sa trousse. (Houellebecq, PE 163) 
 
What is a ruler, if not the nearest embodiment to traditional Cartesian thought? A ruler 
divides space into homogeneous subparts, each abstracting away the specific content of 
space with a nearly indistinguishable series of ticks. In other words, it creates an absolute 
background through which material objects may be displaced. A ruler permits the 
creation of basic Euclidian geometric objects – triangles, rectangles, and others – that 
approach abstract Cartesian truth in the relationships between their sides, areas, or 
internal angles (Descartes, Œuvres 71-72). If a ruler is used to create a right triangle with 
the two legs forming the right angle of lengths 3 and 4 units, then the hypotenuse will 
necessarily be of length 5 by virtue of the Pythagorean theorem. In theory, every ruler is 
the same,
31
 and will perform exactly the same function at any place and any moment in 
time. If, as previously mentioned, Descartes viewed mathematical abstractions as a key 
form of intellectual truth, a ruler enables a near-perfect externalization of that truth.    
                                                        
31
 In fact, the original meter stick, Le mètre des Archives created in 1799, was used as a model 
for all meter sticks in France for a period of 80 years. (Giacomo 167). 
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 In the case of Michel’s ruler, however, the Cartesian has again yielded to more 
modern scientific and epistemological concepts. Evidently, a ruler which “n’était plus 
droite, elle ne pouvait même plus tirer de traits, remplir sa fonction de règle,” no longer 
performs any of the functions associated with a traditional model of geometrical truth. It 
does not perform accurate measurements; and if it does not draw straight lines, the 
creation of geometric forms built on predictable formulae is no longer possible. Perhaps 
the rules of Euclidian geometry have not broken down, but their external embodiment 
quite literally has. Michel’s ruler is no longer reasonably comparable to others – the rule, 
or more appropriately, the ruler, has passed to the exception. This is a clear illustration of 
the intellectual transition that took place through the development of thermodynamics 
and the concept of entropy. The break in the ruler is a simple result of “la dégradation 
naturelle des objets,” the process by which information decays to information-less 
equilibrium through the second law of thermodynamics. The straight-edged sides of the 
ruler, its evenly spaced markings, tend towards inaccuracy and fracture in form, and error 
and misinformation in function. To counteract this process of decay, Michel is obliged to 
piece together the parts of the ruler by “les réparant à l’infini.” That an effort infini is 
necessary reinforces a point made by Brillouin in connection with information theory – to 
preserve and transmit information perpetually, without loss, indeed requires an infinite 
effort. It would require intervention at every point from one end of Pascal’s deux infinis 
to the other (Pascal 153-61). Atoms and their sub-particles that were originally part of the 
ruler would need to be marshaled to remain attached to the ruler in exactly the same 
location. Forces operating at the scale of human existence – gravity and tensile or 
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shearing forces – would need to be controlled to prevent splitting of the ruler. And at a 
cosmic scale, the planetary movement of Earth would have to be preserved without 
disruption by any number of macroscopic causes.
32
 Degradation is naturelle, indeed, 
when one considers the truly infinite investment necessary to keep a ruler intact, 
investment required to counteract the behavior of all elementary forces and all 
combinations of matter. What may be most telling about the application of entropy to the 
ruler is the specific choice of tool. A ruler is not just Cartesian; it is also traditionally 
mechanical in a Newtonian sense. It has a mass and shape; it can exert and be subjected 
to basic forces like gravity; it obeys Newton’s laws in an idealized form. It conducts 
practically no electricity, exerts practically no magnetic force, and transfers practically no 
heat. Yet this artifact that is mechanical, and almost nothing else, is not immune to the 
effects of thermodynamics. This brief passage marks a profound indictment of traditional 
mechanics, a tearing of that doctrine as abrupt and irreparable as the break in the 
Djerzinski’s ruler itself.           
 Perhaps it is mere coincidence, but once again, a Cartesian image has split into 
two sub-parts. Just as the original stove-side contemplation for Descartes subdivided into 
Bruno and Michel’s dual interactions with a radiator, so too does Djerzinski’s indivisible, 
Cartesian ruler break into “deux morceaux.” With this second rupture are raised certain 
additional points of evolution between traditional mechanics and more modern relativity- 
and thermodynamics-based theory. The first point of evolution flows from a fundamental 
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 Carnot speaks of perpetual motion in closely related terms. While perpetual motion is often 
imagined as a means of making a mill or engine turn endlessly with no more than an initial energy 
investment, Carnot notes that perpetual motion would actually entail – through its necessarily 
infinite excess – a movement of the entirety of the universe. Carnot, 21-22.  
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change in the view of a system’s reversibility. As Prigogine notes at length, Newtonian 
mechanics brings with it a fundamental concept of efficient reversibility in any 
interaction. This means that the sign of the time variable in an equation can be flipped, 
and the behavior modeled by the equation will be physically unchanged, it will just 
happen backwards (see generally Prigogine and Prigogine and Stengers). It is a point of 
some debate whether this form of time independence in physical modeling persists in the 
earliest observed entropy-driven systems characterized by large-scale statistical 
distributions rather than a few discrete mechanical interactions. Here, we are referring to 
examples like the behavior of many gas particles in a bottle, and we are again posing the 
question asked of Maxwell’s daemon – can the system return to its original state by 
simply reversing its completed evolution? The question is a challenging one, and seems 
to draw a variety of answers. Prigogine argues that it is possible under a traditional view 
of Boltzmann’s modeling of particulate behavior in a gas. Boltzmann might have agreed 
on some level, but would have countered that his models were based on a logarithmic 
relation that tracked the probability of each possible state of a system as a matter of 
probability. As the number of such states increases to encompass even the number of gas 
particles in a bottle, the likelihood of ever returning to a prior state is effectively zero as 
compared to the sheer volume of states that the system might assume (see, e.g., Klein 
222-23). This much is true even near equilibrium, for equilibrium is not a single 
monolithic state, but a wide series of states that exhibit certain global characteristics 
statistically, at the level of the system itself. In a bottle of gas, there may be but one 
equilibrium state of pressure and temperature that the system will reach at the level of the 
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entire bottle; but there are an effectively infinite number of snapshots of the particles in 
the bottle that all approach that systemic result. The likelihood of moving from any one 
of these near-equilibrium states back to a non-equilibrium state would seem infinitesimal 
indeed, even as a simple matter of relocating a single state among the remarkably 
numerous states that the system might achieve. Perrin’s presentation of Brownian motion 
would tend to second Boltzmann’s view, in that whatever possibility exists that a system 
would be restored to an anterior state, such a probability is extremely low, and 
unimaginably low when a system is considered at a level directly perceptible by human 
sense (Perrin, Les atomes 137-38). In this way, a brick might conceivably display the 
very Brownian motion often associated with gas molecules – by rising on its own against 
the force of gravity – but that phenomenon would occur on the order of once every 1010
10
 
years (Perrin, Les atomes 138). That probability is so small, Perrin notes, as to merit no 
attention mathematically or physically. So perhaps Prigogine overstates his case 
somewhat by highlighting the reversibility of thermodynamic systems, but he ultimately 
insists on irreversibility as viewed through what he calls “attractors” situated far from an 
equilibrium state. We will revisit this concept farther, but for now, it is sufficient to say 
that physical modeling has moved – regardless of whether you believe Prigogine on one 
hand or Boltzmann and Perrin on the other – beyond a belief in the meaningful possibility 
of reversibility. No matter how much scotch tape Michel applies to his ruler, it will not 
magically become whole again.    
 In that respect, the ruler is not a ruler in the mechanical sense at all, it is actually a 
clock. To support this interpretation, one need look no further than Serres’ reading of the 
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climactic scene in Barbey d’Aurevilly’s Le Chevalier des Touches (Serres, Hermès IV 
213-19). In that scene, the titular chevalier, a committed royalist, attaches the body of a 
French républicain that he has slain to the arms of a windmill. For Serres, the rotation of 
the windmill in this case better illustrates the passage of time than any clock – for as a 
clock rotates through its periodic cycles, it is ever returning to an apparently identical 
state every twelve hours. Such a return does not mark the passage of time; it masks it. 
The turning blades of the windmill, bearing their bloody burden, by contrast, do mark the 
passage of time by changing the windmill. They are no longer able to turn as cyclically; 
their structure is damaged; their bloody charge has been subject to his own irreversible 
change. The same can be said of Michel’s ruler. With its breakage and subsequent 
patchwork repair, the ruler progressively loses its ability to measure space in a traditional 
Euclidian sense. But with every attempt at repair, Michel imprints the ruler’s surface with 
a record of the irreversible passage of another number of weeks, months, or years. With 
every new coating of tape, there is another example of the ruler’s ability to measure time. 
If Lee Smolin’s concern with the limits of modern physics is the traditional tendency to 
“freeze” time (Smolin 257) as a fixed graphical construct, perhaps the entropically 
motivated change in Michel’s ruler adds enough metaphorical heat to the equation to 
unfreeze time and release its dynamic devenir.   
 The irreversibility of time that flows from the rejection of a simple Newtonian 
view is not the only consequence of the ruler’s ever-changing surface – the ruler is also 
emblematic of a changing notion of space. Just above, it was noted that the ruler’s 
degradation translates to an inability to measure space in a traditional Euclidian sense. 
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Euclidian geometry, considered an “eternal law” until the advent of relativity (Smolin 81) 
in the early twentieth century, depends on the ability to divide space into measurable 
lines, where two such lines cannot create a closed form and two parallel lines cannot meet 
(Bachelard discusses this in Le nouvel esprit 24-43). This made sense traditionally 
because the straight line on a planar surface was the simplest way to imagine the minimal 
distance between two points. Through a network of imaginary lines, Euclidian – and in 
particular, Cartesian - geometry proposes the creation of a fixed spatial background 
against which all movement in space can be measured. The geometry of space, as 
traditionally conceived, was a function of this background, an artificial layer to which 
any part of the universe could be bent. In modern physics, this Euclidian construction of 
space is referred to as background dependence (Smolin 81-82). With non-Euclidian 
geometry, the premises of the old system were no longer given. Space could be traversed 
by curved lines; two such lines could enclose a form; and the sum of the angles in a 
triangle no longer had to add up to precisely 180 degrees. This change worked well with 
relativity, as that theory posited that geometry could no longer be viewed as an 
independent layer applied to space. Space itself had its own evolving geometry that could 
assume any form, a form only determined in a given case by solving Einstein’s equations 
(Smolin 81). This characteristic is referred to as background independence. Again, 
Michel’s ruler closely tracks the transition from the Newtonian to the Einsteinian, from 
the Euclidian to the non-Euclidian. If the fractured ruler would no longer “tirer les traits,” 
that premise requires an underlying assumption that a straight line is traditionally 
Euclidian. By snapping and reconstituting the ruler, what has really happened is a shift 
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from the Euclidian line, which is no longer possible, to a non-Euclidian hyperbolic line, 
which might be drawn perfectly well following the ruler’s newly amorphous contours. 
The ruler in its original had been a symbol for a form of background dependence, a 
means of subdividing space independently of space’s content and bending space to its 
form. In its broken form, the ruler, in its inability to measure, has become another 
element of an evolving, background independent state. The ruler itself has bent within the 
space that surrounds it. Perhaps it has bent space with it, but it falls to the equations of 
relativity to determine that, not the ruler itself as a privileged independent device.  
The consequence of the ruler’s dynamic relations to time and space culminate in a 
combination of the two – the ruler as an artifact in space-time. If some ink has been 
invested here to discuss the separate spatial and temporal consequences of the ruler’s 
breakage, it should be noted that under a relativistic framework, the two concepts cease to 
be independent. With all due respect to Bergson’s thesis in Durée et simultaneité 
(mentioned at length in the previous chapter on Queneau), which essentially reduces the 
effects of relativity to a game of differing frames of reference set against a potentially 
monolithic time (see generally Bergson, Durée et simultaneité), the more common 
interpretation of relativity views all objects as occupying a fundamentally linked space 
and time, where the pace of one and the shape of the other are ever changing in dynamic 
lockstep. The warping of Michel’s ruler, the ever-growing gloss of tape wrapping its 
surface is a simultaneous change in both space and time, particularly when put in motion 
in Michel’s backpack. Houellebecq’s text has taken one of the most traditionally 
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Newtonian artifacts possible, snapped it, and slowly reconstructed it in a form that is 
nothing short of relativistic.   
 
Le mal du siècle and Teilhard 
 A move from Cartesian certitude to relativistic flexibility is not the only critical 
transition evident in Les particules élémentaires. The text also reveals a fin de siècle 
tendency toward the decadent, the lifeless, and the anéanti in direct contrast to the 
Teilhardian vitalist reading of Balzac’s La Peau de chagrin proposed earlier. We will 
return to this contrast later by contemplating the utterly scathing review of Teilhard de 
Chardin offered on a couple of occasions in Houellebecq’s texts. For the moment, an 
initial similarity with nineteenth century decadence bears mention. Through a very basic 
plotting of high-level structural similarities between Les particules élémentaires and 
Villiers de l’Isle Adam’s L’Ève future, it may be shown that symptoms of the maladie 
fin-de-siècle in 1886 – the publication date of L’Ève future – are not very different from 
its 1998 counterpart evidenced in Les particules élémentaires. Each text revolves around 
a basic fraternal structure involving two men - Bruno and Michel for Houellebecq, of 
course, serve as a replay of Villiers’ Lord Ewald-Edison pairing. One of the men in each 
pair – Bruno and Ewald – is a world-weary observer capable of diagnosing the ills of his 
life in philosophical detail but incapable of taking any meaningful action to address such 
ills. Complementing these essentially passive participants is the other man in each pair, 
an innovator actively working in the field of applied science and technology. Edison is 
the Thomas Edison, who, if appearing in intentionally exaggerated form in Villiers’ text 
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(see L’avis au lecteur in Villiers 37), is still known for creating the light bulb among 
many other advances.
33
 Michel has helped to invent a genetically engineered form of cow 
(Houellebecq, PE 290). Both Edison and Michel are to achieve even more remarkable 
technological advances in the two novels themselves, with Edison implementing his 
vision for the entirely robotic woman Hadaly while Michel comes to be known for his 
improvements in the technique of DNA replication, improvements that lead to the 
engineering of an immortal post-human race. These innovations each directly confront 
and aim to resolve a society-level problem. In L’Ève future, that scourge is, in an 
extraordinarily lengthy and detailed exposition of misogyny, effectively all women. 
Complaint upon complaint piles on Ewald’s erstwhile lover, the vapid and petty, but 
physically ideal Miss Alicia Clary. For Les particules élémentaires, women are not 
treated particularly favorably – in fact, each of the four most prominent female characters 
(Christiane, Annabelle, Annick, and the absent mother figure Janine) is some 
combination of confused, decaying, promiscuous and subservient, before dying, mostly 
by suicide. The real plague, however, is the general corruption and decay afflicting all 
strata of Western society, from religion and education to child-rearing and sexuality. The 
problems at the heart of each text lead directly to a form of perfection to the end of their 
resolution. The robotic Hadaly is so lifelike in her physical modeling on Alicia Clary that 
Ewald does not know that she is not real when first meeting her, and Hadaly further 
supplements the original Clary’s personality with a demeanor far more suited to 
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 The real-life Edison also was involved in the development of the Kinetoscope, an early motion 
picture projector and important symbol here for the difference between continuous motion in the 
field of vision and Bergson’s méthode cinématographique. 
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masculine ideals. Robotics for Villiers becomes genetics for Houellebecq, with Hadaly 
yielding to a race of perfected post-human beings created thanks to Michel’s vision for 
efficient, non-decaying genetic replication. Both solutions, then, view an extreme form of 
futurity as the only answer to present ills. Hadaly’s insistent cry to Ewald, “Je surviens de 
la part des tiens futurs!” (Villiers 315) is a precise foreshadowing of the Epilogue to Les 
particules élémentaires, where the tiens futurs are the post-humans themselves revealing 
their purported authorship of Houellebecq’s text.  
 This congruence between Villiers and Houellebecq enables further analysis of Les 
particules élémentaires to be situated in a manner directly contrary to the prior reading of 
Balzac. For the latter, it may be recalled, questions of life and death are addressed in a 
pre-Bernardian form that exceeds measurement or scientific analysis. Degeneration for 
Raphaël depends on his social and familial setting, of course; but degeneration also 
depends on something intangible in the skin itself. This was proposed as a mystical 
characteristic, a point of supernatural selection, captured in some form by an inversion of 
the radial energy proposed by Teilhard. No such excess immeasurable energy seems to 
animate Houellebecq’s text in Les particules élémentaires, at least not so far as the late 
20
th
 century is concerned. Far from it, and the text highlights this when addressing the 
discovery of DNA in material recovered from Mars:   
Il n’y avait pas d’acte unique, grandiose et créateur ; il n’y avait pas de peuple élu, 
ni même d’espèce ou de planète élue. Il n’y avait, un peu partout dans l’univers, 
que des tentatives incertaines et en général peu convaincantes. Tout cela était en 
outre d’une éprouvante monotonie. L’ADN des bactéries martiennes semblait 
exactement identique à l’ADN des bactéries terrestres. … Si l’ADN était partout 
identique il devait y avoir des raisons profondes liées à la structure moléculaire 
des peptides, ou peut-être aux conditions topologiques de l’autoreproduction. 
(Houellebecq, PE 123-24) 
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Clause by clause, sentence by sentence, the scientifically oriented, fin-de-siècle mission 
of Houellebecq’s text is in stark focus in this passage. Il n’y avait pas d’acte unique, 
grandiose et créateur – the belief in a single act of creation by a divine author was the 
dominant scientific theory in the 17
th
 century and remained influential even as late as the 
early 19
th
 century, where all of the variation in modern biology was the immediate result 
of the waving of a magic wand or the chanting of a primordial word (see Jacob, La 
logique du vivant 37). God, soul, and cosmos (Jacob 37) unfolded in a coherent tableau to 
be observed and rigidly classified as part of the scientist’s decryption of a divine but 
accessible truth. For Etienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, a principle of analogies tied all 
organisms together in a harmonious whole, where the fin of a fish became the hoof of the 
horse and the hand of the human (Jacob 116-117 and Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire xxii-xxiii). 
For Cuvier, certain sets of characteristics were necessarily shared in their entirety among 
a class of organisms, such that all animals with hooves also possessed flat teeth and 
longer digestive tracts to accommodate herbivorous consumption (Meyerson, Du 
cheminement 139-41). An ordered, perfected plan awaited only the patient naturalist to be 
discovered, for after all, waiting was all the natural world could do in its temporally-
bound fixity. It was precisely rigid theories like these
34
 that Darwin sought to overturn 
when noting, for example, “We cannot suppose that all the breeds were suddenly 
produced as perfect and as useful as we now see them” (Darwin 29).35 Gone for both 
                                                        
34
 Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire is sometimes credited with a pro-evolutionary point of view, but Piveteau 
views this as an anachronistic opinion not reflected in Geoffroy’s work. (Piveteau 361). 
35
 Darwin was speaking of artificial, and not natural, selection by humans in this specific citation, 
but the vast majority of The Origin of Species is an extension of this anthropocentric example to 
the whole of naturally occurring biology.  
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Darwin and Geoffroy Saint-Hilare, and, eventually for Houellebecq, is the invitation to 
decode the instantaneously delivered and eternal. Replacing it is, of course, the theory of 
natural selection. Il n’y avait pas de peuple élu, ni même d’espèce ou de planète élue – 
just a slight glimpse of Teilhard’s animistic vision peeks through in this sentence. The 
fixity of eternal natural taxonomies was a simple consequence of larger truths – the 
reflections in harmonious feedback between the universe and humanity (Jacob, La 
logique du vivant 35) overseen by a force that can élire. Even where some notion of 
evolution is permitted, as in the work of Teilhard, there remains both a natural hierarchy 
– of the chosen and the non-chosen, arranged in a sprawling pyramid – and an 
energetically guided progression towards perfection for the chosen. For Teilhard, the 
quest for a point oméga would be achieved by the human species on the planet Earth. 
Once again, not so in Les particules élémentaires, where Martian DNA necessarily means 
that no one location or species has been selected to the detriment of all other places or 
organic configurations.     
 Il n’y avait, un peu partout dans l’univers, que des tentatives incertaines et en 
général peu convaincantes. Tout cela était en outre d’une éprouvante monotonie. What 
the text has rejected is clear from the first two citations. In these two sentences that 
follow is the construction of a parallel explanation, devoid of divine guidance or 
meaning. Un peu partout speaks to a blind process of atoms or other molecules moving in 
space, joining and separating in various random regions of space and in various purely 
random or probabilistically favored configurations, subject only to chemical and physical 
limitations. The temptation is to refer to this process as “groping,” but that would too 
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strongly suggest a goal in this great soup of Brownian motion. Even Jacob, who offers 
evolution as a form of bricolage rather than ingénieurie (Jacob, Le jeu 70) may go too far 
for purposes of this passage. Bricolage, as compared to ingénieurie, does remove the 
notion of immediate and directed problem solving by natural process; and in this respect, 
it accords well with the nature of Darwinian evolution as a progressive feedback loop 
between organism and environment limited by a Liebnizian sense of the compossible 
(Latour at 267-70, describes a phenomenon akin to this within various stages of a game 
of Go). Yet bricolage implies construction with an element of intent, if not a perfected 
means of carrying out that intent. All that Les particules élémentaires offers here is a 
series of tentatives incertaines, by extension suggesting no underlying guided outcome of 
any kind. Whether two atoms whiz by each other, collide, or join to form higher 
molecules is a matter of physical and chemical law perhaps, but more than anything a 
matter of uncertainty. An element of pure randomness characterizes interactions at all 
levels of organization, to the detriment of any value system prizing one individual, 
species, or planet over another. Noise and error are the rule; information the exception (as 
Serres notes with respect to modern science in Hermès IV 12-13). But even more 
fundamentally, what an observer calls “noise” or “error” is reduced to no more than 
flawed reflections of a specific frame of observation, wherein the opposite coding, or any 
other permutation of coding, might be possible; and where chaos overwhelms the 
distinction between experimental subject and object. As is often the case in Les particules 
élémentaires and elsewhere in Houellebecq, the text annihilates humanity and its 
prioritized position, leaving only an odd combination of randomness and vacuum behind. 
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In its two potential interpretations, the use of the word monotonie tends to support this 
reading. One such interpretation applies the term to the perspective of the human 
observer, who once enjoyed a traditional position of amazed glorification as the cosmos 
unfolds in docile subordination to his (for indeed, the traditional scientific observer was 
male) increasingly perfected aims and views. Now, that very observer is reduced to 
boredom, as a set of atoms blending into other sets of atoms is jettisoned throughout outer 
space. Or in view of Monod’s conception of evolution, that observer must wait seemingly 
interminably while completely random genetic mutations, brought into contact with the 
environment, are or are not disfavored over periods of hundreds of millennia. Monotonie 
might also describe such processes themselves. Lamarckian transformism implies 
immediate improvements in natural organization, in that whatever the environment 
causes an organism to alter in its lifetime may be passed immediately to the next 
generation, which may in turn feed further progressive changes forward to the subsequent 
generation, and so on. The cycle is constant and efficient, with limited loss of variation 
and little tendency towards imperfection. Natural selection, by contrast, is stop-start, at 
best an extremely slow process of ricochets between the haphazard and sometimes 
atavistic gene and the ever-changing environment. Most often, nothing measurable comes 
of it, and species propagate for many generations in monotonous continuity.        
 L’ADN des bactéries martiennes semblait exactement identique à l’ADN des 
bactéries terrestres. … Si l’ADN était partout identique il devait y avoir des raisons 
profondes liées à la structure moléculaire des peptides, ou peut-être aux conditions 
topologiques de l’autoreproduction. To begin at the end, Monod’s genetic theory is again 
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useful when imagining the conditions topologiques de l’autoreproduction, as it is indeed 
the topology of the peptide in its reproduction that promotes highly precise transfer of 
information between molecules in stereospecific process. Minimization of error leads to 
identical reproduction even as between planets. Yet are there certain epistemological 
traps
36
 hiding in these sentences that threaten to change the entire tenor of the earlier 
portions of this passage? One candidate is the repeated use of the word “identique,” a 
concept that obsessed Meyerson in its negotiated compromise. If perception is potentially 
infinite and never repeated, then conception is the necessary ingredient to an abstraction 
process that establishes artificial identity among natural variety (Meyerson, Du 
cheminement 65-66). In this way, the particular – here, the varied molecules found on 
Mars – becomes the general – a coherent class of literally and metaphorically universal 
DNA. Yet Meyerson questions the fundamental existence of such identity, even when 
stated in a form as unequivocal as in this excerpt. Hiding within all identity is necessary 
difference – the DNA on Mars cannot be exactement identique to the DNA on Earth, 
some difference, potentially non-essential, has been ignored. Let us hold that concern 
with the passage while considering another – the contemplation of possible raisons 
profondes to explain the recurrence of the same DNA on distinct planets. The tendency 
here is to see another epistemological trap – one already discussed in the context of 
Duhem’s Sauver les apparences – wherein science should limit itself to the discovery of 
relations, not deeper reasons for such relations. The text here almost seems to hint at 
                                                        
36
 Meyerson would not refer to what follows as a “trap” in the same way that Bachelard refers to 
epistemological obstacles. Meyerson’s goal is more practical – to understand how thought, both 
scientific and lay, practically proceeds despite its apparent and necessary contradictions. The first 
“trap” described here is one such contradiction.  
  
255 
some divine force responsible for the creation of similar DNA in distinct regions of the 
universe. Yet this concern seems misplaced, as modifying raisons profondes is the 
modifier liées à la structure moléculaire des peptides, an invocation not of a deity but of 
a molecular structure and nothing more. Perhaps the trap, then, is the tendency to apply 
an essentialist or Aristotelian construction to DNA (a construction aggressively opposed 
by Kupiec and Sonigo in Ni Dieu ni gène), where that particular level of molecular 
organization is granted an almost magical meaning compared to larger or smaller 
molecules. Yet that does not seem correct, either. Houellebecq’s texts do not seem 
susceptible to accusation as essentialist. What seems to be happening, instead, is an 
exaggeration of identity that ties back to the prior use of monotonie. If monotony is a 
tiring absence of variety, then the reappearance of DNA in various corners of the 
universe is just an indirect way of expressing a profound ennui baudelairien, another 
symptom of the mal du siècle highlighted in the comparison with Villiers’ L’Ève future. 
The use of scientific language and tone – accordingly bereft of superfluous description – 
only highlights this effect by draining the passage of any emotional content. Once again, 
Les particules élémentaires endorses the Monodian view of a cold universe driven by an 
aimless combination of hazard, repetition, and emptiness. 
If further proof of this point were necessary, it should be enough to highlight the 
degree to which both Les particules élémentaires and La possibilité d’une île reject the 
philosophy of Teilhard de Chardin, and with it, concepts like the dedans des choses and 
l’énergie radiale. In La possibilité d’une île, the critique is direct, as Daniel 1 happens 
upon a neighbor’s bound edition of the priest’s collected works. His reaction is 
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immediate and scathing - his first experience reading Le Milieu divin is a painful memory 
– “en l’espace de quelques pages, l’ouvrage m’avait arraché des hurlements” 
(Houellebecq, La possibilité 78). Teilhard was, in Daniel 1’s view, “un allumé de 
première” resembling one of the “scientifiques chrétiens allemands… qui, une fois 
déposés la cornue ou le scalpel, entreprennent de philosopher sur les concepts reçus lors 
de leur première communion” (Houellebecq, La possibilité 79). The critique continues 
for another page, in which Daniel 1 concludes that Teilhard found Jesus “définitivement 
plus high dope” than sexual relations, and later wonders what sort of people Teilhard 
could have frequented to have “une conception si bénigne et si niaise” of humanity 
(Houellebecq, La possibilité 79), particularly at a time when “salauds” like Sartre, Genet, 
and Céline lived. This is all fairly abrasive, obviously, but it is also quite comical – the 
idea of a first-rate crank who gets high on Jesus and waxes philosophical about the 
sanitized lessons typically transmitted to seven year-olds. The latter critique is 
particularly telling due to its juxtaposition between acute scalpel and obtuse preaching. 
For a Claude Bernard, the scalpel itself does the talking, as a means of discovering and 
controlling a deterministic sequence of events, of mastering illness and reining in 
pathology. All illness reduces to the empirically observable and measurable, so many 
cases awaiting only a certain remedy. Bernard may have put down his scalpel to report 
his findings, but not in the excessive, and excessively naïve, way in which Teilhard is 
purported to have expanded on his scientific inquiries. Teilhard, this passage implies, 
seems to use scientific instruments as a sort of prop to lend objective credibility to a 
philosophy rooted in infantile fairy tales.  
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Houellebecq’s texts often take a less direct approach in their criticism of Teilhard, 
but a more substantive approach in their criticism of his philosophy.  Most notably 
rejected is the proposed point oméga, the perfected end point of Teilhardian evolution:     
Outre les souffrances absurdes qu’elles provoquaient, les révolutions et les 
guerres détruisaient le meilleur du passé, obligeant à chaque fois à faire table rase 
pour rebâtir. Non inscrit dans le cours régulier d’une ascension progressive, 
l’évolution humaine acquérait ainsi un tour chaotique, déstructuré, irrégulier et 
violent. (Houellebecq, PE 165) 
 
The point oméga is closely related to the radial/tangential energy duality already 
discussed as a reasonable model for the shrinking of the skin in La Peau de chagrin. If 
tangential energy is strictly dissipative, subject to entropic loss, its hidden twin, radial 
energy, guides and orients matter around a spiritual center. The intangibility of the latter 
seemed to be inscribed in the shrinking of Raphaël’s skin, imparting an element that 
eluded observation and measurement for the ill-fated young man. No such unknown 
subsists in the Houellebecqian evolution described above. The tour chaotique, 
déstructuré, irrégulier et violent is tangential energy run amok, sowing disorder and 
belying the possible existence of any guided, radial counterforce. With the destruction of 
radial energy comes the associated destruction of the point oméga. In the absence of an 
ascension progressive, there can be no perfected endpoint of the evolution of the entire 
universe captured in a future form of human perfection – at least not for humans in their 
current frail form. If there is to be a point oméga, Houellebecq’s texts can only envision it 
as part of a science fiction/genetic solution – l’avènement des Futurs following 
generations of genetically modified versions of the same humans in La possibilité d’une 
île or the perfected replication of DNA leading to a post-human species in Les particules 
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élémentaires. And even in such allegedly advanced states, particularly in La possibilité 
d’une île, post-humans seem to remain in some measure petty, anti-social and 
judgmental. If the supposedly perfected are not able to achieve a point oméga, no other 
candidate seems destined to grow out of the wreckage of the ever-crumbling human 
edifice. Indeed, it is notable that Les particules élémentaires highlights the destruction of 
war and revolution in the passage above, as such bloody conflicts (along with any other 
form of human evil) are left completely ignored in Teilhard’s Le phénomène humain until 
a brief coda purports to address the entirety of human evil in a mere three pages 
(Teilhard, Le phénomène humain 315-18).     
 Le point oméga receives its most clever skewering in Les particules élémentaires, 
through the person of Bruno and his struggles with the extreme violence and abuse of his 
classmates. After describing one particular infliction of such violence, the text offers an 
alternative scientific model to designate Bruno’s place in the school’s society: 
Les sociétés animales fonctionnent pratiquement toutes sur un système de 
dominance lié à la force relative de leurs membres. Ce système se caractérise par 
une hiérarchie stricte : le mâle le plus fort du groupe est appelé l’animal alpha ; 
celui-ci est suivi du second en force, l’animal bêta, et ainsi de suite jusqu’à 
l’animal le moins élevé dans la hiérarchie, appelé animal oméga. (Houellebecq, 
PE 45) 
 
Bruno, by implication, is the animal oméga, the occupant of the lowest rung in the social 
order. What is telling here is the complete reconfiguration of Teilhard’s concept of the 
point oméga. The point oméga, too, is part of an established hierarchy, a progression 
from the lesser forms of life to the highest form of life realizing its own perfected 
conclusion. In the move from the point oméga to the animal oméga, Les particules 
élémentaires (all the while evoking the caste system of Brave New World) creates an 
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alternative hierarchy where the omega is the most abused and abject, the lowest form of 
life in a hierarchy characterized not by human ascension, but by human degeneration to 
the state of animal.
37
  Hiding beneath the dry tone describing the hierarchy of the 
schoolyard as a strictly scientific phenomenon, then, is a dark irony and a barely 
concealed disdain for Teilhardian philosophy. Plainly, what applied reasonably to La 
Peau de chagrin in the form of immeasurable excess no longer holds in the 
Houellebecqian universe of emptiness and abjection. The undefined consciousness of the 
dedans des choses and the directedness of radial energy is annihilated in inflexible social 
structures of violence and dominance. In this respect, the repeatability and randomness 
that characterize genetic propagation on a microscopic level find a Darwinian counterpart 
at the macroscopic level, for whatever combination of peptides makes up a human’s 
genotype at the outset, later is the subject of a rigid process of environmental selection as 
a matter of phenotype. Bruno is clearly de-selected by the environment, and on many 
occasions, will subsequently be rejected in his attempts to reproduce with women as a 
matter of Darwinian sexual selection. The unguided gene becomes the negatively coded 
person in a step even farther from our reading of Balzac. Supernatural selection seems to 
be reduced to its purely natural form in Houellebecq.    
                                                        
37
 Two points might be raised here. The first is a reminder of Balzac’s project in L’Avant-propos to 
La Comédie humaine, already discussed in the first chapter here. Houellebecq’s zoological 
hierarchy recalls, despite obvious differences with Balzac’s text already noted, Balzac’s stated 
project of constructing a zoology of different species of humans.   
As a second point, might the animal oméga also be a subtle critique of the mathematician 
Gregory Chaitin’s number Ω? That number, infinite in length and transcendental in nature, 
measures the probability that a Turing machine will malfunction after a random sequence of bits. 
(Parrochia 96). Because of the randomness of Ω, it is incompressible, yet contains useful 
information. (Parrochia 97 states, “la réponse à tous les problèmes mathématiques 
intéressants”.) Houellebecq’s form of Ω, by contrast, is finite, violent, and almost entirely useless.  
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The Bifurcation and Prigogine 
 The passage between behavior on the scale of molecules – even macromolecules 
like peptides - and the scale of human beings is a crucial one in Les particules 
élémentaires on a number of levels. The first is a reminder of a fundamental change in 
the approach to scientific analysis begun with thermodynamics and Darwinian evolution 
– the tendency towards statistical measurement recognizing the role of randomness - as 
opposed to reliance on the entirely predictable associated with traditional Newtonian 
mechanics. Perrin’s example of the Brownian motion of a brick is a useful anchoring 
point, as it highlights this rift. Under a traditional methodology, the physical behavior of 
a brick - whether tied to the end of a string as a pendulum, placed on a stack of papers as 
a weight, or dropped from a certain height – could be rendered entirely predictable based 
on knowledge of a few essential conditions like the mass, position, initial velocity and 
acceleration of the brick in the system. If a brick of a certain mass is dropped with a 
certain force from a certain height, the force and location of the brick’s contact with the 
ground is easily calculated for any brick fulfilling such initial conditions. Yet Perrin’s 
example goes beyond this framework by proposing that all objects are, on some level, 
subject to random movement. Phenomena evidencing randomness are the purview of 
statistical analysis because a given input to the system cannot be so thoroughly controlled 
as to lead to a single necessary output, but to a probability distribution of possible outputs 
(it is not a coincidence that Hermès IV is subtitled La distribution). Truly random 
phenomena lead to a random distribution, where all possible outcomes are equally 
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plausible. Most measurable human characteristics follow the well-known bell curve (or 
Gaussian normal distribution) where 68% of the population falls within one standard 
deviation of the curve’s mean and almost no one falls outside of three standard 
deviations. The number of people that join a line in a given span of time may be modeled 
by a Poisson distribution in queuing theory, assuming that newcomers do not balk at the 
line’s length. And the velocity of gas molecules at a given temperature is often modeled 
using a Maxwell-Boltzmann curve. These are but a few examples of how advancements 
in scientific method beginning in the second half of the 19
th
 century began to take 
account of the sheer multiplicity of data points available in a given case, where 
population-level uncertainty replaced idealized certainty. The rule, as Serres notes, 
became the exception, as the overwhelming information once subject to very exceptional 
limits became mere islands of information amid a sea of error, chaos, and randomness. 
Yet there is a key difference between the microscopic behavior of molecules and the 
possibility of Brownian motion for an object as large as a brick. Brownian motion is the 
natural behavior at the microscopic end of the spectrum, with gas molecules zig-zagging 
and colliding in space in stochastic interaction, with electrons occupying not a discrete 
location in space, but a probability cloud where they are most likely to act. Not so for 
bricks, which tend to remain, at least temporarily, where they come to rest, and which 
would only undergo Brownian motion on the scale of infinitesimal probabilities noted by 
Perrin. So at first glance, there is a certain divide between the nature of the statistical 
behavior of a gas molecule or electron versus that of a brick, and with that divide, 
fundamental questions are raised as to the degree of determination that may be applied to 
  
262 
the behavior of one or many such objects. Adding human beings to the equation would 
only seem to complicate the picture further, as population-level statistics concerning 
genetics or environmental influence interface with metaphysical questions about life, free 
will, and agency. It is precisely this complexity that Les particules élémentaires targets 
with its title. What are Michel and Bruno? Perhaps they behave like elementary particles, 
quarks interacting in a stochastic manner only possibly modeled on a statistical scale, and 
otherwise not knowable in and of themselves. The similarity between the text’s main 
characters and certain principles of quantum mechanics like Pauli exclusion and 
complementarity (e.g., the wave-particle duality of light) have already been highlighted 
here. Further comparisons in this vein are possible, with the symmetry of the half-
brothers’ lives recalling a sort of quantum supersymmetry between particles, like that 
between a fermion and its associated boson (Smolin 67). Perhaps Michel and Bruno are 
larger objects, like bricks, negotiating the mechanics of sociological and psychological 
pressures that influence their lives. And perhaps they are also human beings, possessing a 
Bergsonian life that escapes reduction to measurement and a free will that escapes simple 
statistical distributions. The text, it will be shown, offers an extended meditation on these 
different models. Just as the Teilhardian (or anti-Teilhardian) reading of the text tended to 
demonstrate a relative lack of concern for spiritual energy in favor of a combination of 
determinism, entropy, and decay, so too does a reading of the text with the various 
potential statistical models in mind tend to work its own population-based annihilation of 
humanity.          
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The point of sharpest focus when reading for freedom within the textual system is 
the bifurcation, the moment of divergence between two potential paths. At just such a 
moment, any one of a near-mechanical certainty, a strictly probabilistic outcome, or a 
free choice could hypothetically occur. The bifurcation is also a critical construction, as 
shall be shown, for its relations to scientific models as diverse as Darwinian natural 
selection, Latour’s description of the creation of scientific facts, and Prigogine’s non-
equilibrium attraction. Les particules élémentaires furnishes numerous examples of 
bifurcation, including the initial appearance of cancerous cells in the body of Michel’s 
sometime female companion Annabelle, an appearance that leads her to commit suicide 
by drug overdose:    
La vie était organisée ainsi, pensait-elle ; une bifurcation s’était produite dans son 
corps, une bifurcation imprévisible et injustifiée ; et maintenant son corps ne 
pouvait plus être une source de bonheur et de joie. Il allait au contraire, 
progressivement mais en fait assez vite, devenir pour elle-même comme pour les 
autres une source de gêne et de malheur. Par conséquent, il fallait détruire son 
corps. (Houellebecq, PE 280) 
 
Annabelle’s thoughts, through a loose style indirect libre blurring her viewpoint and the 
narrator’s, veer heavily toward the decadent and the anti-Bergsonian. The former is in 
evidence in the destruction and degeneration of Annabelle’s body. In a text where Michel 
is summoned to the exhumation of his grandmother’s body and is surprised at what little 
remains (so to speak), decay and death play the role of an oddly sublime spectacle. The 
reader of Houellebecq’s text may feel the same sort of perverse attraction that Baudelaire 
once felt towards the splayed, rotting corpse in Une charogne (Baudelaire 142). Here, 
Annabelle’s path parallels that of Baudelaire’s lover in Une charogne, as both are 
threatened with the same fatal decline that will end in convergence with death’s 
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putrefying touch. The apparent bifurcation in Annabelle’s cells from healthy to cancerous 
already seems deceiving, inasmuch as her body is heading to the same endpoint when 
viewed along a sufficient time scale. There are no bifurcations in Houellebecq’s text, in 
other words, just the inevitable path to death.    
The earmarks of an anti-Bergsonian view, also evident throughout the passage, 
provide a different approach to the same question. For Annabelle, life is organisée – by 
extension, a sequence of points or events, each of which can be fit into categories in a 
broader taxonomy. The bifurcation in question here is just one such event, a process with 
its own duration and development whose details remain ignored, lost in the abrupt 
collapse to a single word. Life is not a progression or devenir – the passage’s very use of 
the word devenir belies such a possibility. Devenir here speaks to the eventual change in 
the coded value of Annabelle’s body due to her developing cancer, a change necessarily 
simplifying a process of degradation as a simple shift in condition, from source de 
bonheur to source de gêne. The word progressivement offering the possibility of devenir 
is immediately minimized, a compacted process that will take place assez vite. And to 
whatever extent that the growth of cancerous cells progressivement might still be 
interpolated as a form of devenir in this change in bodily coding, that devenir is not to be. 
Annabelle is to destroy her body before any such devenir can take place.  
 Annabelle may be thinking here (pensait-elle), but her thoughts reflect an 
obsession with the corporeal. The word corps appears three times in the passage and is 
indirectly referenced by pronoun or as a source three other times. The transition is 
immediate, from the openness of thought to the closed system of the body, from the 
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openness of possibility as temporal process to the quick closure of cancer and suicide. 
The body of Annabelle, once a generative force, is destined to degenerate, to consume 
energy and create negatively coded energy in further closure of possibility. Body seems to 
assume a traditionally mechanical meaning like Zola’s Florent, as the agency of the 
human is overwhelmed by the idealization of Annabelle as no more than a body, an 
object with mass stylized as a single point à la Newton. Source reinforces this reading, as 
a source is traditionally merely a point, a pole of infinitesimal size. For a reasoning being 
reduced to a source, body, or simple particle, the fatality of the passage’s conclusion is 
predictable – par conséquent, il fallait détruire son corps. Annabelle must destroy her 
body, it is the only possible consequence. The body already reduced to a simple point or 
source takes yet another step in its self-destruction, as the island transmitting emotional 
information undergoes a move to pure entropy. Again, there is no life to counteract the 
destructive force, no Lamarckian or Bergsonian philosophy to maintain organization in 
the face of degeneration. There is only pure destruction consistent with the second law of 
thermodynamics.  
 Information theory and thermodynamics have a place here by virtue of the very 
nature of the bifurcation in Annabelle’s body. This is in part due to the use of 
imprévisible to describe the initial development of cancerous cells. The unforeseeable 
growth speaks to its fundamental randomness, an ordered and predictable replication of 
cells shifted to the disordered and unpredictable. With this change, more than just 
emotional information is lost and/or re-coded – the very cellular processes that promote 
health have lost their ability to transmit information forward in reproductive cycles. The 
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appearance of cancer is an appearance of error, the inevitable limit in transmission where 
insufficient energy is available to ensure a complete message is passed from person to 
person and from cell to cell. What is worth note here is a further bifurcation implicitly 
shadowing Annabelle’s cellular bifurcation. For if error propagation means a loss of 
informational content fed forward in the cycle of cellular generation, it does not mean a 
loss of content generally. The error, despite elements of noise, also contains alternate 
information. This speaks to a possible openness that is never realized. Bergson’s chapter 
Le possible et le réel in La Pensée et le Mouvant proposes just such openness when 
considering the notion of possibility in the future (see specifically Bergson, La Pensée 
144-48). While Bergson acknowledges a potential meaning of “possible” in the form of 
that which is not prevented from happening, the true meaning of “possible” for Bergson 
is backward-facing or Bayesian - in that an object or event only becomes possible once it 
has been realized. Reality predates possibility for Bergson; a book is possible only once it 
has been written, in much the way that modern Bayesian probability looks back in time to 
determine the conditions that surrounded an event’s genesis. This view focuses attention 
on “coming into being” as a fundamentally unpredictable process, one of almost pure 
indeterminacy until completed. By this logic, Annabelle’s affliction with cancer is 
possible, in that it has come into being; but what is to follow as a matter of future devenir 
remains indeterminate until unrealized possibilities are in fact embodied. Possibility in its 
commonly understood sense sets artificial limits in a Bergsonian view. Annabelle could 
have viewed the unpredictable bifurcation in her cells as one realized possibility that 
would lead to others, as indeterminate as the first. Yet Annabelle clearly chooses a 
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different philosophical path, forsaking the flexibility inherent in Bergsonian 
unpredictability in favor of an ever-receding horizon of decay and premature demise. A 
probabilistic event like the formation of cancer cells, far from tending to show 
randomness by its very nature, is no more than a vehicle of fatality and closure. The 
almost magical excess of the Balzacian skin yields in Les particules élémentaires to the 
rigidly structured and fatalistic decay that even the near-pure unpredictability of cellular 
mutation cannot overcome. This first example of a Houellebecqian bifurcation seems to 
be an artificial decision point interpreted as, if not in fact, certain. So even as 
Houellebecq’s text acknowledges the historically significant bifurcation in science from 
the mechanical to the stochastic and probabilistic, it follows the opposite bifurcation 
philosophically by staging characters that subscribe to a fatalistic and mechanical 
worldview. Probability and its Bernouilli trials or distributions are a new form of 
positive, sufficient knowledge that serve their own almost Bernardian end.           
 A second example offers only a little more in the way of possibility, in either a 
Bergsonian or more common sense. Once again, the bifurcation point involves 
Annabelle, facing another apparently important decision roughly twenty-five years before 
her cancer diagnosis and subsequent suicide. On the day that Michel’s grandmother (and 
primary caregiver) passes away, Annabelle decides to visit Michel’s house to check in on 
him, and gets as far as his gate, where she faces the decision whether to go in or stay 
outside:  
Elle ne savait pas qu’elle était en train de vivre l’expérience concrète de la 
liberté ; en tout cas c’était parfaitement atroce, et elle ne devait jamais plus tout à 
fait être la même, après ces dix minutes. Bien des années plus tard, Michel devait 
proposer une brève théorie de la liberté humaine sur la base d’une analogie avec 
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le comportement de l’hélium superfluide. Phénomènes atomiques discrets, les 
échanges d’électrons entre les neurones et les synapses à l’intérieur du cerveau 
sont en principe soumis à l’imprévisibilité quantique ; le grand nombre de 
neurones fait, cependant, par annulation statistique des différences élémentaires, 
que le comportement humain est, dans ses grandes lignes comme dans ses détails 
– aussi rigoureusement déterminé que celui de tout autre système 
naturel. Pourtant, dans certaines circonstances, extrêmement rares – les chrétiens 
parlaient d’opération de grâce – une onde de cohérence nouvelle surgit et se 
propage à l’intérieur du cerveau ; un comportement nouveau apparaît, de manière 
temporaire ou définitive, régi par un système entièrement différent d’oscillateurs 
harmoniques ; on observe alors ce qu’il est convenu d’appeler un acte libre.  
Rien de tel ne se produisit cette nuit-là. (Houellebecq, PE 92) 
 
Ultimately, after ten minutes of waiting, Annabelle does not present herself at Michel’s 
door, and she would not see him again for another twenty-five years. Yet once again, 
even what the text presents as a moment potentially allowing the exercise of free will in 
human decision, no acte libre occurs. Annabelle’s decision not to knock on Michel’s 
door was no such acte libre either according to the text or, as we shall see, more 
generally.  The bifurcation seems at first glance false.  
 Regardless of the specific events of the scene, however, Les particules 
élémentaires presents in this passage a concept more general in scope to address the 
possibility of free will at a given bifurcation point. As with much of the rest of the text, 
the most obvious tendencies in evidence are de-humanizing and de-totalizing - the 
scientific and the statistical. Rather than focus on human agency at all in human 
“decision,” the text limits itself to a detailed description of the series of scientific 
phenomena that occur in the brain, so many neurological and synaptic firings leading to 
predictable outcomes. Annabelle’s brain gets the same treatment as her body in her later 
cancer diagnosis, in that the brain is as susceptible of observation, classification, decay, 
and de-humanization as the body. No mind/body distinction saves one half of the 
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dichotomy to the detriment of the other. No distinction between the organic and inorganic 
or the human and non-human is possible in the vast majority of cases. By extension, no 
cogito is possible here, as the mind and body, the human and the surrounding world, are 
all specimens on equal footing, each as knowable as the other by a Laplace’s daemon 
(Laplace 4) possessing sufficient information (or an omniscient narrator, as it were). No 
privileges are granted for the doubting subject. This effect is only magnified by resort to a 
statistical view of the human neurological system. Unpredictability is possible, but an 
annulation statistique ensures that the brain’s version of Brownian motion quickly 
approaches a central limit to be modeled by a Gaussian normal distribution (Keller & 
Warrack 262) when enough neurons are considered. The brain is no different than the 
bottle of gas molecules, whose individual, random motions and collisions cancel each 
other to create overarching averages. The pressure and temperature of such gas molecules 
translates here to the predictable neurological transmission across synapses. There may 
be many aspects of the system that remain microscopically unknown or variable, but they 
simply do not matter.       
 The only exception to this is the extremely rare reorientation of the system that 
amounts to a basis for the acte libre. Breaking from the usual tendency of systemic 
coherence in one direction, une onde de cohérence nouvelle surgit et se propage à 
l’intérieur du cerveau. The shape underpinning the act of free will is a waveform, a shape 
that again evokes images of quantum mechanical complementarity. It is a form of 
clinamen, a substantial turbulence in rupture with the system’s general movement along a 
shared vector. Perhaps most importantly, it is a move from the stable and mechanical 
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object to the wave characterized by frequency and potential interference; from the given 
event at a given point in space and time to the strictly probabilistic object without a 
knowable trajectory (Prigogine, La Fin des certitudes 127). This new wave surging in the 
brain is essentially unknowable in a traditional sense – it can only be conceived as part of 
a sort of Bachelardian doubling. Un comportement nouveau apparaît, de manière 
temporaire ou définitive, régi par un système entièrement différent d’oscillateurs 
harmoniques. Oscillation is a concept close to Prigogine – he uses the term in multiple 
forms to describe the behavior of chemical systems in non-equilibrium states (Prigogine, 
La Fin des certitudes 77). In such states, the system’s behavior is no longer inevitably a 
simple question of decay to an equilibrium state as dictated by the second law of 
thermodynamics. Rather, Prigogine speaks of bifurcations containing an irreducible 
element of probability such that the system’s behavior cannot be rigorously predicted. At 
a specific point away from equilibrium, an element in the system will randomly follow 
one of two highly distinct branches, and no amount of information, no Laplace’s daemon 
would be able to predict which branch would be followed (Prigogine, La Fin des 
certitudes 81 and Prigogine and Stengers, La nouvelle alliance 230-31). This marks a 
double rupture in two traditional scientific constructs – the reversibility of time and the 
relation between microscopic and macroscopic elements as a matter of statistics. On the 
first count, because of the uncertainty necessarily introduced in the system, it is not 
possible to reverse the sign of the time variable in the equations determining the system’s 
unfolding and be sure that the model will simply symmetrically retrace its steps into the 
past. Prigogine sees this as providing the system with its own history. Unpredictable 
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bifurcations at non-equilibrium states also promote a rupture in the equivalence between 
individual descriptions like the trajectory of molecules and the statistical description of 
the system as a whole (Prigogine, La Fin des certitudes 179). The system no longer has a 
simple pressure or temperature; it presents an element of necessary uncertainty in such 
measurements. Such is the comportement nouveau of the human brain pursuing the acte 
libre according to the post-human narrators of Les particules élémentaires – it effects 
precisely the sort of rupture where the normal statistical cancelation of neurological 
behavior is disrupted, and a necessary element of uncertainty enters the system. What it 
also means is that humans, even in their free behavior, still are no more special than a 
non-equilibrium molecule unpredictably changing its frequency of oscillation. Humans 
may have a history; they may participate in a world containing elements of indeterminacy 
and irreversibility; but they are still fundamentally able to be modeled like any other 
physical or chemical object.            
 This is precisely Prigogine’s point. The concept of La nouvelle alliance (the title 
of his book co-authored with Isabelle Stengers) is not monolithic. Many new alliances are 
proposed, between philosophy and modern science, where science has finally advanced 
to address Bergson’s concerns; and between more traditional approaches to knowledge 
and modern science, where the wisdom of the paysan can speak to the laboratory 
researcher (Prigogine and Stengers, La nouvelle alliance 391). Perhaps the alliance most 
fervently underscored is the newfound parity between humans and nature. The 
traditionally superior human subject faced with the inferior natural object (a posture 
already discussed here with respect to Descartes) would finally confront a form of 
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indeterminate, open, evolving nature on the human’s level, and a form of time common 
to all, not just an irreversible time for humans and a strictly reversible time for natural 
objects (Prigogine and Stengers, La nouvelle alliance 51-53). The very same 
indeterminacy and irreversibility that characterize the human could be shown to apply 
equally well to all phenomena, from the microscopic to the macroscopic, throughout the 
universe. Humans are not lowering themselves to nature’s traditional level, Prigogine 
seems to say; nature is finally able to join humans in a universal synthesis and 
transcendance. It follows that Prigogine views this new relation as a positive 
development, a newfound harmony establishing previously unknown connections 
between humans and their surroundings. If Houellebecq’s text shares Prigogine’s 
conception of parity between humans and their natural objects, the result of such parity is 
neither harmonious nor affirming. In each of the last two passages cited, it is clear that 
nature does not rise to the level of humans, humans sink to the level of the strictly natural 
or animal. Annabelle, faced with the possibility of making a decision at two separate 
bifurcation points, is reduced in the first to a mere body that must be destroyed (as if by 
an actor outside herself). In the second, she never exercises her potential freedom in the 
text’s view; but even if she had, she would have been no different than a mere particle 
moving indeterminately in a non-equilibrium eddy. That which is glorifying and 
empowering of nature in Prigogine’s construction is only debasing and objectifying of 
humans in Houellebecq’s. 
 Much of the opposition between these two constructions is the consequence of 
what Houellebecq’s text views as a confusion between freedom and unpredictability. The 
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text introduces such confusion in exactly those terms when discussing contemplations by 
Michel in furtherance of his philosophy. There is, in his view, a      
confusion entre liberté et imprévisibilité. Les turbulences d’un flot liquide au 
voisinage d’une pile de pont sont structurellement imprévisibles ; nul n’aurait 
songé pour autant à les qualifier de libres. … Les équations de la théorie du chaos 
ne faisaient aucune référence au milieu physique dans lequel se déployaient leurs 
manifestations ; cette ubiquité leur permettait de trouver des applications en 
hydrodynamique comme en sociologie des groupes. Leur pouvoir de modélisation 
morphologique était bon, mais leurs capacités prédictives quasi nulles. A 
l’opposé, les équations de la mécanique quantique permettaient de prévoir le 
comportement de systèmes microphysiques avec une précision excellente, et 
même avec une précision totale si l’on renonçait à tout espoir de retour vers une 
ontologie matérielle. Il était au moins prématuré, et peut-être impossible, d’établir 
une jonction mathématique entre ces deux théories. Cependant, Michel en était 
convaincu, la constitution d’attracteurs à travers le réseau évolutif des neurones et 
des synapses était la clef de l’explication des opinions et des actions humaines. 
(Houellebecq, PE 227) 
 
If there is an alliance of any kind between the unpredictability of human behavior and 
that of particle behavior, neither leads to meaningful freedom or agency. This is a 
fundamental critique of Prigogine, who interprets his scientific proof of the necessary 
indeterminacy of molecules as a pedestal on which to build a philosophy of human free 
will. If Laplace’s daemon would not suffice to predict a simple bifurcation point for a 
particle far from equilibrium, how could anyone propose to predict something as 
complicated as human behavior with any certainty? Houellebecq’s text would respond 
that the question does not make sense. Just because humans and particles do things that 
are fundamentally unpredictable does not mean that they exercise any freedom in doing 
such things. Turbulent water molecules by a bridge abutment are not free even if they 
evidence a sort of clinamen; human beings are not free even if they seem to decide, as 
Annabelle does, not to visit a friend after ten minutes of waiting. The lack of 
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predictability, the passage clarifies, is just part of a trade-off between complementary 
scientific techniques. On one hand, the equations associated with chaos theory offer the 
ability to model form, but not to predict changes over time. On the other, traditional 
mechanics offer the ability to make predictions to a high degree of precision while 
sacrificing form through the idealization of matter as points. The text presents two 
potential methods of analysis interacting in a sort of chiasmus. Neither seems particularly 
preferable to the other (contrary to Prigogine’s wholesale rejection of traditional 
mechanics in favor of something closer to the theory of chaos). At bottom, they are just 
models, artificial glosses on underlying reality in the rationalist view (Bachelard, Le 
nouvel esprit scientifique 5-7). Michel’s thoughts here tend toward the common scientific 
goal of unification of disparate theories - much as physicists have long but unsuccessfully 
tried to unify all fundamental forces - but ultimately he rejects such unification as 
premature or even impossible. He instead falls back on a theory akin to the acte libre 
offered to describe how Annabelle might have acted when waiting at Michel’s gate. 
Neuroscience may ultimately be a solution for Michel’s neo-humans, but for actual 
humans at the end of the twentieth century, all remains negative, a series of models each 
as flawed as the last, each as entirely unable to achieve any metaphysical advance.  
 There remains the further question – is Laplace’s daemon as a construct even 
possible? If all of the conditions of the universe were known, would its unfolding occur 
predictably or mechanically? Prigogine’s response seems to be “no” – even if all theories 
were unified and all conditions catalogued, scientific prediction could never reach the 
level of absolute certainty due to the residue of pure, irreducible indeterminacy that 
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remains. Houellebecq’s text does not agree with this view, of course. The hope of 
unification for Michel, the fact that he is convaincu that there is a possible key to an 
improved theory, speaks to the current reality that science is not able to model and predict 
all things, including human behavior. Yet this is only the fault of current science; and as 
that field improves, so too will the ability to predict the behavior of humans who are 
fundamentally and inextricably bound by a theory merely waiting to be discovered.         
 
A Brief Comparison with La possibilité d’une île 
 We will return to a possible solution to the mal du siècle in the form of genetic 
advancement a little later, but for now, it is worthwhile to engage in a closer review of La 
possibilité d’une île to see how its brand of malaise compares to that of Les particules 
élémentaires. Some similarity in the philosophies of the two texts should not be 
surprising in view of the numerous structural similarities between them. Each seems to 
champion advancement beyond the modern human condition via genetic engineering that 
fundamentally changes the human species into something different. Each proposes a 
solution in the form of genetic perfection, replications that can take place infinitely 
without loss or error, thus proposing an escape from both the second law of 
thermodynamics and Monod’s concept of hasard matching nécessité. Each paints the 
negative aspects of the turn of the 21
st
 century through reliance on male characters and 
flawed fraternity – Michel and Bruno in Les particules élémentaires become the jaded 
comic Daniel and the criminally culpable triumvirate governing the Elohimites in La 
possibilité d’une île. Each presents the solution to such failings as a transition to 
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traditionally feminine values – demain sera féminin is the motto of the neo-human race in 
Les particules élémentaires while the future versions of Daniel live in a world governed 
by la Sœur supreme. (See e.g., Houellebecq, La possibilité d’une île 97).   
 As may be expected, then, the treatment of epistemology and the history of 
science in La possibilité d’une île is not substantially different than that of Les particules 
élémentaires. Again, the modern world of Daniel 1 feels far more like the univers glacé 
of Jacques Monod than the nouvelle alliance of Prigogine. Daniel 1’s description of 
humankind tends to underscore this: 
[L]’homme était une espèce animale, issue d’autres espèces animales par un 
processus d’évolution tortueux et pénible ; il était composé de matière configurée 
en organes, et après sa mort ces organes se décomposaient, se transformaient en 
molécules plus simples ; il ne subsistait plus aucune trace d’activité cérébrale, de 
pensée, ni évidemment quoi que ce soit qui puisse être assimilé à un esprit ou une 
âme. (Houellebecq, La possibilité d’une île 238-39). 
 
There is no fine gradation between species here, no intermediate forms to tie humans 
directly to other species, but there is also nothing talismanic about humankind in and of 
itself. Humans are precisely as Darwinian natural selection views them – the endpoint of 
a different sort of bifurcation between evolving species. That process is not charmed or 
supernatural; it does not follow the detour-free Lamarckian path to perfection, nor 
certainly the spiritualized path to Teilhard’s point oméga. No, evolution is tortueux and 
pénible, a replay of the monotonie presented earlier in Les particules élémentaires. That 
the evolutionary path was tortueux is particularly notable, as the groping sort of bricolage 
followed by genetics in interplay with the selecting environment requires a lot of twists 
(helical and other), turns, false starts, and dead ends in evolution before a species can 
establish itself. And like any other species, humans are not immune to facing their own 
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extinction if a better adapted organism arrives to take their place. Such are the perfectly 
replicated later versions of Daniel, living in the same compound as the original Daniel 
(thus having taken his place) while the last remaining humans extinguish themselves in 
acts of remarkable brutality.  
 The perceived “coldness” of the modern view of Darwinian evolution continues 
in a specifically anti-vitalist vein in the remainder of the passage. Humans are 
composé[s] de matière, made up of the same abstract “stuff” as everything else in the 
world – be it organic or inorganic, organized or simple. They are not a special form of 
elect because they are imbued with a vital force that unknowably counteracts the forces 
of decay. That generative force is specifically omitted from this description. The only 
remaining tendency highlighted is the tendency to decompose and transform into simpler 
molecules, the very tendency common to everything in the universe. The human is as 
subject to the second law of thermodynamics as everything else, as powerless against 
ever-increasing entropy. Even the brain, endowed with such particular value in Cartesian 
thought, comes to hold no information whatsoever. Aucune trace d’activité cérébrale, de 
pensée may be a reminder of the temporal limits of existence, and with it, the eventual 
failing of the cogito at life’s end. But that failing might also be read as a rejection of the 
cogito during life. People may exist (without entering into an endless debate about the 
difference between “exist” and “be,” it could also be said here “People may be”), but 
their limited cerebral output is not in and of itself a guarantor of that existence. As strictly 
material entities, humans exist simply because they contain matter, whether or not they 
actually think. And many of Houellebecq’s characters, it could be argued, do not think 
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for themselves, if they think at all. The choice of Houellebecq’s text may have changed, 
but we are once again facing the example of the near-comatose Bruno staring at the 
radiator in complete abjection.         
 The passage concludes with a final rejection of esprit or âme, a rejection that is 
inserted more for emphasis than as a matter of logical necessity. For if the scientific 
makeweight that was vitalist thought in the 19
th
 century is rejected here, so too must be 
rejected any theological notions more akin to Teilhard’s. And with the rejection of such 
theories typically comes a slew of other rejected views (see Perrin 22-25 for the 
oppositions about to be discussed). Discontinuity replaces continuity, as the body 
decomposes not into blurred totality but into discrete molecular subparts. Matter replaces 
energy, as the remains are no more than simple matter devoid of Ostvaldian energetics. 
Induction replaces intuition, as the body is subject to a series of induced natural laws, not 
an abstract intuition of life force or soul. If intuition means the empirically complex 
described by the invisibly simple, then induction here means something far simpler 
empirically, a basic process of decay hiding nothing. And perhaps most importantly, the 
empty replaces the full, as the spiritually affirming is confronted with the sheer void, 
anéantissement, and (as we saw earlier) annulation statistique of human existence. Every 
element of the reading of Balzac’s La Peau de chagrin has flipped here, and one cannot 
help but think that this is due to the increasing ability of scientific inquiry to reach 
seemingly every chemical and physical phenomenon. With developments as wide-
ranging as vastly improved microscopy to quantum theory and relativity, an improved 
understanding of the universe at all levels leads to its demystification. The enchanted skin 
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was a receptacle for a certain magic because the best scientists of the time could not 
discover its inner workings, and the best doctors of the time could not discover the 
ailment of the skin’s possessor. For Houellebecq, by contrast, everything reduces to cold, 
objective description, from the putrefaction of the body to the chemistry of the brain in 
decision-making. There is no longer a distinction between the organic and inorganic, 
between the purview of science and the purview of metaphysics, in this descent of man.   
 In the much the same vein, La possibilité d’une île revisits questions of 
determinism as approached by Les particules élémentaires. As Daniel 25 attempts a 
pilgrimage by retracing the original voyage of Daniel 1 in the direction of what remains 
of Lanzarote, his thoughts wander to a key distinction between earlier humans and their 
versioned replacements: 
La conscience d’un déterminisme intégral était sans doute ce qui nous 
différenciait le plus nettement de nos prédécesseurs humains. Comme eux, nous 
n’étions que des machines conscientes ; mais, contrairement à eux, nous avions 
conscience de n’être que des machines. (Houellebecq, La possibilité d’une île 
433). 
 
The distinction here is only a matter of awareness. Even in unplanned flight from his 
compound, in break from the expected behavior of his race, Daniel 25 does not view his 
actions as anything but determined. The same determinism applies a fortiori to Daniel 1 
and his fellow humans. If the cogito is rejected in La possibilité d’une île, the Cartesian 
homme-horloge remains, just all the more debased for his lack of awareness in his lack of 
free will.   
 Perhaps La possibilité d’une île’s most notable supplement to its similarly 
scientifically motivated predecessor text is its close look at the inner workings of the New 
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Age organization, the Elohimites. According to the teachings of this group (which one 
would be tempted to call a “cult” based on the exaggerated, empty, and sex-driven 
showmanship of its founder):    
En somme, selon eux, tout reposait sur une erreur de transcription dans la 
Genèse : le Créateur, Elohim, ne devait pas être pris au singulier, mais au pluriel. 
Nos créateurs n’avaient rien de divin, ni de surnaturel ; ils étaient simplement des 
êtres matériels, plus avancés que nous dans leur évolution, qui avaient su maîtriser 
les voyages spatiaux et la création de la vie ; ils avaient également vaincu le 
vieillissement et la mort, et ne demandaient qu’à partager leurs secrets avec les 
plus méritants d’entre nous. (Houellebecq, La possibilité d’une île 105). 
 
Even in its most religious élan, La possibilité d’une île remains firmly anchored in the 
scientific tradition already observed here. Judeo-Christian religions are flawed due to an 
error in transcription, the inevitable loss of content in an information network. In fact, the 
line may be read in a parallel form where the erreur de transcription dans la Genèse 
becomes an erreur de transcription dans la génétique, as the Elohimite religion’s 
proposed solution is ultimately the termination of randomness and error in genetic 
transmission by ensuring the creation of exact genetic copies. Modern scientific concepts 
again appear to the end of undermining traditional theological notions. Thus, rien de 
divin, ni de surnaturel, just the intervention of material beings. The vanquishing of aging 
and death remain a secret, but nothing that could not be shared with the new elect, 
selected on pure merit. The scientific reduction here ensures that there is less to the 
Elohimite belief structure than its Judeo-Christian counterparts. There may be even less 
still when the organization is viewed as a ruse to satisfy its founder’s sexual desires. In 
that respect, the use of scientific discourse here is about creating a new cosmogony that 
can withstand scrutiny and promote credibility. Perhaps scientific discourse here has 
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morphed into a gloss on an empty belief system, a means to accomplish one person’s end. 
Or perhaps, and this possibility cannot be discounted in texts as darkly humorous
38
 as 
Houellebecq’s, the very emptiness of scientific discourse for the Elohim characterizes 
scientific discourse throughout Houllebecq’s texts. Houellebecq’s narrators rely on 
scientific presentation in part as a hollow device, a meaningless signifier further 
emphasizing the meaninglessness of the signified. They also rely on these techniques to 
present a gloss of truth and objectivity for their consuming public, a way of proselytizing 
a new sort of Elohimite to a different philosophical cause. In all of its facets, scientific 
discourse in Houellebecq’s texts may first and foremost be the trick of a funhouse mirror, 
an exaggerated distortion lying just beneath a supposedly reflective surface. The reader is 
not a simple recipient of objective reporting; the reader is, in the worst case, a potential 
pawn to a discursive technique, and in the best (Barthesian) case, a full player in an 
interactive, deeply ironic game. Perhaps Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle should be 
recalled here, as not only does the effect of scientific discourse remain equivocal in 
Houellebecq’s texts, but the very act of trying to determine that effect involves dynamic 
changes in the reader as subject set against the text as object, where it is the text that 
seems more and more the scientific subject and the reader the debased human object.        
 
                                                        
38
 This seems an entirely appropriate characterization of Houellebecq’s novels. In La carte et le 
territoire, he goes so far as to insert a character named “Michel Houellebecq” – apparently a 
reflection of himself in some parodically depressive and alcoholic form – only to have that 
character violently murdered in the second half of the text. Darkly humorous, indeed, but also a 
reminder to respect the limits of a reading based on Barthes’ La mort de l’auteur. If the author 
goes so far as to commit fictional suicide, how can any reader possibly feel justified keeping him 
alive as a source of authorial intent or message?  
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The Possibility of a Solution? 
 So do Houellebecq’s texts offer a meaningful response to the dreary, decaying 
tedium of human existence at the turn of the 21
st
 century? Are the genetically perfected 
humans in either Les particules élémentaires or La possibilité d’une île any better off 
than their apparently miserable predecessors? The answer initially seems equivocal, as 
this section’s discussion will show, hesitating between the positively coded value of 
perfected genetics and the negatively coded continuation of certain aspects of the 
presently debased human condition. One thing is abundantly clear from each of the texts, 
however - the possibility of a triumphant science mitigating the ills of humanity with 
remarkable precision and certainty. Daniel 24 ruminates on this in connection with the 
creation of his eventual successor, Daniel 25:    
Un être est façonné, quelque part dans la Cité centrale, qui est semblable à moi ; il 
a du moins mes traits, et mes organes internes. Lorsque ma vie cessera, l’absence 
de signal sera captée en quelques nanosecondes ; la fabrication de mon successeur 
sera aussitôt mise en route. … Il sera le destinataire de ce livre. (Houellebecq, La 
possibilité d’une île 29-30) 
 
The creation of Adam in the Garden of Eden is substantially reimagined here. The lump 
of clay that became man fashioned in God’s image in the idyllic garden is translated to a 
simple être fashioned in its own image in a central urban area. (It should be recalled in 
this respect that the original texts describing the coming of the new prophet in La 
possibilité d’une île were four in number in an obvious parallel to the Gospels.) This 
change tends to demystify the divine creative act, rendering it predictable, cold, and by its 
very definition, sterile (Serres’ three libidones in Le contrat naturel, based on the Garden 
of Eden and already discussed in relation to Balzac, are notably absent here). The theme 
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is pursued with the relegation of life to a signal on a network, devoid of any content other 
than its basic existence. Daniel 24’s life is no more than a single binary bit in a larger 
system, which when flipped to “true” (or 1) tells a central control system not to build his 
successor, and when flipped to “false” (or 0) shifts to a state where fabrication of a 
successor is necessary. Fabrication adds to the passage’s demystification by proposing 
not the birth of a human, but its manufacture. The futuristic and mechanical are 
embraced, but not as a means of improving human condition. Rather, they are a means of 
pairing the reality of the human condition with its creation and realization. The machine 
born of the machine finally experiences an existence consonant with, and conscious of, 
his reality. Monod’s universe is no less glacé, the humans in it have simply been chilled 
to its ambient level. The fundamentals of thermodynamics still seem to prevail here.    
 The case is slightly different in Les particules élémentaires, where lossless 
replication seems to have replaced entropy. Michel’s ultimately triumphant theories are 
presented as follows:   
A la fin de 2009, il ne pouvait plus subsister aucun doute : les résultats de 
Djerzinski étaient valides, on pouvait les considérer comme scientifiquement 
démontrés. Les conséquences pratiques, évidemment, étaient vertigineuses : tout 
code génétique, quelle que soit sa complexité, pouvait être réécrit sous une forme 
standard, structurellement stable, inaccessible aux perturbations et aux mutations. 
Toute cellule pouvait donc être dotée d’une capacité infinie de réplications 
successives. Toute espèce animale, aussi évoluée soit-elle, pouvait être 
transformée en une espèce apparentée, reproductible par clonage, et 
immortelle. (Houellebecq, PE 308) 
 
The unquestionable validity, the scientifically demonstrable results of Michel’s theory 
work a Kuhnian paradigm shift (See generally, Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions), a fundamental change in the plan de clivage (to borrow Lévy-Bruhl’s term) 
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by which the world is perceived. The consequences of this change are exceptionally far-
reaching. It really is as if Michel has handed humankind inverter glasses (Kuhn 112-13) 
to correct their perception – the world has figuratively turned upside down.  
Let us perform an accounting of the changes implied by no more than the passage 
just cited. Certain changes go to the nature of epistemology and philosophy, while others 
still reshape both theoretical and applied science. The theories of Pierre Duhem no longer 
apply, where teeming hypotheses and a fear of deciding metaphysical questions meant 
that each theory was no more than an artificial construction among many others of equal 
value and validity. Michel’s work is correct, demonstrably so, and other theories may be 
set aside on that basis. Aucun doute can remain – Descartes is again relegated to the past 
as a new unassailable truth forms a new method. With Descartes go the traditional limits 
of thermodynamics in the face of une forme standard, structurellement stable, 
inaccessible aux perturbations et aux mutations, where toute cellule pouvait donc être 
dotée d’une capacité infinie de réplications successives. If this is to be believed, Michel 
has discovered the perpetual motion machine, the engine that loses no energy in its cycle. 
He has penetrated to the essence of nature to create the infinitely reproductive and 
generative text, and in so doing, has eliminated aging and death. In the discussion of 
Balzac, we cited La Peau de chagrin for a laudatory description of Cuvier in which the 
naturalist’s work created the following effect, among others: “Soudain les marbres 
s’animalisent, la mort se vivifie, le monde se déroule !” For Balzac, Cuvier embodied an 
idealized science in his ability to create a generative discourse, a model that breathed life 
into science, even if the actual science itself had not yet reached this lofty pinnacle.  With 
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Michel’s work, science has finally broken through methodological limits; it has finally 
overcome the need for discursive artificiality in its generative aim. Applied science itself 
is infinitely generative, able to breathe life into marble and animate death itself. The zone 
ever beyond the grasp of medical science – disguised in words like vitalité and mort and 
thoroughly decried by Bernard – no longer exists. Almighty science has swallowed these 
concepts, rendering them no different than any other condition rigorously treatable by 
modern medicine.      
 Michel’s discoveries call into question more than just the limits of 
thermodynamics and traditional medicine, they also profoundly shake the foundations of 
the theory of evolution as proposed by Darwin. If an organism’s genetic code cannot 
change, then that organism cannot evolve by definition. The very variation necessary for 
environmental selection is absent when no mutation can be favored or disfavored. 
Evolutionary dynamism, however random, shifts entirely to non-evolutionary stasis, a set 
of organisms that never change or die. Humans are not the only species affected: Toute 
espèce animale, aussi évoluée soit-elle, pouvait être transformée en une espèce 
apparentée, reproductible par clonage, et immortelle. If the word apparentée is given its 
broadest scope, the new species created by genetic transformation are all related, forming 
a harmonious chain from organism to organism. Michel has discovered the essence of 
living matter through genetics, and has thereby promoted its actual manifestation to 
human reason – l’ordre naturel or la classification naturelle is not a Lamarckian 
construction, but an actual biological reality.  
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The same might equally apply to systems of homologies, where all organisms 
could contain structurally equivalent parts. Cuvier’s deductive method of determining 
entire organisms based on the presence of a few characteristics might finally find 
reflection in reality. (And if Cuvier is sometimes associated with an anti-evolutionary 
perspective, then his theories again finally achieve embodiment here.) Science’s conquest 
in light of Michel’s discoveries is manipulative and transformative. The artificially 
constructed theory becomes empirically observable reality. Under the traditional 
scientific method, concrete, diverse reality had to be transformed into an abstract human 
construction before the latter construction could be fed back into concrete reality as an 
artificial reconstitution of that reality (as well described by Meyerson in Du cheminement 
369-73). All objects were, on some level, dependent on the mediation of thought. If 
Michel enables all species to be transformed as desired, the detour through human 
thought is no longer necessary. Reality is constituted objectively, essentially, without 
need for scientific construct or intellectual feedback loop. Yet subsequent stasis 
backstops science’s initially transformative conquest. By virtue of infinite reproducibility 
in genetic transmission, the entirety of natural organization restabilizes in a permanent 
Linnaean fixity. Species may be related to other species in the broad sense of apparentée, 
but they also form new species in a relation (a parenté) to their prior forms. This one-to-
one transformation is a final bifurcation, all aspects of the organic world conform to 
rigorous definition and classification thereafter. Indestructible, unchanging genetics are 
the key to this classification, the unquestionable locus of essential value in a profound 
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renunciation of Kupiec and Sonigo’s theory which rejects applying talismanic value to 
any particle, physical location, or organizational order (Kupiec and Sonigo 22-33).  
This advance presumably would spell the end of numerous fields of study. In the 
face of entirely determinative genetics, the study of chemistry and physics at any other 
level of organization would seem ineffectual. Neither the whole organism and its 
environment nor the very elementary particles mentioned in the text’s title bear closer 
scrutiny as their behavior is a simple consequence of genetic organization. It is not clear 
what purpose the sociological study of neo-humans would serve if they have infinite 
energy and a shared genetic code at their disposal. And it is even less clear what place 
fields like metaphysics or theology might have. Michel’s theories have finally and fully 
arrogated the traditional place of a deity in the control of energy and life. Those same 
theories, through their stabilization of a shared essence for all beings, leave little room to 
debate the merits of traditional philosophical dichotomies like organic/inorganic, 
universal/particular, abstract/concrete, immaterial/material, essence/existence, 
induction/deduction, intuition/logic, movement/fixity, and any other dichotomy that one 
might imagine. Perhaps the greatest triumph of Michel’s science, though, is the very 
destruction of science itself. What might remain to be learned in the wake of the 
discovery of eternal life and with it, an endless supply of energy? Science is at once a 
commitment to knowledge in its creation and adoption of theories, and a recognition of 
imperfection through the replacement of such theories through observation and 
experimentation. If all organic life may be reduced to a genetic essence, all is arguably 
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known and perfected. Houellebecq’s text offers an example not of just any Kuhnian 
paradigm shift, but perhaps the final such shift.  
 To this point, the solutions presented by scientific advancement in Les particules 
élémentaires and La possibilité d’une île present a certain internal tension. On one hand, 
La possibilité d’une île seems to retain in the post-human species many of the nihilistic 
tendencies present in their human forebears, including the fundamental emptiness of life 
and the eventuality of death. Les particules élémentaires, by contrast, has shattered the 
limits of traditional science in an infinitely generative process. Is there ultimately any 
point of convergence between the two visions of a futuristic, genetically engineered 
species? Is there a concept that serves as an intermediary between the two visions, as a 
synthesis in this dialectic? In a surprisingly redemptive turn, the texts seem to answer this 
question in the affirmative, offering a return to vitalism as a shared endpoint for the 
futuristic species. In Les particules élémentaires, the post-human species finally reveals 
itself in the Epilogue, describing its existence as follows: “Ayant rompu le lien filial qui 
nous rattachait à l’humanité, nous vivons. A l’estimation des hommes, nous vivons 
heureux” (Houellebecq, PE 316). The link with humankind is broken, but the neo-human 
species is still alive. They may not enjoy the same emotional attachment with life as their 
primitive ancestors; they may not suffer death either; but they still carry on in life. The 
observation is all the more unusual in view of their creator Djerzinski’s dual role 
anathema to vitalism – that of the homo faber (Bergson, L’évolution 140) and the homo 
mathematicus (Bachelard, Le nouvel esprit 59). The former is the traditional human 
whose perception primarily serves the aim of action by inventing and promoting the 
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manufacture of tools. Michel fulfills just such a role through his genetically altered cows 
and his grander theories to reengineer mankind. This traditional construction inevitably 
focuses on logic and rigidity to the detriment of the very intuition and devenir that 
constitute life. Bachelard’s view proposes homo mathematicus as successor to homo 
faber, shifting the functionality of the latter to the more abstract space of mathematical 
operations to the end of discovering a noumenal truth. Again, Michel fits this mold, as he 
proposes scientific and mathematical theories to model marital love, free will, and other 
social interactions, presumably to the end of discovering some as-yet unknown 
noumenon. Despite this (potentially strained) application of mathematics, it would be 
difficult to argue that homo mathematicus is any more attentive to the movements of 
immeasurable intuition and the development of life than his earlier counterpart homo 
faber. Michel should be the anti-vitalist, and yet, his creations attest to the ongoing 
importance of irreducible life.       
 The same tendency seems to be in evidence for Daniel 25 in La possibilité d’une 
île. As he concludes his pilgrimage to the area where Lanzarote may once have poked up 
from the ocean, he settles into a tropical existence where each succeeding day is like the 
last, save for minor changes in the configuration of the clouds. In the very last line of his 
text (and the last line of the text generally), he notes: “Mes rêves étaient peuplés de 
présences émotives. J’étais, je n’étais plus. La vie était réelle.” (Houellebecq, La 
possibilité d’une île 447). Perhaps the présences émotives counterbalance the lack of 
emotion felt by the neo-humans in Les particules élémentaires, but a similar monotony 
remains – a monotony characterized by the apparent collapse of the final sixty years of 
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his life into the binary phrase j’étais, je n’étais plus. Nothing is so notable during this 
period that Daniel feels the need to mention it. Once again, the human mind folds up the 
fan of time – in this case, to a remarkable degree – thereby omitting movement and 
reducing process to a few short words. Yet for the lack of emotion of the neo-humans in 
Les particules élémentaires and the lack of detail for Daniel 25 in La possibilité d’une île, 
life still remains in each case, as a real, irreducible point. Life is the possible island, a 
form of information maintained far from equilibrium in the chaotic cloud of non-organic 
matter surrounding the living organism. It is the Darwinian species that avoids extinction 
due to its insularity and inaccessibility to competition. It is at once static – the lack of 
evolutionary impulse affecting the organism adapted to its island, the organism whose 
genetic code has not changed in 25 versions – and dynamic – the island of Lanzarote is 
volcanic, an ever-changing mass of viscous lava adding new layers from within and 
without, while Daniel 25 breaks away from his fenced-in compound to traverse hundreds 
of miles on foot (See Bergson, L’évolution 129, “La vie en général est la mobilité 
même”). Life is information – the bits passed back and forth between Daniel 25 and his 
correspondents, the conscious machinality of Daniel and his fellow post-humans – and 
energy – a reservoir stocked to fuel continuous participation with the environment in the 
location that was Lanzarote. Yet life for Daniel 25 and the neo-humans in Les particules 
élémentaires seems to be something more, something that obstinately refuses to be 
measured as simple information and energy (Serres, Hermès IV 29 notes the end of 
vitalism in the face of information and energy). It may be a form of perfection. The area 
where Daniel 25 ends his journey (and where the Elohimites established their plan for 
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spiritual conquest) once witnessed Aronnax and Nemo crawling its depths in the Nautilus 
(Verne, Vingt mille lieues 455-57) and happening upon the ruins of Atlantis. The utopian 
Atlantis has reemerged from those depths, perhaps, in upward solidifying growth that 
favorably evokes the point oméga, the one remaining post-human having surpassed the 
natural tendencies of the entire universe around him. Life may also be a form of 
indetermination - “Le rôle de la vie est d’insérer de l’indétermination dans la matière” 
(Bergson, L’évolution 127). This “réservoir d’indétermination” is not the heat source for 
Carnot’s engine, as Serres would have it, but a bifurcation in the Prigoginian sense, the 
decision to leave a pre-plotted life in a secured compound to brave the uncontrolled 
world, and in so doing, become an integral actor in it. The irreducible essential of life is 
finally real. No enchanted skin or magic word could make it so; it required the advent of 
perfected genetic replication. Science, in Houellebecq’s text, may be more than 
destructive in its advancement; it may be redemptive for the world that it creates. Real 
life might be evidence of an exalted nouvelle alliance after all.  
   This probably goes too far, though; and even in the reminder of life’s reality for 
advanced humans, Houellebecq’s texts offer a check on any vitalist poetic élan. Daniel 
25’s location remains indeterminate at the end of his text, as “Lanzarote pouvait être 
demeurée une presqu’île, être devenue une île, ou avoir complètement disparu” 
(Houellebecq, La possibilité d’une île 436). Error has crept back into the equation, as the 
planet’s tendency to a hybrid equilibrium of parcels of land and scattered small bodies of 
water makes it impossible for Daniel to get his bearings. The volcano and its radiating 
reservoir of heat and dynamically constructive fluidity seems to have disappeared.  There 
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is no longer an origin by which other points might be measured; there is no source of 
spiritual energy; there is no island at all. The only island of information that remains 
possible amid the exaggerated monotony of the natural environment is Daniel 25 himself. 
Life is possible, but it is only a possibility among other options, a more or less probable 
outcome among discrete outcomes. A certain degree of discontinuity remains in the face 
of vitalism’s proposed continuity. Even in Daniel’s case, where life is real, it is described 
by resort to a past tense – Daniel was, he ceased to be. Life was real. The very last word 
of the book is a passage to the limit at the edge of life and death. The hand holding the 
pen is necessarily animated as it writes the words, but the real last word will belong to 
decay and entropy.
39
  
 
                                                        
39
 The hand writing itself at the conclusion of Houellebecq’s text recalls Escher’s depiction of that 
very image. It is yet another example of the “Strange Loop” phenomenon oft-illustrated by 
Hofstadter in Gödel, Escher, Bach.  
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CONCLUSION 
 In view of the four authors studied here, we may now proceed to provide a brief 
summary of the various movements, both epistemological and scientific, captured in the 
texts. With a review of two critical variables – the text’s positive or negative coding of 
science, and the text’s relation to the esprit préscientifique imagined by Bachelard – a 
complete table of the four permutations of these variables is immediately evident. To aid 
in visualizing this taxonomy, a Karnaugh map - a form of tabulation commonly used in 
digital logic to represent combinations of various binary outcomes (Brown and Vranesic 
144-52) – will be employed.40 As the textual attitudes both towards science as positively 
or negatively coded and towards the esprit préscientifique are offered here as binary 
variables (even if they could be arranged with a bit more nuance according to a 
spectrum), each will occupy one side of the table in their two possible outcomes. The 
blank table will therefore look as follows: 
L’esprit préscientifique → 
Coding of science ↓ 
Text evidences l’esprit 
préscientifique 
Text does not evidence 
l’esprit préscientifique 
Text positively codes 
science 
  
Text negatively codes 
science 
  
Table 1: Blank Karnaugh Map Illustrating Two Dimensions of Scientific Approach in Literature 
 
Balzac’s La Peau de chagrin clearly evidences l’esprit préscientifique, as has been 
shown at length here, through its use of vitalistic unknowability and its reliance on 
                                                        
40
 A Karnaugh map is also known as a “contingency table” in statistics.  
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mystical, alchemistic concepts. La Peau de chagrin also plainly codes science positively 
through its description of the endless possibilities engendered by the ever-generative 
works of Cuvier. Both Le Ventre de Paris and Le Roman expérimental tend to continue 
the positive coding of science imagined by Balzac, this time in a renewed faith in 
Bernard’s experimental method as applied to the novel. Yet it is this very move to the 
Bernardian that implies a complete rejection of l’esprit préscientifique and its reliance on 
fundamentally undefinable variety. In Queneau’s textual space, the rejection of modern 
doctrines like relativity in favor of a variety of eternal returns and passage à la limite 
suggests at once a playful adhesion to l’esprit préscientifique coupled with a negative 
view of modern science when matched against the freedom required by comedy. Science 
remains negatively coded in Les particules élémentaires and La possiblité d’une île, if in 
a somewhat different manner than Queneau, as it serves as a discursive technique to drain 
human existence of any form of mystical or symbolic value. To accomplish this objective 
most effectively, the text adopts a thoroughly modern scientific discourse that is as 
cutting as any scalpel Bernard ever wielded.     
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In view of the foregoing, this is how the previously blank table looks when 
populated: 
L’esprit préscientifique → 
Coding of science ↓ 
Text evidences l’esprit 
préscientifique 
Text does not evidence 
l’esprit préscientifique 
Text positively codes 
science 
Balzac Zola 
Text negatively codes 
science 
Queneau Houellebecq 
Table 2: Completed Karnaugh Map Illustrating Two Dimensions of the Scientific Approach of 
Balzac, Zola, Queneau, and Houellebecq 
 
The chronological trip from Balzac through Houellebecq, when traced through the table, 
forms a letter Z. It is in part a curious coincidence that flows from the particular table 
layout chosen, of course - had the variables been arranged differently, the trace could 
have followed a backwards Z, an N, or a backwards N. Yet in each of these cases, the 
tortuous nature of the study is underlined – there is no simple straight chain in series 
through the authors studied here, but a zigzag revealing the complexities of an internal 
divergence ever renewed and reimagined. With this rejection of Cartesianism evident 
from a basic logical (and theoretically Cartesian) mapping, perhaps literature serves a 
reminder that it is not a space of pure and ever-accreting science, but a site for eddies and 
clinamina that break from science’s progressive flow. The Z is independently interesting, 
however. Coincidentially, it has a place in Balzac, begins the name Zola, and symbolizes 
the castrato axis in Barthes’ reading of Sarrasine. More importantly, in its rarity of use, it 
is an island of negentropy in an anonymous sea of vowels and more popular consonants. 
In that respect, it serves as a further form of eddy away far from the equilibrium of 
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language. Ideally, this Dissertation’s Z serves the same purpose, a gathering of 
information temporarily away from equilibrium (and awaiting the total entropy of the end 
of days imagined in the final lines of Les derniers jours or the post-human landscape of a 
Houellebecq novel). And Z is a final letter for the near final words of this Dissertation.    
If Houellebecq’s texts are the point of conclusion here, they obviously should not 
be viewed as the point oméga as to the application of science and epistemology to 
literature. The Z sketched here might come to wrap back around itself, perhaps in the 
eminently scientific forms of a caduceus or an enclosed double helix. What has been 
revealed here is less a progressive march towards an ultimate end – like that of science 
itself – and more the endless oscillations of a pendulum pitting a totalizing view against a 
view that values parts and their sum, an intuitive view against a strictly logical view, a 
view highlighting the movement in time and between categories against a more rigid 
view that populates a methodologically rigorous taxonomy. Almost two hundred years 
after the debate between Cuvier and Saint-Hilaire discussed at the outset of this 
Dissertation, the same methodological fault lines still exist, even if they can now be 
applied to very different material – be it the difference between Ostvald and Boltzmann, 
the difference between Bergson and Monod, or the difference between Balzac and 
Houellebecq. Such perhaps is the central argument here – not to pick a side in this 
perpetual and perpetually reapplied debate, but to show that this debate continues 
dynamically today, and will undoubtedly continue without resolution. For as long as 
humans lack the infinite energy to know everything, there will always be a place for 
voices dissenting against current structures and rules in an appeal to the often mystical 
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unknown. For as long as human judgment relies on arbitrary divisions, there will always 
be a place for those who question such categories, and who wish to highlight the 
instability of such categories, along with the evolution and dynamic movement that such 
categories should not ignore. The Balzacian answer to Houellebecq will undoubtedly 
come in due course.    
Just as the Introduction here closed with an exemplary scene from nineteenth-
century French literature, so too will this Dissertation close with one of the lessons of 
another scene in nineteenth-century French literature. Instead of Verne, however, we 
shall shift to Dumas’ Le Vicomte de Bragelonne. When the bourgeois innkeeper Cropole 
– having abandoned the original, more Italian form of his name, Cropoli – seeks to have a 
sign painted for his inn, he hires his late father’s protégé, the failed artist Pittrino. 
Pittrino, in an artistic élan inconsistent with his prior work, produced an appealing, if 
racy, tableau of sirens to accompany the inn’s name, Aux Médicis. (Dumas, Vicomte 122-
24). A local dignitary subsequently brings to Cropole and Pittrino’s attention that the 
combination of the inn’s name and the risqué content of the tableau might cause a scandal 
if royal authorities saw members of their family depicted so scantily clad. After debating 
whether the inn’s name or the tableau’s content should be modified, Pittrino and Cropole 
settled on a change to the tableau, replacing the previously scandalous content with a 
drawing of six doctors – a wordplay on the meaning of médicis in Italian. This brief scene 
undoubtedly highlights a number of interesting theoretical themes – from paternity to 
aesthetics to a conflict between language and visual depiction. But for now, let us limit 
commentary to the outcome - where the image of six doctors serves not as a symbol of 
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immutable science, but as an outlet both aesthetic and comedic. This recalls Balzac’s four 
doctors called to Raphaël’s bedside, offered not as a guarantee of the infallibility of 
science, but as a parody of its institutional oddity and its necessary limits. Science can be 
a stilted and rule-bound lens that fits poorly in the space of literature, but it also can be a 
critical point of connection to both a deeper textual understanding and to other aesthetic, 
metaphysical, and theological spaces beyond the pure science itself. This Dissertation has 
sought that latter end – metaphorically, to go beyond the mere picture of the doctors on 
the Aux Médicis sign to place that sign in a broader context and more open dialogue with 
other disciplines – to apply science and thereby, on some level, to transcend it.       
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